本文關(guān)鍵詞： 民間借貸 抵押擔(dān)保 社會(huì)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò) 聲譽(yù) 信號(hào)傳遞　出處：《寧波大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：面對農(nóng)戶缺乏抵押物以及抵押物與金融機(jī)構(gòu)的要求不匹配的現(xiàn)狀，民間借貸是如何防范風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的？在經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)型期，民間借貸存在的基礎(chǔ)和條件發(fā)生了變化，傳統(tǒng)的以血緣、地緣為基礎(chǔ)的強(qiáng)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)逐漸向以學(xué)緣、業(yè)緣為基礎(chǔ)的不穩(wěn)定的弱關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)過渡，民間借貸是如何應(yīng)對這些變化的？鑒于此，本文從抵押擔(dān)保降低借貸交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)視角出發(fā)，認(rèn)為只要能發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用的，都可以充當(dāng)借貸交易中的擔(dān)保物，即擔(dān)保替代，從而不必要求實(shí)物資產(chǎn)作抵押，這也與民間借貸一般無實(shí)物抵押、高履約率的實(shí)情相符合。也就是說，民間借貸本身存在著有效的抵押擔(dān)保替代機(jī)制或者說隱性擔(dān)保機(jī)制。 基于村莊治理理論，本文首先構(gòu)建了完全信息下民間借貸的運(yùn)行機(jī)制模型，在此基礎(chǔ)上，放寬抵押擔(dān)保條件和范圍，研究民間借貸在不完全信息下的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防控機(jī)制�；趶�(qiáng)、弱社會(huì)關(guān)系以及主動(dòng)、被動(dòng)違約行為的劃分，分別研究了社會(huì)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)在強(qiáng)關(guān)系民間借貸中和聲譽(yù)在弱關(guān)系民間借貸中的抵押擔(dān)保機(jī)制；假設(shè)社會(huì)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)機(jī)制和聲譽(yù)機(jī)制可以有效抑制主動(dòng)違約，利用信號(hào)傳遞博弈模型研究了借款者項(xiàng)目投資規(guī)模的信號(hào)傳遞效應(yīng)對被動(dòng)違約的甄別作用。 本文的主要結(jié)論是： 1、只要能發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用的都可以充當(dāng)借貸交易中的擔(dān)保物，即擔(dān)保替代，，民間借貸的高履約率是因?yàn)槠鋬?nèi)在有效的擔(dān)保替代機(jī)制； 2、民間借貸有三大隱性擔(dān)保機(jī)制，即社會(huì)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)機(jī)制、聲譽(yù)機(jī)制和信號(hào)傳遞機(jī)制。社會(huì)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)機(jī)制在強(qiáng)關(guān)系民間借貸中發(fā)揮著抵押擔(dān)保作用，聲譽(yù)機(jī)制和借方項(xiàng)目投資規(guī)模的信號(hào)傳遞機(jī)制在弱關(guān)系民間借貸中發(fā)揮了抵押擔(dān)保作用； 3、社會(huì)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)機(jī)制通過當(dāng)?shù)匦畔�、同伴選擇、同伴監(jiān)督、多邊懲罰和關(guān)聯(lián)懲罰機(jī)制以及規(guī)范、信念和道德治理機(jī)制發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用。聲譽(yù)機(jī)制通過借貸雙方不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈發(fā)揮聲譽(yù)的評價(jià)以及聲譽(yù)的信息形成和違約懲罰作用。信號(hào)傳遞機(jī)制通過借款者項(xiàng)目投資規(guī)模的信號(hào)傳遞效應(yīng)發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用； 4、本文分別研究了三大擔(dān)保替代機(jī)制，但這并不意味著它們是分別獨(dú)立發(fā)揮作用的，實(shí)際上這三者是同時(shí)發(fā)揮作用的，只是在不同類型的民間借貸中占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位的擔(dān)保機(jī)制不同。
[Abstract]:Facing the situation that farmers lack collateral and the requirements of mortgage and financial institutions do not match, how to prevent the risk of private lending? In the period of economic and social transformation, the foundation and conditions of folk lending have changed, and the traditional strong relationship network based on blood and geography has gradually changed to learning. How does private lending cope with these changes in the transition of unstable weak relational networks based on industry fate? In view of this, this paper from the perspective of mortgage guarantee to reduce the risk of lending transactions, think that as long as they can play the role of information formation and default punishment, they can all act as collateral in the loan transaction, that is, the substitution of security. Thus do not need to ask for real assets as collateral, this also with private loans generally no physical collateral, high compliance rate in line with the truth. That is. Private lending itself has an effective mortgage guarantee alternative mechanism or implicit guarantee mechanism. Based on the theory of village governance, this paper first constructs the operational mechanism model of private lending under complete information, and on this basis, relax the mortgage guarantee conditions and scope. This paper studies the risk prevention and control mechanism of folk lending under incomplete information. Based on strong, weak social relations and active and passive behavior of breach of contract. This paper studies the mortgage guarantee mechanism of social relationship network in strong relation private loan and reputation in weak relation private loan respectively. Assuming that social network mechanism and reputation mechanism can restrain active default effectively, this paper studies the discriminating effect of signal transfer effect of borrower project investment scale on passive default by using signal transfer game model. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: 1. As long as they can play the role of information formation and penalty of breach of contract, they can act as collateral in the loan transaction, that is, the substitution of security. The high performance rate of folk loan is due to its intrinsic and effective guarantee substitution mechanism; 2. There are three implicit guarantee mechanisms in private lending, namely, social network mechanism, reputation mechanism and signal transmission mechanism. Social relationship network mechanism plays a role of mortgage guarantee in strongly related folk lending. The reputation mechanism and the signalling mechanism of the investment scale of the borrower project play the role of mortgage guarantee in the weak relation private loan; 3, social network mechanism through local information, peer selection, peer supervision, multilateral punishment and association punishment mechanisms and norms. The mechanism of belief and moral governance plays the role of information formation and punishment of breach of contract. Reputation mechanism plays the role of reputation evaluation and information formation and punishment of breach of contract through dynamic game of incomplete information between the two parties. The mechanism plays the role of information formation and penalty of default through the signalling effect of borrower project investment scale; 4. This paper studies the three major security substitution mechanisms, but this does not mean that they are acting independently, in fact, these three play a role at the same time. Only in different types of private lending in the dominant position of the guarantee mechanism is different.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：寧波大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4;F224

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