【摘要】：會計穩(wěn)健性是關(guān)于會計盈余確認和計量的一項重要原則,是財務會計研究領域中的一個重要組成部分。在市場經(jīng)濟條件下,會計穩(wěn)健性作為衡量會計信息質(zhì)量的標準之一,不僅能夠抑制企業(yè)管理層高估盈余的動機,還有助于緩解資本市場的信息不對稱,進而降低企業(yè)的融資成本和投資風險。因此,對會計穩(wěn)健性影響因素的研究一直都是國內(nèi)外理論界和實務界廣泛關(guān)注的問題。CEO和CFO作為對會計信息質(zhì)量負最高責任和直接責任的關(guān)鍵高管,根據(jù)高階理論,他們的個人背景特征如性別、年齡、學歷、任期等,無疑都會對會計穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生重要影響。但高管任期與高管其他背景特征相比,是影響企業(yè)財務行為和財務報告質(zhì)量的關(guān)鍵因素。因此,本文認為研究高管任期與會計穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實意義。本文通過理論分析和實證研究相結(jié)合的方法,旨在研究高管任期對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響以及不同公司治理機制對二者關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)作用。在對2009-2016年深滬A股上市公司進行實證檢驗后,本文得出以下結(jié)論:(1)高管(CEO/CFO)現(xiàn)有任期與會計穩(wěn)健性呈倒U型關(guān)系,高管(CEO/CFO)預期任期與會計穩(wěn)健性正相關(guān),并均在國有樣本中表現(xiàn)更加明顯。(2)CEO和CFO任期異質(zhì)性可以提高會計穩(wěn)健性水平,CEO和CFO任期異質(zhì)性程度越高,會計穩(wěn)健性水平越高,CFO任職早于CEO更有利于企業(yè)會計穩(wěn)健性水平的提高,并均在非國有樣本中表現(xiàn)的更加明顯。(3)從全樣本來看,董事會獨立性在高管(CEO/CFO)任期(現(xiàn)有任期、預期任期和兩者任期異質(zhì)性)與會計穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系中沒有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)作用;但在非國有樣本中有正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用。(4)機構(gòu)投資者持股在高管(CEO/CFO)現(xiàn)有任期及CEO與CFO任期異質(zhì)性與會計穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系中有正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用,這一關(guān)系在國有樣本中表現(xiàn)的更加明顯;在高管(CEO/CFO)預期任期與會計穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系中,在全樣本中機構(gòu)投資者沒有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)作用,但在非國有樣本中有正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle of accounting earnings recognition and measurement. It is an important part of financial accounting research field. Under the condition of market economy, accounting conservatism, as one of the standards to measure the quality of accounting information, can not only restrain the motivation of overvaluing earnings of enterprise management, but also help to alleviate the information asymmetry in capital market. Then reduce the financing cost and investment risk of the enterprise. Therefore, the research on the influencing factors of accounting conservatism has always been a widespread concern of the theoretical and practical circles at home and abroad. CEO and CFO, as the key executives with the highest and direct responsibility for the quality of accounting information, are based on the higher order theory. Their personal background, such as gender, age, education, tenure and so on, will undoubtedly have an important impact on accounting conservatism. However, executive tenure is a key factor affecting financial behavior and financial reporting quality compared with other background characteristics of executives. Therefore, the study of the relationship between executive tenure and accounting conservatism has important theoretical and practical significance. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper aims to study the impact of executive tenure on accounting conservatism and the regulatory effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between them. Based on the empirical test of Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share listed companies in 2009-2016, this paper draws the following conclusions: (1) the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is inversely U-shaped in relation to accounting conservatism. The expected tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is positively correlated with accounting conservatism, and both of them are more obvious in state-owned samples. (2) CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity can improve accounting conservatism, and the higher the CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity is, The higher the level of accounting conservatism, the earlier CFO holds office than CEO, which is more favorable to the improvement of accounting conservatism in enterprises, and all of them are more obvious in non-state-owned samples. (3) from the perspective of the whole sample, The independence of the board of directors has no significant moderating role in the relationship between the term of CEO/CFO (current term, expected term and heterogeneity of tenure) and accounting conservatism; But there is a positive regulatory role in the non-state-owned sample. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior management (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. This relationship is more obvious in the state-owned sample; In the relationship between expected tenure of CEO/CFO and accounting conservatism, institutional investors have no significant moderating role in the whole sample, but positive regulation in non-state-owned samples.
【學位授予單位】：桂林電子科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F272.91

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