會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量、盈余管理與企業(yè)投資效率關(guān)系的研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-08-16 07:54
【摘要】:投資活動(dòng)是企業(yè)一項(xiàng)非常重要的價(jià)值活動(dòng),在完美世界里,企業(yè)投資效率取決于企業(yè)投資項(xiàng)目?jī)衄F(xiàn)值的正負(fù),相應(yīng)的,企業(yè)投資支出總額也僅由其面臨的投資機(jī)會(huì)集決定,與其他因素?zé)o關(guān)。但是,在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界里,由于委托代理問(wèn)題及信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題的存在,企業(yè)的投資效率會(huì)受到不同程度的影響,導(dǎo)致投資過(guò)度或投資不足,降低企業(yè)的價(jià)值、損害股東的利益、影響企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。近年來(lái),我國(guó)上市企業(yè)普遍存在非效率投資行為,嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了股東利益和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展。高質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)信息能夠緩解資本市場(chǎng)上的信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題,減少逆向選擇,同時(shí)也能在公司治理中發(fā)揮監(jiān)督、評(píng)價(jià)的功能,緩和企業(yè)的委托代理沖突。雖然,高質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)信息對(duì)企業(yè)非效率投資有抑制作用,但是盈余管理能夠通過(guò)加大代理成本和信息不對(duì)稱扭曲會(huì)計(jì)信息,進(jìn)而對(duì)企業(yè)的投資效率造成影響?梢(jiàn),企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量、盈余管理與投資效率對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)的有效運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)起著重要作用,為了了解他們之間的相互關(guān)系,本文研究了會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量對(duì)投資效率的影響以及會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量與盈余管理的交互作用對(duì)投資效率的影響。本文選取的研究方法為定性分析與定量分析,首先基于經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境、制度環(huán)境對(duì)我國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量與投資狀況進(jìn)行定性分析,然后對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量、盈余管理、投資效率從理論角度進(jìn)行分析,進(jìn)而提出研究假設(shè)。在進(jìn)行假設(shè)檢驗(yàn)的過(guò)程中本文以2013~2014年滬深A(yù)股上市企業(yè)為研究對(duì)象,數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)源為RESSET金融數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù),從中篩選出1306個(gè)樣本數(shù)據(jù)。首先,運(yùn)用DD模型及因子分析法對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià),然后運(yùn)用Jones模型、Richardson模型分別對(duì)盈余管理和投資效率進(jìn)行測(cè)度。最后對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行描述性分析、相關(guān)性分析及回歸分析,檢驗(yàn)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量、盈余管理及投資效率之間的關(guān)系。本文使用Excel 2010軟件對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行整理,Stata 14.0統(tǒng)計(jì)分析軟件對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)我國(guó)非金融上市公司普遍存在投資過(guò)度現(xiàn)象;(2)上市企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量與企業(yè)投資效率之間存在顯著負(fù)相關(guān)性,提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量能夠有效的緩解投資過(guò)度及投資不足;(3)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量與企業(yè)盈余管理的交互作用,能夠增強(qiáng)對(duì)企業(yè)投資過(guò)度的解釋能力;(4)企業(yè)的盈余管理與企業(yè)投資不足之間的相關(guān)性較弱,說(shuō)明盈余管理不是造成企業(yè)投資不足的主要原因。(5)我國(guó)企業(yè)投資狀況總體較好,但是投資過(guò)度行為普遍存在,相比投資不足,我國(guó)的投資過(guò)度狀況更應(yīng)該得到關(guān)注。
[Abstract]:Investment activity is a very important value activity for an enterprise. In a perfect world, the investment efficiency of the enterprise depends on the positive or negative net present value of the enterprise investment project. Accordingly, the total investment expenditure of the enterprise is only determined by the set of investment opportunities it faces. It has nothing to do with other factors. However, in the real world, due to the existence of principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problem, the investment efficiency of enterprises will be affected to varying degrees, resulting in excessive investment or underinvestment, reducing the value of enterprises and harming the interests of shareholders. Affect the long-term development of enterprises. In recent years, China's listed enterprises generally have inefficient investment behavior, which seriously damages the interests of shareholders and the healthy development of macroeconomic. High quality accounting information can alleviate the problem of asymmetric information in the capital market, reduce adverse selection, at the same time, it can also play the role of supervision and evaluation in corporate governance, and ease the principal-agent conflict of enterprises. Although high quality accounting information can inhibit the inefficient investment of enterprises, earnings management can distort accounting information by increasing agency cost and asymmetric information, which will have an impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises. It can be seen that the quality of accounting information, earnings management and investment efficiency play an important role in the effective operation of the capital market. This paper studies the influence of accounting information quality on investment efficiency and the interaction between accounting information quality and earnings management on investment efficiency. The research methods selected in this paper are qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Firstly, based on the economic environment and institutional environment, the quality of accounting information and the investment situation in China are qualitatively analyzed, then the quality of accounting information and earnings management are analyzed. Investment efficiency is analyzed from the angle of theory, and then the research hypothesis is put forward. In the course of hypothesis testing, 1306 samples were selected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed enterprises from 2013 to 2014. The data were derived from RESSET financial database. Firstly, the quality of accounting information is evaluated by DD model and factor analysis method, and then the earnings management and investment efficiency are measured by Jones model and Richardson model. Finally, the relationship between accounting information quality, earnings management and investment efficiency is tested by descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis. In this paper, Excel 2010 software is used to analyze the data. The results of this study are as follows: (1) overinvestment exists in non-financial listed companies in China, (2) there is a significant negative correlation between the quality of accounting information and the investment efficiency of listed companies. Improving the quality of accounting information can effectively alleviate the overinvestment and underinvestment; (3) the interaction between accounting information quality and earnings management, (4) the correlation between earnings management and underinvestment of enterprises is weak, which indicates that earnings management is not the main reason for the underinvestment of enterprises. (5) the investment situation of enterprises in China is generally good. However, excessive investment behavior is common and should be paid more attention to than insufficient investment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:江蘇科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2016
【分類號(hào)】:F275
,
本文編號(hào):2185376
[Abstract]:Investment activity is a very important value activity for an enterprise. In a perfect world, the investment efficiency of the enterprise depends on the positive or negative net present value of the enterprise investment project. Accordingly, the total investment expenditure of the enterprise is only determined by the set of investment opportunities it faces. It has nothing to do with other factors. However, in the real world, due to the existence of principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problem, the investment efficiency of enterprises will be affected to varying degrees, resulting in excessive investment or underinvestment, reducing the value of enterprises and harming the interests of shareholders. Affect the long-term development of enterprises. In recent years, China's listed enterprises generally have inefficient investment behavior, which seriously damages the interests of shareholders and the healthy development of macroeconomic. High quality accounting information can alleviate the problem of asymmetric information in the capital market, reduce adverse selection, at the same time, it can also play the role of supervision and evaluation in corporate governance, and ease the principal-agent conflict of enterprises. Although high quality accounting information can inhibit the inefficient investment of enterprises, earnings management can distort accounting information by increasing agency cost and asymmetric information, which will have an impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises. It can be seen that the quality of accounting information, earnings management and investment efficiency play an important role in the effective operation of the capital market. This paper studies the influence of accounting information quality on investment efficiency and the interaction between accounting information quality and earnings management on investment efficiency. The research methods selected in this paper are qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Firstly, based on the economic environment and institutional environment, the quality of accounting information and the investment situation in China are qualitatively analyzed, then the quality of accounting information and earnings management are analyzed. Investment efficiency is analyzed from the angle of theory, and then the research hypothesis is put forward. In the course of hypothesis testing, 1306 samples were selected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed enterprises from 2013 to 2014. The data were derived from RESSET financial database. Firstly, the quality of accounting information is evaluated by DD model and factor analysis method, and then the earnings management and investment efficiency are measured by Jones model and Richardson model. Finally, the relationship between accounting information quality, earnings management and investment efficiency is tested by descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis. In this paper, Excel 2010 software is used to analyze the data. The results of this study are as follows: (1) overinvestment exists in non-financial listed companies in China, (2) there is a significant negative correlation between the quality of accounting information and the investment efficiency of listed companies. Improving the quality of accounting information can effectively alleviate the overinvestment and underinvestment; (3) the interaction between accounting information quality and earnings management, (4) the correlation between earnings management and underinvestment of enterprises is weak, which indicates that earnings management is not the main reason for the underinvestment of enterprises. (5) the investment situation of enterprises in China is generally good. However, excessive investment behavior is common and should be paid more attention to than insufficient investment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:江蘇科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2016
【分類號(hào)】:F275
,
本文編號(hào):2185376
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