本文選題：腐敗 + 公共支出　； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：改革開放三十年來,中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)保持高速增長(zhǎng),同時(shí)公共支出也迅速增長(zhǎng),并且在我國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值中所占的比重也越來越大,但同時(shí)中國(guó)較為嚴(yán)重的腐敗問題也漸漸成為整個(gè)社會(huì)關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。一般來講,腐敗發(fā)生于公共支出領(lǐng)域,經(jīng)濟(jì)水平較發(fā)達(dá)的地區(qū)腐敗程度相對(duì)較低。中國(guó)卻出現(xiàn)了高腐敗與高經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的現(xiàn)象。本文的主要內(nèi)容是研究腐敗如何通過公共支出途徑來作用于我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的。本文首先深入分析我國(guó)腐敗和公共支出的現(xiàn)狀、特點(diǎn),從理論上分析了我國(guó)腐敗通過公共支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響機(jī)制,在此基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建計(jì)量模型,探求我國(guó)腐敗通過公共支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響。其次,本文的實(shí)證分析采用我國(guó)31個(gè)省份1994-2012年的數(shù)據(jù),通過兩步實(shí)證研究來驗(yàn)證理論假設(shè)。第一步,經(jīng)過豪斯曼檢驗(yàn)后,采用固定相應(yīng)回歸來驗(yàn)證腐敗對(duì)公共支出的影響,得出腐敗擴(kuò)大了公共支出規(guī)模,扭曲公共支出結(jié)構(gòu)即腐敗擴(kuò)大了經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)支出和行政管理支出,減少了教科文衛(wèi)支出和國(guó)防支出的計(jì)量結(jié)果,基本上與理論機(jī)理相符。第二部,在Barro的經(jīng)典內(nèi)生經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模型中嵌入腐敗這一變量,并采用Hansen的門檻回歸的計(jì)量方法進(jìn)行回歸。計(jì)量結(jié)果表明,公共支出規(guī)模和各類公共支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響均存在腐敗的門檻效應(yīng)：公共支出規(guī)模對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響存在腐敗的雙重門檻,隨著腐敗程度的加劇,公共支出規(guī)模對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)作用由促進(jìn)作用變?yōu)椴伙@著再變?yōu)橐种谱饔茫唤?jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響存在腐敗的單一門檻,當(dāng)腐敗程度較低是,經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)支出促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),當(dāng)腐敗程度較高時(shí),經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)影響不顯著；教科文衛(wèi)支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響存在腐敗的雙重門檻,隨著腐敗程度的加劇,教科文衛(wèi)支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的作用由促進(jìn)作用變?yōu)椴伙@著再變?yōu)橐种谱饔�；�?guó)防支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響存在腐敗的單一門檻,當(dāng)腐敗程度較低時(shí),國(guó)防支出促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),當(dāng)腐敗程度較高時(shí),國(guó)防支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)影響不顯著。行政管理支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響存在腐敗的單一門檻,當(dāng)腐敗程度較低時(shí),行政管理支出對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)影響不顯著,當(dāng)腐敗程度較高時(shí),行政管理支出抑制經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。最后,在理論和實(shí)證分析的基礎(chǔ)上,針對(duì)腐敗通過公共支作用于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Over the past 30 years of reform and opening up, China's economy has maintained rapid growth, while public expenditure has also increased rapidly, and it also accounts for an increasingly large proportion of China's gross domestic product. But at the same time, the more serious corruption in China has gradually become the focus of the whole society. Generally speaking, corruption occurs in the field of public expenditure, and the degree of corruption is relatively low in economically developed areas. However, China has a high level of corruption and high economic growth. The main content of this paper is to study how corruption acts on China's economic growth through the way of public expenditure. Firstly, this paper analyzes the current situation and characteristics of corruption and public expenditure in China, and theoretically analyzes the mechanism of the influence of corruption on economic growth through public expenditure, on the basis of which a measurement model is constructed. To explore the impact of corruption on economic growth through public expenditure. Secondly, the empirical analysis of this paper uses the data from 1994 to 2012 from 31 provinces in China, and verifies the theoretical hypothesis through two-step empirical research. The first step, after the Hausmann test, uses fixed regression to verify the influence of corruption on public expenditure. It is concluded that corruption expands the scale of public expenditure, and distorts the structure of public expenditure, that is, corruption expands economic construction expenditure and administrative expenditure. The results of reducing the expenditure of education, science, culture and health and national defense are basically consistent with the theory and mechanism. In the second part, the variable of corruption is embedded in Barro's classical endogenous economic growth model, and Hansen's threshold regression method is used for regression. The results show that both the scale of public expenditure and the influence of all kinds of public expenditure on economic growth have the threshold effect of corruption: the impact of scale of public expenditure on economic growth has a double threshold of corruption, and with the increase of the degree of corruption, The influence of economic construction expenditure on economic growth has a single threshold of corruption. When the degree of corruption is low, economic construction expenditure promotes economic growth. When the degree of corruption is high, the influence of economic construction expenditure on economic growth is not significant, and the impact of education, science, culture and health expenditure on economic growth has a double threshold of corruption, as the degree of corruption intensifies, The effect of education, science, culture and health expenditure on economic growth has changed from promoting function to not significant effect to restraining effect. There is a single threshold of corruption in the influence of national defense expenditure on economic growth. When the degree of corruption is low, national defense expenditure promotes economic growth. When corruption is high, defense spending has no significant impact on economic growth. There is a single threshold of corruption in the influence of administrative expenditure on economic growth. When the degree of corruption is low, the impact of administrative expenditure on economic growth is not significant, and when the degree of corruption is high, administrative expenditure inhibits economic growth. Finally, on the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations on corruption acting on economic growth through public branches.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45
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本文編號(hào)：2043987