本文選題：風險分擔 + 不完全合同理論�。� 參考：《天津理工大學》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：合理的風險分擔對項目管理績效的促進作用已經(jīng)在理論界與實務界得到共識。然而,工程實踐中的風險分擔仍存在著下列問題:(1)業(yè)主普遍認為在讓承包商承擔風險的過程中,給予其相匹配的經(jīng)濟收益就能保證其風險承擔的積極性,卻忽視了風險分擔受風險承擔者行為因素——風險偏好的影響;(2)大多數(shù)實際工作者都認為風險分擔就是在締約階段將風險一次分擔完備,而對由于工程項目合同不完全的原因而導致的項目執(zhí)行過程中風險分擔方案經(jīng)常需要調整這一現(xiàn)象卻較少考慮。上述問題的有效解決能夠促使項目中更加科學、合理的風險分擔的制定,對于減少我國建筑業(yè)由于發(fā)承包之間關于風險分擔問題產(chǎn)生的糾紛具有重要意義。本文在文獻研究的基礎上,將7個引起合同價格調整的風險界定為研究對象,在風險分擔方案的制定過程中,引入發(fā)承包雙方的風險偏好,并制定了對于上述風險分擔實施效率的保障制度,同時,對于事后各類原因引起的風險分擔方案調整,確定了相對應的適合調整機制。本文主要研究內容包括以下三個方面:第一,在文獻研究的基礎上,確定了風險分擔指標體系,運用模糊集理論與TOPSIS技術,開發(fā)了風險分擔定量模型,運用模糊語義轉化技術將業(yè)主方的風險偏好加入到風險分擔方案進行過程中。同時,將本模型確定的各類風險的分擔比例與業(yè)主合同類型選擇建立了聯(lián)系。通過具體案例展示了該模型的計算流程,證實了模型的有效性,并對項目參與方不同風險偏好水平下的風險分擔方案進行了對比,為業(yè)主風險分擔決策的制定提供建議。第二,提出發(fā)承包雙方可以在合同談判階段加入具有激勵性與約束性的條款保障風險分擔方案實施的效率。通過對業(yè)主單位與承包商單位的共計17人進行訪談,收集了具有風險分擔效率保障作用的激勵性與約束性條款集。結果表明:(1)雙方可以在合同談判階段加入經(jīng)濟激勵類、基于承包商權利保障類的激勵性條款正向保障風險分擔的實施效率;(2)加入經(jīng)濟懲罰類、清晰界定合同內容類的約束性條款反向保障風險分擔的實施效率。第三,通過對7個項目實施過程中發(fā)生風險分擔調整的案例進行分析,識別了引起風險分擔方案調整的常見原因,分析了風險分擔的調整方式,建立了風險分擔調整的引起原因與調整方式之間的聯(lián)系,構建了風險分擔調整策略。結果表明:(1)應首先采用承包商提出主動變更申請等方式避免受到狀態(tài)變化的損失;(2)狀態(tài)變化發(fā)生后,由于初始風險分擔方案不適用或初始風險分擔未規(guī)定導致風險分擔方案需要調整,可采用包括變更方式、補充協(xié)議方式、索賠方式等的再談判機制進行調整;(3)初始風險分擔的規(guī)定不明確引起雙方爭議,可采用以協(xié)商和解為主的自我履行方式進行調整;(4)運用自我履約機制為未解決爭議后,可采用第三方履行機制進行調整。研究成果將構建嵌入雙方風險偏好的風險分擔定量模型,同時形成風險分擔效率保障制度策略集,從而形成更加科學與合理的風險分擔方案;并建立發(fā)承包雙方風險分擔調整策略,進而有利于減少工程實際中由于風險分擔調整產(chǎn)生的糾紛。
[Abstract]:The role of reasonable risk sharing in the promotion of project management performance has been recognized in both the theoretical and practical circles. However, the following problems still exist in the risk sharing in engineering practice: (1) the owners generally believe that in the process of making the contractor undertake the risk, it can guarantee the enthusiasm of the risk taking by giving it a matched economic benefit. It is ignored that risk sharing is affected by risk bearer's behavior factor - risk preference; (2) most of the actual workers think risk sharing is to share the risk in a contracting stage, and the risk sharing scheme often needs to be adjusted in the process of project execution due to incomplete project contract. The effective solution of the above problems can lead to more scientific and reasonable risk sharing in the project, which is of great significance for reducing the disputes arising from the risk sharing between the construction industry in China. On the basis of literature research, this paper will bring 7 risk circles that can cause the contract price to be adjusted. As the research object, in the process of risk sharing scheme, the risk preference of the two parties is introduced, and the guarantee system for the efficiency of the risk sharing is formulated. At the same time, the corresponding adjustment mechanism is determined for the adjustment of the risk sharing scheme caused by various reasons. The main contents of this paper include the main contents of this paper. The next three aspects: first, on the basis of literature research, the risk sharing index system is determined. Fuzzy set theory and TOPSIS technology are used to develop the risk sharing quantitative model. The fuzzy semantic transformation technology is used to add the risk preference of the owner to the risk sharing scheme. At the same time, the risk of the model is determined. The share ratio has established the connection with the type selection of the owner's contract type. The calculation flow of the model is demonstrated through a specific case, the validity of the model is confirmed, and the risk sharing scheme under different risk preference levels of the project participants is compared, and the proposal for the establishment of the owner's risk sharing decision is provided. Second, the two sides of the contract are put forward. The efficiency of guaranteeing the implementation of the risk sharing scheme can be guaranteed by adding incentive and restrictive clauses at the stage of the contract negotiation. Through interviews with 17 people in the employer and contractor units, the incentive and restrictive terms of the risk sharing efficiency are collected. The results show that: (1) both parties can negotiate in the contract. At the stage of economic incentive, the incentive clause based on Contractor's rights guarantee is positive to guarantee the efficiency of risk sharing; (2) join the economic punishment category, clearly define the restrictive clauses of the contract content category and ensure the efficiency of risk sharing. Third, through the case of risk sharing adjustment in the implementation of the 7 projects An example is made to identify the common reasons for the adjustment of the risk sharing scheme, analyze the adjustment methods of risk sharing, establish the connection between the causes of the risk sharing and adjustment, and construct the risk sharing adjustment strategy. The results show that: (1) first, the contractor should put forward the active change application and so on. To the loss of state change; (2) after the change of state, since the initial risk sharing scheme is not applicable or the initial risk sharing does not lead to the need to adjust the risk sharing scheme, the re negotiation mechanism, including the mode of change, the mode of supplemental agreement, the way of claim, and so on, can be adjusted. (3) the provisions of the initial risk sharing are not clear. The dispute can be adjusted by the way of self fulfillment based on negotiation and reconciliation. (4) the implementation mechanism of the third party can be adjusted by the implementation mechanism of self compliance. The research results will build a quantitative model of risk sharing in the risk preference of both sides, and form a risk sharing efficiency guarantee system strategy set at the same time. A more scientific and reasonable risk sharing scheme is formed, and the risk sharing adjustment strategy of the two parties is set up, which will help to reduce the disputes arising from the risk sharing and adjustment in the engineering practice.

【學位授予單位】：天津理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：TU723

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本文編號：1778367