管理防御對企業(yè)資本結構調整速度的影響研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-13 18:25
【摘要】：自從公司所有權與經營權相分離之后,股東與經理人之間的代理問題成為學術研究的重點課題,這一問題由詹森和麥克林在“代理成本理論”中首次提出。隨著公司治理的深入,在傳統(tǒng)代理問題上如經理人濫用現(xiàn)金流量、構建事實上的“經理人帝國”等,已有大量文獻進行相關性研究并取得有效成果,能夠有針對性地對企業(yè)實踐活動中的治理問題進行有效借鑒,但在傳統(tǒng)代理問題之上,關于經理人職位沖突下的經理人私利行為,稱之為“經理人管理防御”問題,我國研究尚處于起步階段,并沒有形成一套系統(tǒng)性的理論能夠對企業(yè)運行產生有效借鑒意義。本文基于經理人管理防御假說下對管理防御與企業(yè)資本結構調整速度之間的關系具體從以下五個方面進行分析,在文章第一部分對所研究問題的相關背景進行分析,具體闡述本文研究的主要內容、研究特色與創(chuàng)新點。第二部分為相關文獻綜述,對國內外圍繞這一問題所得出的研究結論進行評述,并以此為基礎探究本文所要研究問題的切入點。第三部分為理論分析部分,通過對經理人管理防御動機與影響因素分析對經理人管理防御對企業(yè)資本結構調整速度影響的作用機理進行理論探索。在第四部分,構建防御動機驅動下經理人資本結構調整決策的博弈模型,分析不同股權集中狀況下公司股權結構對其資本結構調整動力的影響,探索出管理防御對企業(yè)資本結構調整速度影響的影響路徑,為后文相關研究奠定理論基礎。第五部分通過構建管理防御對企業(yè)資本結構調整速度影響的線性回歸模型,以兩大主板上市公司2012年12月31日至2016年12月31日財務數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,將其分為高負債樣本與低負債樣本分別進行多元線性回歸分析,驗證本文所提出的相關假設。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),經理人管理防御對企業(yè)資本結構調整速度具有顯著影響,在高負債公司與低負債公司中,基于經理人管理防御程度的不同,這種影響作用呈現(xiàn)出不同的影響效用,這一研究結論的發(fā)現(xiàn),為緩解股東與經理人之間委托代理問題與提升公司治理效率奠定基礎,同時,也為完善我國國有企業(yè)內部監(jiān)督機制與強化經理人市場競爭機制提供政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since the separation of corporate ownership and management right, the agency problem between shareholders and managers has become a key issue in academic research. This problem is first proposed by Jansen and Mclean in the "agency cost theory". With the deepening of corporate governance, the fact that managers abuse cash flow on the traditional agency problems is a fact. "Manager Empire" and so on, there have been a large number of literature related research and effective results, can be targeted to the effective reference to the governance problems in the enterprise practice, but on the traditional agency problem, the manager's private profit under the manager position conflict is called "manager management defense" problem. In this paper, the relationship between management defense and capital structure adjustment is analyzed from the following five aspects. In the first part of the article, the research on the relationship between management defense and enterprise capital structure adjustment is analyzed. The relevant background of the question is analyzed, the main content of the study, the research characteristics and the innovation point are elaborated. The second part is related literature review, commenting on the research conclusions surrounding this problem at home and abroad, and taking this as the basis to explore the breakthrough point of this paper. The third part is the theoretical analysis part, through which it is a theoretical analysis part. This paper makes a theoretical exploration of the mechanism of manager management defense motivation and influence factors on the effect mechanism of manager management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure. In the fourth part, we construct the game model of manager capital structure adjustment decision driven by defensive motivation, and analyze the ownership structure of the company under the absence of ownership concentration. The influence of capital structure adjustment motivation, explore the influence path of management defense on the speed of enterprise capital structure adjustment, lay a theoretical foundation for the related research. The fifth part, by constructing the linear regression model of the influence of management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure, the two major board listed companies from December 31, 2012 to 2016. In December 31st, the financial data were divided into high liability samples and low debt samples, which were divided into multiple linear regression analysis to verify the relevant hypotheses proposed in this paper. The difference in the degree of human management defences shows different effects. The discovery of this research conclusion lays the foundation for alleviating the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers and improving the efficiency of corporate governance. At the same time, it also provides a policy for improving the internal supervision mechanism of the state-owned enterprises and strengthening the market competition mechanism of the managers in China. Suggestions.
【學位授予單位】：西安理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51
本文編號：2120345
[Abstract]:Since the separation of corporate ownership and management right, the agency problem between shareholders and managers has become a key issue in academic research. This problem is first proposed by Jansen and Mclean in the "agency cost theory". With the deepening of corporate governance, the fact that managers abuse cash flow on the traditional agency problems is a fact. "Manager Empire" and so on, there have been a large number of literature related research and effective results, can be targeted to the effective reference to the governance problems in the enterprise practice, but on the traditional agency problem, the manager's private profit under the manager position conflict is called "manager management defense" problem. In this paper, the relationship between management defense and capital structure adjustment is analyzed from the following five aspects. In the first part of the article, the research on the relationship between management defense and enterprise capital structure adjustment is analyzed. The relevant background of the question is analyzed, the main content of the study, the research characteristics and the innovation point are elaborated. The second part is related literature review, commenting on the research conclusions surrounding this problem at home and abroad, and taking this as the basis to explore the breakthrough point of this paper. The third part is the theoretical analysis part, through which it is a theoretical analysis part. This paper makes a theoretical exploration of the mechanism of manager management defense motivation and influence factors on the effect mechanism of manager management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure. In the fourth part, we construct the game model of manager capital structure adjustment decision driven by defensive motivation, and analyze the ownership structure of the company under the absence of ownership concentration. The influence of capital structure adjustment motivation, explore the influence path of management defense on the speed of enterprise capital structure adjustment, lay a theoretical foundation for the related research. The fifth part, by constructing the linear regression model of the influence of management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure, the two major board listed companies from December 31, 2012 to 2016. In December 31st, the financial data were divided into high liability samples and low debt samples, which were divided into multiple linear regression analysis to verify the relevant hypotheses proposed in this paper. The difference in the degree of human management defences shows different effects. The discovery of this research conclusion lays the foundation for alleviating the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers and improving the efficiency of corporate governance. At the same time, it also provides a policy for improving the internal supervision mechanism of the state-owned enterprises and strengthening the market competition mechanism of the managers in China. Suggestions.
【學位授予單位】：西安理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前10條
1 燕志雄;張敬衛(wèi);費方域;;代理問題、風險基金性質與中小高科技企業(yè)融資[J];經濟研究;2016年09期
2 劉嬋;;股權集中度與資本結構動態(tài)調整——來自我國上市公司的證據(jù)[J];財經界(學術版);2015年16期
3 李秉祥;吳建祥;;管理防御視角下經理人長短期項目選擇的可分離均衡[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐;2015年04期
4 張維迎;;經濟轉型需讓企業(yè)家精神自由[J];中國投資;2015年04期
5 張海龍;姚冰n\;;經理管理防御對公司資本結構調整速度的非對稱性影響研究——來自我國制造業(yè)上市公司的經驗證據(jù)[J];管理評論;2014年09期
6 張春景;馬文超;;基于企業(yè)經營預期下的資本結構調整——來自我國制造業(yè)上市公司的經驗證據(jù)[J];會計研究;2014年08期
7 李秉祥;惠祥;;我國上市公司高管股權激勵影響因素的實證研究[J];財會月刊;2013年08期
8 郝艷;李秉祥;;基于信號傳遞模型的企業(yè)投資短視與敲竹杠長期投資行為分析[J];管理工程學報;2011年03期
9 權小鋒;吳世農;;CEO權力強度、信息披露質量與公司業(yè)績的波動性——基于深交所上市公司的實證研究[J];南開管理評論;2010年04期
10 李秉祥;薛思珊;;基于經理人管理防御的企業(yè)投資短視行為分析[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐;2008年11期
，本文編號：2120345
本文鏈接：http://www.sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/huobiyinxinglunwen/2120345.html
教材專著
