本文選題：退市監(jiān)管 + 股價崩盤風(fēng)險�。� 參考：《中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟》2016年12期

【摘要】：本文從公司股價崩盤風(fēng)險這一視角來探討退市監(jiān)管的治理作用,以2012年深圳證券交易所和上海證券交易所推出的較之前更為嚴格的"退市新規(guī)"作為準自然實驗,選取2010—2013年A股上市公司為樣本,采用雙重差分方法控制內(nèi)生性問題,研究發(fā)現(xiàn):與退市新規(guī)實施之前相比,受退市新規(guī)影響的上市公司在退市新規(guī)之后其股價崩盤風(fēng)險更低,表明退市監(jiān)管能夠降低股價崩盤風(fēng)險。本文還發(fā)現(xiàn),退市監(jiān)管降低上市公司股價崩盤風(fēng)險,主要是通過業(yè)績提升而非信息披露操縱和盈余管理發(fā)揮作用。進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),更低的企業(yè)代理成本、更好的信息透明度,以及更好的外部治理監(jiān)督有助于更好地發(fā)揮退市監(jiān)管降低股價崩盤風(fēng)險的作用,最終有利于提高市場定價效率和企業(yè)價值。以上研究結(jié)果表明,更加嚴格的退市監(jiān)管對提高上市公司的信息透明度、維持資本市場的良好運作有著重要的積極作用。
[Abstract]:This paper discusses the governance role of delisting supervision from the perspective of the risk of stock price collapse, taking the more stringent delisting rules introduced by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2012 as quasi-natural experiments. In this paper, A share listed companies from 2010 to 2013 are selected as samples to control endogenetic problems by using double difference method. The results show that: compared with the new rules before delisting, Listed companies affected by the new delisting rules have a lower risk of a stock crash after delisting, suggesting delisting regulation can reduce the risk of a stock crash. This paper also finds that delisting regulation reduces the risk of stock price collapse of listed companies mainly through performance improvement rather than disclosure manipulation and earnings management. Further studies have found that lower corporate agency costs, better information transparency, and better external governance oversight help to better play the role of delisting regulation in reducing the risk of stock price crashes. Finally, it will help to improve the market pricing efficiency and enterprise value. The results show that more strict delisting regulation plays an important and positive role in improving the information transparency of listed companies and maintaining the good operation of capital market.
【作者單位】： 首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)會計學(xué)院;清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金青年項目“基于文本分析的管理層語調(diào)研究:信息含量及其經(jīng)濟后果”(批準號71502116)
【分類號】：F832.51
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本文編號：2080954