本文選題：大股東 + 掏空行為��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：一直以來,大股東對上市公司的“掏空”行為在全球多個(gè)國家均有發(fā)生,“掏空”的方式也愈發(fā)復(fù)雜和隱蔽。據(jù)資料顯示,近十幾年中,我國證券市場有近十分之一的資金流失都是由上市公司大股東“掏空”行為所致。因此,深入分析大股東“掏空”行為,對實(shí)現(xiàn)資本市場長遠(yuǎn)有序地發(fā)展具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文主要研究大股東的“掏空”行為,共分為五個(gè)部分。第一部分,從大股東“掏空”的原因、方式、“掏空”對公司業(yè)績以及資本市場的影響等幾個(gè)方面,對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了梳理。第二部分,從概念上界定了大股東”掏空“行為,并以委托代理理論、利益相關(guān)者理論和控制權(quán)私人收益理論為基礎(chǔ),分析了大股東“掏空”行為產(chǎn)生的原因。第三部分,選取安泰集團(tuán)為案例公司,通過對其大股東“掏空”事件的回顧,分析發(fā)現(xiàn)安泰集團(tuán)大股東主要通過關(guān)聯(lián)方資金占用、違規(guī)為關(guān)聯(lián)方提供擔(dān)保等方式“掏空”上市公司。第四部分,利用安泰集團(tuán)近五年的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),對大股東的“掏空”行為進(jìn)行了后果和原因分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)安泰集團(tuán)大股東“掏空”行為對企業(yè)未來的持續(xù)經(jīng)營造成了非常惡劣的影響。同時(shí)研究發(fā)現(xiàn),導(dǎo)致大股東產(chǎn)生“掏空”行為的原因包括中小股東不作為、大股東與關(guān)聯(lián)方之間關(guān)系復(fù)雜、公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)不合理、外部監(jiān)管力度不足等幾個(gè)方面。第五部分,針對上述原因,提出了制約安泰集團(tuán)大股東“掏空”行為的建議。本文采取了理論結(jié)合實(shí)際的方法,對大股東“掏空”行為進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)地分析。一方面豐富了已有文獻(xiàn)在相關(guān)方面的研究;另一方面,能讓中小股東更為清楚地了解大股東“掏空”行為,并增強(qiáng)防范意識(shí)。同時(shí),本文以案例公司的角度提出了幾點(diǎn)建議,對制約大股東“掏空”行為、提升公司治理水平具有一定的參考性意義。
[Abstract]:For a long time, the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders on listed companies has occurred in many countries around the world, and the way of "tunneling" has become more complex and covert. According to the data, in the past ten years, nearly 1/10 of the capital loss in China's securities market is caused by the "hollowing" behavior of the major shareholders of listed companies. Therefore, it is of practical significance to analyze the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders in order to realize the long-term orderly development of capital market. This paper mainly studies the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders, which is divided into five parts. The first part, from the major shareholders "tunneling" reasons, ways, "tunneling" on the company's performance and the impact of the capital market, and other aspects of the relevant literature at home and abroad have been combed. In the second part, the author defines the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders conceptually, and analyzes the causes of the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders based on the principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory and private income theory of control. The third part, select Antai Group as the case company, through the review of the "tunneling" event of its major shareholders, we find that the majority shareholders of Antai Group mainly through the related party funds occupied. Violation of the related party to provide security and other ways to "empty" listed companies. The fourth part, using the financial data of Antai Group in the past five years, analyzes the consequences and causes of the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders. It is found that the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders of Aetai Group has a very bad effect on the future operation of the company. At the same time, it is found that the causes of the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders include the omission of minority shareholders, the complexity of the relationship between major shareholders and related parties, the unreasonable internal governance structure of the company, the insufficient external supervision and so on. The fifth part, in view of the above reasons, puts forward the suggestion of restricting Antai Group's "tunneling" behavior. In this paper, theoretical and practical methods are adopted to systematically analyze the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders. On the one hand, it enriches the relevant research in the literature; on the other hand, it can make the minority shareholders understand the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders more clearly, and enhance the awareness of prevention. At the same time, this paper puts forward some suggestions from the angle of case company, which has certain reference significance for restricting the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders and improving the corporate governance level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F406.7;F426.7;F832.51

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