本文選題：合法化悖論 + 內(nèi)部化悖論�。� 參考：《中國(guó)農(nóng)村觀察》2016年06期

【摘要】：本文在回顧以往研究的基礎(chǔ)上,提出農(nóng)村小微金融的發(fā)展困境源于"雙重悖論":第一重是"合法化悖論",第二重是"內(nèi)部化悖論"。前者主要體現(xiàn)為制度效率較高的非正規(guī)小微金融在"正規(guī)化"之后制度效率下降,對(duì)此學(xué)術(shù)界已經(jīng)有過(guò)充分討論;后者形成于當(dāng)前農(nóng)民合作組織及政府普惠政策的"精英俘獲"特征漸趨強(qiáng)化的現(xiàn)實(shí)背景下。本文以Z合作社資金互助部為例進(jìn)行案例分析,認(rèn)為該合伙制小微金融能夠內(nèi)部化交易成本卻因不能內(nèi)部化外部性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而只能將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)化成組織解體的制度風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。最后,本文提出"通過(guò)以重構(gòu)合作制為基礎(chǔ)的組織創(chuàng)新和制度創(chuàng)新破解‘雙重悖論’"的政策啟示。
[Abstract]:On the basis of reviewing previous studies, this paper points out that the development dilemma of rural microfinance originates from "double paradox": the first is "legalization paradox" and the second is "internalization paradox". The former is mainly reflected in the decline of the institutional efficiency of informal micro-finance with high institutional efficiency after "regularization", which has been fully discussed in academic circles. The latter came into being under the background of the strengthening of the characteristics of "elite capture" of the farmers' cooperative organization and the government's inclusive policy. This paper takes Z cooperative fund mutual aid department as an example, thinks that the partnership can internalize the transaction cost, but it can only transform the risk into the institutional risk of organizational disintegration because it can not internalize the external risk. Finally, this paper puts forward the policy enlightenment of solving the 'double paradox' through organizational innovation and institutional innovation based on the reconstruction of cooperative system.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)人民大學(xué)農(nóng)業(yè)與農(nóng)村發(fā)展學(xué)院;
【基金】：北京市社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目“城鄉(xiāng)二元結(jié)構(gòu)下改善社會(huì)治理研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):15FXA003)的資助
【分類號(hào)】：F832.35
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本文編號(hào)：1830196