發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-19 23:33

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 上市商業(yè)銀行 高管 薪酬 影響因素　出處：《內(nèi)蒙古農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中,在所有資源當(dāng)中,人是最具活躍性的資源。在人們創(chuàng)造財(cái)富的過(guò)程中,積極發(fā)揮人的主觀能動(dòng)性具有重要意義。如何去激發(fā)人們的主觀能動(dòng)性,是一個(gè)永恒的話題。在當(dāng)前,我們?nèi)绾稳ヅ袛嘟?jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)制是否合理有效的運(yùn)行,其中一個(gè)重要的指標(biāo)就是看經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行機(jī)制能否調(diào)動(dòng)人的生產(chǎn)積極性,使人們提高生產(chǎn)效率,創(chuàng)造更多的社會(huì)財(cái)富。商業(yè)銀行在一國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)中扮演著重要的作用,尤其是在以間接融資為主的發(fā)展中國(guó)家,可以這樣說(shuō),銀行系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定對(duì)一國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)有著重要意義。在1998年,亞洲金融危機(jī)以后,無(wú)數(shù)商業(yè)銀行因?yàn)闊o(wú)法繼續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)而瀕臨破產(chǎn),其給一國(guó)的金融穩(wěn)定、經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展帶來(lái)了巨大的社會(huì)成本損失,迫使人們開始關(guān)注商業(yè)銀行的公司治理問(wèn)題。2008年經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)以后,金融全球化趨勢(shì)更加深入,對(duì)于我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行來(lái)說(shuō),其經(jīng)營(yíng)面臨著重大的調(diào)整轉(zhuǎn)型。正確調(diào)動(dòng)高管的管理積極性,對(duì)提高商業(yè)銀行的營(yíng)業(yè)成果、穩(wěn)定一國(guó)的金融系統(tǒng)有著重要作用。由于商業(yè)銀行高管在經(jīng)營(yíng)中具有重大作用、肩負(fù)重大責(zé)任,因此健全商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬的激勵(lì)機(jī)制、完善薪酬設(shè)定體系就成為解決問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵。本文的意義在于通過(guò)分析我國(guó)上市商業(yè)銀行高管在薪酬設(shè)定時(shí)的弊端,理清高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的不足,結(jié)合15家上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬以及高管薪酬影響因素的數(shù)據(jù),得出實(shí)證結(jié)果,進(jìn)而進(jìn)行分析,最后得出改進(jìn)措施。在第一章,主要有研究的背景、主要的研究?jī)?nèi)容以及我們?nèi)绾稳パ芯康姆绞椒椒�。第二章主要關(guān)于當(dāng)前國(guó)內(nèi)外對(duì)于商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬研究的文獻(xiàn)綜述以及對(duì)其的評(píng)述,同時(shí)明確了相關(guān)概念以及本文涉及的激勵(lì)相關(guān)理論。第三章主要分析了目前我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀,主要是高管任職說(shuō)明,薪酬制度的演變以及薪酬總體趨勢(shì)和結(jié)構(gòu)等,最后分析了當(dāng)前存在的主要問(wèn)題。第四章主要是相關(guān)的實(shí)證分析部分,主要是指標(biāo)的選擇原則、數(shù)據(jù)的來(lái)源、模型的構(gòu)建以及相關(guān)的統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述和回歸過(guò)程。在第五章,主要是根據(jù)第四章的回歸結(jié)果,結(jié)合上市商業(yè)銀行公布的數(shù)據(jù),對(duì)當(dāng)前薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制存在的問(wèn)題進(jìn)行分析。在第六章,根據(jù)論文前面的分析與實(shí)證,根據(jù)發(fā)現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題,提出具體解決當(dāng)前商業(yè)銀行在高管薪酬設(shè)定時(shí)出現(xiàn)不足的措施。在第七章,對(duì)本文的研究進(jìn)行了概括,使論文在結(jié)構(gòu)體系方面更加完善。
[Abstract]:In social and economic life, of all resources, man is the most active resource. How to stimulate people's subjective initiative is an eternal topic. At present, how to judge whether the economic mechanism is reasonable and effective. One of the important indicators is to see whether the economic operation mechanism can mobilize the enthusiasm of human production, so that people can improve production efficiency and create more social wealth. Commercial banks play an important role in a country's economy. In particular, in developing countries with indirect financing, it can be said that the stability of the banking system is of great importance to a country's economy. In 1998, after the Asian financial crisis. Numerous commercial banks are on the verge of bankruptcy because they can not continue to operate, which brings huge social cost loss to a country's financial stability and economic development. After the economic crisis in 2008, the trend of financial globalization is deeper, for our commercial banks. Its management is faced with a major adjustment and transformation. Correctly mobilize the management enthusiasm of senior executives to improve the business results of commercial banks. The stability of a country's financial system plays an important role. Because the commercial bank executives have a significant role in the management, shouldering a major responsibility, so improve the incentive mechanism of the executive compensation of commercial banks. The significance of this paper is to analyze the drawbacks of executive compensation timing in China's listed commercial banks, and to clear up the deficiencies of executive compensation incentive mechanism. Combining with the data of 15 listed commercial banks' executive compensation and the influencing factors of executive compensation, the empirical results are obtained, and then the improvement measures are obtained. In the first chapter, there is the background of research. The main research content and how to study the ways and methods. Chapter two mainly about the current domestic and foreign research on the executive compensation of commercial banks literature review and its comments. At the same time, it clarifies the related concepts and incentive theories involved in this paper. Chapter three mainly analyzes the current situation of executive compensation in commercial banks in China, mainly the executive position description. The evolution of the compensation system as well as the overall trend and structure of compensation, and so on. Finally, the main problems are analyzed. Chapter 4th is mainly related empirical analysis, mainly the selection principle of indicators, the source of data. In chapter 5th, according to the regression results of Chapter 4th, combined with the published data of listed commercial banks. In chapter 6th, according to the analysis and demonstration in the front of the paper, according to the problems found. In chapter 7th, the author summarizes the research of this paper, which makes the paper more perfect in the aspect of structure system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.33
，

本文編號(hào)：1445942