多屬性逆向拍賣中最優(yōu)信息披露政策研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-12-20 09:42
【摘要】：隨著電子商務的快速發(fā)展,在線逆向拍賣已成為一種新型電子化采購工具,其不僅可以擴大供應商選擇范圍,更能大幅度地降低采購成本、提高采購效率,進而為采供雙方帶來更多的收益。鑒于此,越來越多的公司開始采用該項技術(shù)進行全球化采購。拍賣中披露的信息作為影響采供雙方行為和收益的重要因素,近年來引起高度關(guān)注。本文主要目的在于探討多屬性逆向拍賣中不同拍賣階段的最優(yōu)信息披露政策,通過仿真實驗驗證模型推導結(jié)果并補充所得結(jié)論,在此基礎上探究信息有效披露的管理策略。本文研究按信息披露發(fā)生在實時報價前和實時報價后兩大階段進行。在實時報價前的階段,首先,通過建立博弈模型求出供應商真假披露自身信息與采購商是否核實的均衡,給出不同情形下采供雙方的應對策略及為促進誠信交易采供雙方的管理建議。其次,運用博弈方法求解并分析披露和不披露供應商質(zhì)量屬性值對應的采購商效用。在實時報價后的階段,建立基于伯蘭德的動態(tài)博弈模型,分析首輪投標后完全披露和非完全披露供應商報價對采供雙方的影響,并通過MATLAB7.0軟件得到圖形化界面。而后,開發(fā)了一個仿真實驗網(wǎng)站用以模擬不同信息披露政策下的拍賣流程,通過收集和分析實驗數(shù)據(jù),驗證和補充模型推導。最后,基于采供雙方視角給出信息有效披露的策略建議。結(jié)果表明:(1)實時報價前,為促進供應商真實披露減少采購商核實,應提高采購商核實效率,加大處分力度,降核實成本和供應商虛假披露的額外收益等。當各供應商質(zhì)量屬性值分布不均勻時應將該值予以披露,分布均勻時不披露更為有利。(2)實時報價后,一般情形下完全披露供應商首輪信息更優(yōu),當一輪獲勝者質(zhì)量屬性顯著占優(yōu)或并非最優(yōu)時選擇非完全披露政策。且信息披露政策對不同質(zhì)量屬性級別的供應商效應程度不同,造成供應商反應策略有所差異。(3)為促進誠信交易和信息有效披露,采購商應正確引導,建立獎懲機制,提高自身實力和準入門檻,視具體情況靈活采用相應的信息披露政策。供應商應“說真話”,提高自身質(zhì)量屬性,理性競爭等。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce, online reverse auction has become a new electronic procurement tool, which can not only expand the scope of supplier selection, but also greatly reduce procurement costs and improve procurement efficiency. In turn, for the two parties to the harvest to bring more revenue. In view of this, more and more companies began to use the technology for global procurement. The information disclosed in the auction, as an important factor affecting the behavior and income of both parties, has attracted much attention in recent years. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the optimal information disclosure policy in different auction stages of multi-attribute reverse auction. The results of the model are verified by simulation experiments and the conclusions are supplemented. On this basis, the management strategy of effective disclosure of information is explored. In this paper, information disclosure occurs before and after real-time quotation. In the stage before real-time quotation, first of all, by establishing a game model to find out the balance between the true and false disclosure of the supplier's own information and whether the purchaser verifies or not. The coping strategies of both parties in different situations and the management suggestions of both parties in order to promote the good faith transaction are given. Secondly, using the game method to solve and analyze the buyer utility corresponding to the disclosure and non-disclosure of supplier quality attribute value. The dynamic game model based on Burland is established to analyze the influence of complete and incomplete disclosure of supplier quotation on the two parties after the first round of bidding. The graphical interface is obtained by MATLAB7.0 software. Then, a simulation experiment website is developed to simulate the auction process under different information disclosure policies. Through collecting and analyzing the experimental data, we verify and supplement the model derivation. Finally, based on the perspective of the two parties, the effective disclosure of information is proposed. The results are as follows: (1) in order to promote the true disclosure of suppliers and reduce the verification of buyers, we should improve the efficiency of verification, increase the punishment, reduce the cost of verification and the extra income of false disclosure of suppliers. When the quality attribute value of each supplier is distributed unevenly, the value should be disclosed, and it is more advantageous not to disclose the value when the distribution is even. (2) after the real-time quotation, it is better to completely disclose the first round information of the supplier in general. The incomplete disclosure policy is chosen when the quality attribute of a winner is significantly superior or not optimal. And the effect of information disclosure policy on different quality attributes of suppliers is different, which results in different supplier response strategies. (3) in order to promote good faith transactions and effective disclosure of information, buyers should guide correctly and establish reward and punishment mechanism. Improve their own strength and entry threshold, according to specific circumstances flexible use of the corresponding information disclosure policy. Suppliers should "tell the truth", improve their own quality attributes, rational competition and so on.
【學位授予單位】：江蘇科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274;F224.32
本文編號：2387811
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce, online reverse auction has become a new electronic procurement tool, which can not only expand the scope of supplier selection, but also greatly reduce procurement costs and improve procurement efficiency. In turn, for the two parties to the harvest to bring more revenue. In view of this, more and more companies began to use the technology for global procurement. The information disclosed in the auction, as an important factor affecting the behavior and income of both parties, has attracted much attention in recent years. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the optimal information disclosure policy in different auction stages of multi-attribute reverse auction. The results of the model are verified by simulation experiments and the conclusions are supplemented. On this basis, the management strategy of effective disclosure of information is explored. In this paper, information disclosure occurs before and after real-time quotation. In the stage before real-time quotation, first of all, by establishing a game model to find out the balance between the true and false disclosure of the supplier's own information and whether the purchaser verifies or not. The coping strategies of both parties in different situations and the management suggestions of both parties in order to promote the good faith transaction are given. Secondly, using the game method to solve and analyze the buyer utility corresponding to the disclosure and non-disclosure of supplier quality attribute value. The dynamic game model based on Burland is established to analyze the influence of complete and incomplete disclosure of supplier quotation on the two parties after the first round of bidding. The graphical interface is obtained by MATLAB7.0 software. Then, a simulation experiment website is developed to simulate the auction process under different information disclosure policies. Through collecting and analyzing the experimental data, we verify and supplement the model derivation. Finally, based on the perspective of the two parties, the effective disclosure of information is proposed. The results are as follows: (1) in order to promote the true disclosure of suppliers and reduce the verification of buyers, we should improve the efficiency of verification, increase the punishment, reduce the cost of verification and the extra income of false disclosure of suppliers. When the quality attribute value of each supplier is distributed unevenly, the value should be disclosed, and it is more advantageous not to disclose the value when the distribution is even. (2) after the real-time quotation, it is better to completely disclose the first round information of the supplier in general. The incomplete disclosure policy is chosen when the quality attribute of a winner is significantly superior or not optimal. And the effect of information disclosure policy on different quality attributes of suppliers is different, which results in different supplier response strategies. (3) in order to promote good faith transactions and effective disclosure of information, buyers should guide correctly and establish reward and punishment mechanism. Improve their own strength and entry threshold, according to specific circumstances flexible use of the corresponding information disclosure policy. Suppliers should "tell the truth", improve their own quality attributes, rational competition and so on.
【學位授予單位】：江蘇科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274;F224.32
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