【摘要】：隨著十二五規(guī)劃對建立我國藍色經(jīng)濟區(qū)的建議的提出,海洋產(chǎn)業(yè)正逐步發(fā)展為我國國民經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的支柱產(chǎn)業(yè),作為身處海洋大國的我們,也要重視起海洋蘊含的資源所帶來的巨大的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展空間。但是面臨世界環(huán)境的惡化,全球氣溫變暖,資源枯竭等越來越多的問題,海洋災(zāi)害的發(fā)生頻率也在不斷加快,給人們帶來巨大的經(jīng)濟損失。所以,海洋災(zāi)害保險的實施,是人們分散和轉(zhuǎn)移海洋災(zāi)害風險所必須采取的手段和方法。我國海洋災(zāi)害保險模式主要是由投保人投保,政府主導,商業(yè)性保險公司協(xié)作的模式,但是由于理性經(jīng)濟人的存在,各參與保險的主體之間因為自身利益最大化的驅(qū)使,導致海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式存在不穩(wěn)定性。因此,對我國海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式進行研究,將再保險公司引入海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式,可以有效的提高海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式的合作效率,也可以達到長期穩(wěn)定合作。本文綜合各海洋災(zāi)害保險參與主體的行為特征,以聯(lián)盟博弈為分析工具,利用核和核心進行海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式下各主體之間的利益分配,并將海洋災(zāi)害再保險機構(gòu)引入到保險模式中,運用Shapley值進行實證分析,并以此建立長期、穩(wěn)定參與的海洋災(zāi)害保險模式,促進我國海洋經(jīng)濟的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。文章首先海洋災(zāi)害保險所具有的雙重準公共物品和正外部性屬性進行了描述,提出我國海洋災(zāi)害保險市場存在的逆向選擇和道德風險問題,導致了保險市場失靈,運行效率低下,也對國內(nèi)外災(zāi)害保險市場進行了歸納,比較了國內(nèi)外災(zāi)害保險市場的現(xiàn)狀和海洋災(zāi)害保險的基本模式,分析了災(zāi)害保險市場的特征。然后,通過對海洋災(zāi)害保險模式中保險參與主體的行為特征進行識別,確定了文章的主要分析方法。以聯(lián)盟博弈為基礎(chǔ)對投保人、政府和保險公司參與的海洋災(zāi)害保險模式進行了利益分配核和核心的求解,發(fā)現(xiàn)在這種模式下,海洋災(zāi)害保險基于理性人的假定,存在多個利益最優(yōu)分配或是不存在均衡的利益分配,進而將海洋災(zāi)害再保險機構(gòu)納入海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式中,利用聯(lián)盟博弈Shapley值進行分析,結(jié)果表明,將海洋災(zāi)害再保險機構(gòu)納入海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式中,更有利于提高保險的合作收益和穩(wěn)定性。最后,本文針對實證分析結(jié)果,對我國現(xiàn)行的海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式提出建議,使各主體進行有效參與,提高海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式的可行性和持續(xù)性。論文主要從以下幾個方面進行了創(chuàng)新性探討：從投保人、政府和商業(yè)性保險公司角度出發(fā),對其參與海洋災(zāi)害保險模式的行為特征進行了識別,并以此確定了海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式的分析方法。引入了海洋災(zāi)害再保險機構(gòu),同經(jīng)典的海洋災(zāi)害保險模式相比較,將再保險機構(gòu)引入到海洋災(zāi)害保險中,可以保證海洋災(zāi)害保險模式的運行更有效,更有利于海洋災(zāi)害保險參與主體的利益分配。對海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式進行分析中,運用了以聯(lián)盟博弈為基礎(chǔ)的核心、和Shapley值分析方法,使針對我國海洋災(zāi)害保險參與模式的建議提出具有依據(jù)性。
[Abstract]:With the proposal of the 12th Five-Year Plan for the establishment of China's Blue Economic Zone, the marine industry is gradually developing into a pillar industry of China's national economic development. As a large marine country, we should also pay attention to the huge economic development space brought by the marine resources. But facing the deterioration of the world environment, the global temperature changes. More and more problems such as warmth, exhaustion of resources and so on, the frequency of marine disasters is also accelerating, bringing huge economic losses to people. Therefore, the implementation of marine disaster insurance is the means and methods that people must adopt to disperse and transfer the risk of marine disasters. Leading, commercial insurance company cooperation model, but due to the existence of rational economic people, the main participants in the insurance because of their own interests to maximize the driving, resulting in marine disaster insurance participation model instability. Insurance participation model can effectively improve the cooperation efficiency of marine disaster insurance participation model, and can also achieve long-term stable cooperation. This paper synthesizes the behavior characteristics of the marine disaster insurance participants, and uses the coalition game as the analysis tool, uses the core and core to distribute the interests among the participants in marine disaster insurance participation model. Then, the marine disaster reinsurance institution is introduced into the insurance mode, and the Shapley value is used to make an empirical analysis, and a long-term and stable participation marine disaster insurance mode is established to promote the sustainable development of marine economy in China. Adverse selection and moral hazard existing in the marine disaster insurance market of our country are put forward, which leads to the failure of the insurance market and the inefficiency of its operation. The domestic and foreign disaster insurance markets are also summarized. The current situation of the domestic and foreign disaster insurance markets and the basic modes of marine disaster insurance are compared, and the characteristics of the disaster insurance market are analyzed. Then, by identifying the behavior characteristics of the insurance participants in the marine disaster insurance model, the main analysis method is determined. Based on the coalition game theory, the core of interest distribution and the core of the marine disaster insurance model involving the policy holder, the government and the insurance company are solved. It is found that under this model, marine disaster insurance is the key to marine disaster insurance. Based on the hypothesis of rational person, there are multiple interests optimal allocation or no balanced interests allocation. Then marine disaster reinsurance institutions are included in the marine disaster insurance participation model. The Shapley value of alliance game is used to analyze the risk. The results show that marine disaster reinsurance institutions are included in the marine disaster insurance participation model, and more importantly, marine disaster reinsurance institutions are included in the marine disaster insurance participation model. Finally, based on the results of the empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the current participation model of marine disaster insurance in China, so as to make the main bodies participate effectively and improve the feasibility and sustainability of the participation model of marine disaster insurance. From the angle of policy-holder, government and commercial insurance company, this paper identifies the behavior characteristics of marine disaster insurance mode, and determines the analysis method of marine disaster insurance participation mode. In marine disaster insurance, the operation of marine disaster insurance model can be guaranteed to be more effective and more conducive to the distribution of the interests of marine disaster insurance participants. The proposal put forward is based on nature.
【學位授予單位】：中國海洋大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F842.64;F224

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 仲品;王賑陽;;巨災(zāi)保險進行時[J];中國西部;2013年34期

2 蘇明;楊良初;韓鳳芹;武靖州;李成威;王敏;李婕;馮翊明;;促進我國海洋經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的財政政策研究[J];經(jīng)濟研究參考;2013年57期

3 石先武;譚駿;國志興;劉欽政;;風暴潮災(zāi)害風險評估研究綜述[J];地球科學進展;2013年08期

4 劉明;;適應(yīng)海洋災(zāi)害風險的分析框架及政策涵義[J];發(fā)展研究;2013年05期

5 戴紹文;任雅姍;;巨災(zāi)綜合風險管理:國際經(jīng)驗及啟示[J];保險職業(yè)學院學報;2012年06期

6 王鵬飛;;金融支持海洋經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的若干問題與建議[J];區(qū)域金融研究;2012年11期

7 劉強;張玉紅;;青島地區(qū)風暴潮災(zāi)害易損性風險區(qū)劃建模[J];海洋地質(zhì)前沿;2012年09期

8 鄭慧;趙昕;;核密度估計在海洋災(zāi)害保險純保費厘定中的應(yīng)用——以風暴潮災(zāi)害為例[J];海洋環(huán)境科學;2012年04期

9 楊黎靜;徐志良;婁全勝;潘虹;王亮;楊磊;謝健;;海洋災(zāi)害的外部不經(jīng)濟性及對策探討[J];海洋湖沼通報;2012年01期

10 李鴻敏;;韓國漁業(yè)保險政策對建立我國漁業(yè)巨災(zāi)保險基金的啟示[J];中國漁業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2012年01期

相關(guān)重要報紙文章 前1條

1 鐘言;;發(fā)達國家的巨災(zāi)保險制度[N];中國保險報;2010年

相關(guān)博士學位論文 前3條

1 邢慧茹;主體行為下農(nóng)業(yè)自然災(zāi)害風險管理機制研究[D];華中農(nóng)業(yè)大學;2013年

2 趙昕;海洋災(zāi)害補償基金設(shè)計研究[D];中國海洋大學;2010年

3 趙領(lǐng)娣;中國災(zāi)害綜合管理機制構(gòu)建研究——以風暴潮災(zāi)害為例[D];中國海洋大學;2003年

相關(guān)碩士學位論文 前1條

1 王曉婷;我國海洋災(zāi)害保險模式研究[D];中國海洋大學;2011年

，

本文編號：2217157