【摘要】：在工程項目結(jié)束期內(nèi),由于項目主體工作結(jié)束,項目干系人團隊成員的責(zé)任心變得比較弱,開始敷衍了事,有些團隊甚至于逃避工作、工作人員提前撤離,這些現(xiàn)象都影響了建設(shè)項目的順利結(jié)束。因而本文選擇工程項目結(jié)束期項目干系人團隊合作的行為進行研究具有很重要的現(xiàn)實意義。區(qū)別于其他相關(guān)文章對項目團隊成員合作行為的研究,本文主要在前人對項目團隊成員合作進行研究的基礎(chǔ)上,選擇了建設(shè)項目結(jié)束期這一時期內(nèi)項目干系人團隊成員問合作情況作為研究對象,對建設(shè)項目結(jié)束期內(nèi)項目干系人團隊合作的難點重點以及合作中出現(xiàn)的問題進行總結(jié),分析影響項目結(jié)束期內(nèi)合作形成的因素,并項目干系人中的建設(shè)單位與參建單位之間的組織構(gòu)架、管理模式以及激勵機制進行剖析,根據(jù)項目結(jié)束期內(nèi)項目團隊的特點,構(gòu)建建設(shè)項目結(jié)束期的團隊合作的演化博弈模型,探討什么樣的激勵機制或者管理模式是有利于項目團隊成員之間的合作。本文主要從兩個維度來研究項目結(jié)束期項目干系人團隊合作行為：(1)結(jié)合項目結(jié)束期的情況,建立工程項目結(jié)束期建設(shè)單位成員與參建設(shè)單位成員之間的合作行為博弈模型,分析了項目結(jié)束期建設(shè)單位成員與參建單位成員雙方不重視合作行為的原因,以及雙方都重視合作行為的前提條件,最后結(jié)合實際案例用仿真分析,證明了相關(guān)措施對促進建設(shè)單位及參建單位在項目結(jié)束期重視合作行為的重要性。(2)對項目結(jié)束期內(nèi)各個參建單位成員之間合作行為進行研究,在考慮對團隊成員合作成果進行獎勵的情況下,構(gòu)建了項目結(jié)束期內(nèi)配合建設(shè)單位進行收尾工作的各個參與建設(shè)的單位成員選擇工作努力情況的行為演化博弈模型,并對其進行分析研究,得出了項目結(jié)束期內(nèi)采用諸如對合作成果進行獎勵的措施是切實有效的。
[Abstract]:During the completion period of the project, due to the completion of the main work of the project, the team members of the project stakeholders became less responsible and began to work perfunctorily. Some teams even evaded work, and the staff were evacuated early. These phenomena have affected the successful conclusion of the construction project. Therefore, it is of great practical significance for this paper to select the behavior of project stakeholders' team cooperation at the end of the project. Different from other related articles on the cooperative behavior of project team members, this paper is mainly based on the previous research on project team members' cooperation. Select the project stakeholders team members as the research object, summarize the key points of the project stakeholders team cooperation and the problems that appear in the cooperation during the period of the end of the construction project, and select the project stakeholders team members as the research object during the period of the end of the construction project, and summarize the key points of the project stakeholders team cooperation and the problems in the cooperation. This paper analyzes the factors that affect the formation of cooperation in the end of the project, and analyzes the organizational structure, the management model and the incentive mechanism between the construction units and the participating units in the project stakeholders, according to the characteristics of the project team during the end of the project. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of team cooperation at the end of construction project and discusses what kind of incentive mechanism or management model is beneficial to the cooperation among the members of the project team. This paper mainly studies the cooperative behavior of project stakeholders in the end of the project from two dimensions: (1) according to the situation of the end of the project, the game model of cooperative behavior between the members of the construction unit and the member of the construction unit in the end of the project is established. This paper analyzes the reasons why the members of the construction unit and the participating units do not attach importance to the cooperative behavior and the preconditions for both sides to attach importance to the cooperative behavior at the end of the project. It proves the importance of relevant measures to promote the construction units and participating units to attach importance to cooperative behavior in the end of the project. (2) to study the cooperative behavior among the members of each participating unit during the period of the end of the project. Considering the reward of team members' cooperation results, a game model of behavior evolution of the members of the construction units involved in the closing work of the construction units during the period of the end of the project is constructed. Through the analysis and research, it is concluded that it is effective to use measures such as reward for cooperation results in the end of the project.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F272.9;F284

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