本文選題：自然資源開發(fā)利用 + 分稅制��； 參考：《江漢論壇》2016年01期

【摘要】：自然資源的合理開發(fā)利用是可持續(xù)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的助推力量,而"營改增"弱化了地方政府推動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的力量。建立地方政府與其行政管轄區(qū)域內(nèi)自然資源類國有企業(yè)的激勵(lì)相容機(jī)制,既有利于地方政府財(cái)權(quán)和事權(quán)的良性匹配,又有利于自然資源開發(fā)利用的合理有序。本文引入狀態(tài)空間模型化方法對地方政府與其行政區(qū)域內(nèi)自然資源類國有企業(yè)之間建立激勵(lì)機(jī)制的期望收益及約束條件進(jìn)行了分析,進(jìn)一步證實(shí)了在委托—代理?xiàng)l件下建立地方政府與自然資源類國有企業(yè)的激勵(lì)相容機(jī)制,既有利于地方政府財(cái)權(quán)和事權(quán)的良性匹配,又有利于自然資源開發(fā)利用的合理有序,實(shí)現(xiàn)雙重紅利效應(yīng)。為了保證這種契約關(guān)系的有效而穩(wěn)固,必要的約束和監(jiān)督機(jī)制應(yīng)該著眼于企業(yè)(及其經(jīng)營者)可能存在的機(jī)會主義傾向、監(jiān)督成本、監(jiān)督績效及獎懲機(jī)制的合理性。
[Abstract]:The rational exploitation and utilization of natural resources is sustainable economic growth and boost power, "replacing business tax with value-added tax(VAT)" local government weakened the strength of economic growth. The establishment of local government and administrative jurisdiction of natural resources of state-owned enterprises incentive mechanism, both benign, conducive to government financial authority and powers, but also conducive to the the development and utilization of natural resources reasonably and orderly. The establishment of incentive mechanism and constraint conditions between the expected revenue by introducing the state space model of local government and its administrative area of natural resources of state-owned enterprises were analyzed, further confirmed the establishment of local government and natural resources of state-owned enterprises in the principal-agent incentive mechanism under the condition of, both benign, conducive to property rights and powers of local government, but also conducive to the development and utilization of natural resources reasonably, to achieve double dividend In order to ensure the effectiveness and stability of such contractual relationship, the necessary constraint and supervision mechanism should focus on the opportunist tendencies of enterprises and their operators, the cost of supervision, the performance of supervision and the rationality of rewards and punishments mechanism.

【作者單位】： 吉林大學(xué)中國國有經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中心;吉林大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;吉林大學(xué)數(shù)學(xué)學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社會科學(xué)重點(diǎn)研究基地重大項(xiàng)目“中國國有自然資源合理開發(fā)利用和完善監(jiān)管體制研究”(項(xiàng)目編號:14JJD790037) 吉林大學(xué)“985工程”哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)創(chuàng)新基地項(xiàng)目“中國國有經(jīng)濟(jì)改革與發(fā)展”(項(xiàng)目編號:201112)、吉林大學(xué)科學(xué)前沿與交叉學(xué)科創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目“我國自然資源開發(fā)利用與監(jiān)管機(jī)制優(yōu)化研究”(項(xiàng)目編號:2014QY057)的階段性成果
【分類號】：F276.1;F205

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