本文關(guān)鍵詞： 食品安全 誠信缺失 博弈 規(guī)制　出處：《江南大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：食品安全問題不僅關(guān)系到人民群眾的身體健康和生命安全,還事關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和社會穩(wěn)定。近年來,食品安全事件屢見報(bào)端,表明食品企業(yè)誠信缺失嚴(yán)重。對食品企業(yè)誠信缺失的研究是弘揚(yáng)誠信文化,完善食品安全監(jiān)管體系,保障食品安全的需要。在對誠信缺失食品企業(yè)的規(guī)制研究中,主要采用了列舉歸納法、博弈分析法等研究方法,以信息不對稱理論和博弈理論作為研究的理論基礎(chǔ),采用建立博弈模型的方法,分析博弈雙方策略選擇的影響因素,尋求規(guī)制路徑。食品企業(yè)誠信缺失現(xiàn)象在生產(chǎn)加工領(lǐng)域和銷售流通領(lǐng)域的表現(xiàn)尤為突出,廣泛分布在生產(chǎn)、加工、銷售的各個環(huán)節(jié)。食品市場上的信息不對稱是引發(fā)市場機(jī)制失靈,造成食品企業(yè)誠信缺失的主要原因。此外,食品行業(yè)競爭激烈和監(jiān)管機(jī)制不健全致使食品市場的誠信經(jīng)營環(huán)境進(jìn)一步惡化。在消費(fèi)者和食品企業(yè)的博弈中,消費(fèi)者舉報(bào)可以促進(jìn)食品企業(yè)誠信經(jīng)營,但是高額的舉報(bào)成本會降低消費(fèi)者舉報(bào)的積極性。借助Matlab軟件對食品企業(yè)之間信用失衡的演化過程進(jìn)行模擬,發(fā)現(xiàn)隨著對失信經(jīng)營企業(yè)懲罰力度的加強(qiáng),食品企業(yè)失信經(jīng)營的概率不斷下降。然而,受制于監(jiān)管成本太高,監(jiān)管效率低下,監(jiān)管部門對失信經(jīng)營食品企業(yè)的懲罰力度不足。但是,隨著消費(fèi)者監(jiān)督的不斷加強(qiáng),監(jiān)管部門的信息劣勢得到改善,監(jiān)管成本降低�；谙M(fèi)者監(jiān)督的食品企業(yè)和監(jiān)管部門的演化博弈結(jié)果表明,在長期的演化過程中,監(jiān)管部門將加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管,食品企業(yè)趨向于誠信經(jīng)營。根據(jù)相關(guān)的博弈理論分析結(jié)果,對誠信缺失食品企業(yè)的規(guī)制可以從以下四個方面入手:第一,加強(qiáng)對監(jiān)管缺失人員的責(zé)任追究,降低監(jiān)管成本,提高政府部門的監(jiān)管效率;第二,提高懲罰金和賠償金的數(shù)額,發(fā)揮誠信評價(jià)體系的激勵作用,提高食品企業(yè)誠信經(jīng)營的自覺性;第三,增加食品安全信息投資,完善食品信息披露制度,建立食品安全信息分享機(jī)制;第四,改善消費(fèi)者維權(quán)的外部環(huán)境,完善食品安全舉報(bào)制度以提高消費(fèi)者監(jiān)督的積極性。
[Abstract]:Food safety is not only related to the health and safety of the people, but also to economic development and social stability. In recent years, food safety incidents have been frequently reported. The research on the lack of good faith in food enterprises is to carry forward the culture of good faith, perfect the supervision system of food safety, and ensure the safety of food. This paper mainly adopts the methods of enumeration induction and game analysis, taking the information asymmetry theory and the game theory as the theoretical basis, using the method of establishing the game model to analyze the influencing factors of the strategy choice of both sides of the game. The phenomenon of lack of good faith in food enterprises is particularly prominent in the field of production and processing and sales circulation, widely distributed in production, processing, processing, The information asymmetry in the food market is the main reason for the failure of the market mechanism and the lack of good faith in the food enterprises. The fierce competition in the food industry and the lack of a sound regulatory mechanism have further worsened the good faith operating environment in the food market. In the game between consumers and food enterprises, consumer reporting can promote the good faith management of food enterprises. But the high cost of reporting will reduce the enthusiasm of consumers to report. With the help of Matlab software to simulate the evolution process of credit imbalance between food enterprises, it is found that with the punishment of dishonest enterprises strengthened, However, due to the high cost of regulation, inefficient supervision, and inadequate penalties for food companies, however, as consumer supervision continues to increase, The information inferiority of regulators has been improved and the cost of supervision has been reduced. The evolutionary game between food companies and regulators based on consumer supervision shows that in the long-term evolution process, regulators will strengthen supervision. Food enterprises tend to operate in good faith. According to the analysis results of relevant game theory, the regulation of food enterprises without good faith can be started from the following four aspects: first, to strengthen the accountability of the lack of supervision, reduce the supervision costs, To improve the efficiency of government supervision; second, to increase the amount of punishment and compensation, to give play to the incentive role of the integrity evaluation system, and to improve the consciousness of food enterprises to operate in good faith; third, to increase the investment in food safety information, Improve food information disclosure system, establish food safety information sharing mechanism; 4th, improve the external environment of consumer rights, improve food safety reporting system to improve consumer supervision enthusiasm.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F203
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本文編號：1535737