【摘要】：隨著市場經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,社會民主化進程不斷加深,這對政府部門制定公共事業(yè)價格的形式提出了新的要求。為了順應(yīng)這種變化,上世紀(jì)90年代末,我國在政府價格決策方面出臺了價格聽證制度,吸收價格聽證會上相關(guān)利益方的意見。價格聽證會逐步成為公共部門價格決策的重要環(huán)節(jié),這在一定程度上提高了公共產(chǎn)品和公共服務(wù)價格制定的公開性和透明性。但我國的價格聽證實踐仍然存在著各種弊端,遭到社會各界的質(zhì)疑。一方面,相關(guān)法律對于價格聽證的規(guī)定比較概括,使得其中各利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利義務(wù)得不到實施,致使政府、經(jīng)營者、消費者三大利益主體結(jié)構(gòu)中消費者處于弱勢地位。另一方面,聽證會中消費者的弱勢地位導(dǎo)致聽證會“逢聽必漲”、“聽證專業(yè)戶”、“信息不對等”等亂象叢生,嚴重削弱了公共價格制定的群眾基礎(chǔ)和公信力。因此,進一步優(yōu)化價格聽證制度,完善價格聽證程序,對推動我國價格決策科學(xué)化具有重要意義。 文章在借鑒國內(nèi)外有關(guān)價格聽證研究的基礎(chǔ)上,從博弈論的視角,深入剖析我國價格聽證制度中的政府部門、經(jīng)營者和消費者這三大主要利益相關(guān)者結(jié)構(gòu),構(gòu)建博弈模型。同時結(jié)合北京市公共交通價格調(diào)整聽證案例,揭示我國現(xiàn)實價格聽證中三大主要利益相關(guān)群體之間博弈力量不均衡現(xiàn)象,并分析造成這種困境的原因。最后,以平衡博弈三方力量為準(zhǔn)則,從改善政府管理角度,分別提出完善制度規(guī)范、保證信息安全和建立群眾基礎(chǔ)等建議,以期完善我國價格聽證制度,加快公民參與社會管理的步伐。主要研究成果包括：(1)總結(jié)出目前我國價格聽證制度所存在的具體問題。在各利益者地位設(shè)置上存在天然失衡現(xiàn)象,法律中價格聽證參與人的界定和產(chǎn)生方式缺失明確規(guī)定,價格聽證參與人的進入權(quán)掌握在政府部門手中；(2)運用博弈論的方法,構(gòu)建了政府部門、經(jīng)營者和消費者兩兩博弈關(guān)系,據(jù)此來了解價格聽證過程中主要局中人是如何進行博弈,并影響價格聽證結(jié)果的；(3)指出價格聽證主要利益相關(guān)者之間博弈存在著局中人地位不平等、力量不均衡、效力不一致等困境,并認為法律制度缺失、民主意識淡薄、政企關(guān)系不清以及主體經(jīng)濟人的特性等都是導(dǎo)致這一困境出現(xiàn)的原因,從而提出對應(yīng)的解決途徑。
[Abstract]:With the development of market economy, the process of social democratization is deepening. In order to adapt to this kind of change, in the late 1990s, our country introduced the price hearing system in the government price decision, absorbing the views of the relevant stakeholders in the price hearing. Price hearings gradually become an important part of public sector price decision-making, which to some extent improves the openness and transparency of public goods and public service pricing. However, the practice of price hearing in our country still has a variety of drawbacks, which has been questioned by all walks of life. On the one hand, the provisions of the relevant laws on price hearing are more general, which makes the rights and obligations of the stakeholders can not be implemented, resulting in the government, operators, consumers in the three main interests of the consumer in a weak position. On the other hand, the weak position of consumers in the hearings leads to the chaos of hearing "every hearing," hearing professional households "," unequal information ", and so on, which seriously weakens the public basis and credibility of public price formulation. Therefore, it is of great significance to further optimize the price hearing system and perfect the price hearing procedure to promote the scientific price decision in our country. Based on the research of price hearing at home and abroad and from the perspective of game theory, this paper deeply analyzes the structure of the three main stakeholders in the price hearing system of our country, namely the government department, the operator and the consumer, and constructs the game model. At the same time, combining with the case of public transport price adjustment hearing in Beijing, this paper reveals the imbalance of game power among the three major interest groups in the real price hearing in China, and analyzes the reasons for this dilemma. Finally, in order to perfect the price hearing system of our country, we take the balanced game as the criterion, from the angle of improving the government management, put forward the suggestion of perfecting the system norm, guaranteeing the information security and establishing the mass base, etc., in order to perfect the price hearing system of our country. Speed up the pace of citizen participation in social management. The main research results are as follows: (1) the concrete problems existing in the price hearing system in China are summarized. There is a natural imbalance in the establishment of the status of the stakeholders. It is clearly stipulated in the law that the definition and the mode of production of the participants in the price hearing are in the hands of the government; (2) the method of game theory is used. The game relationship among government departments, operators and consumers is constructed to understand how the main players in the price hearing process play games and affect the results of the price hearings. (3) pointing out that the main stakeholders of price hearing have the dilemma of unequal status, unbalanced power, inconsistent effectiveness and so on, and holding that the legal system is lacking and the democratic consciousness is weak. The unclear relationship between the government and the enterprise and the characteristics of the principal economic man are the causes of this dilemma, and the corresponding solutions are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F726

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