【摘要】：IPO盈余管理一直以來都是重要的研究課題,投資者會(huì)因被粉飾的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告而做出錯(cuò)誤的股票估價(jià)和買賣決定。由于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資不僅為被投資公司注入資金,同時(shí)還會(huì)提供一系列的增值服務(wù)、對(duì)企業(yè)進(jìn)行治理,即風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資具有理論上的監(jiān)督作用。本文通過實(shí)證研究,考察了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資是否具有財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告監(jiān)督作用,即風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資是否能夠抑制被投資公司的IPO盈余管理。 本文研究了IPO附近的三個(gè)時(shí)期：IPO前一年、IPO當(dāng)年、IPO后一年。本文的研究對(duì)象為創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng),考慮到金融危機(jī)這一特殊宏觀時(shí)期的干擾,剔除了2009年上市的公司,最終選取了2010-2012年上市的319家公司為研究樣本。本文首先運(yùn)用截面修正瓊斯模型分年度回歸計(jì)算得出了樣本公司的操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn),以此作為盈余管理程度的衡量指標(biāo)。接著,本文考慮了可能影響盈余管理程度的公司規(guī)模、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿、成長(zhǎng)性、現(xiàn)金流充裕情況等因素,同時(shí)將有無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景作為虛擬變量,建立了多元回歸模型,驗(yàn)證有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景的公司與無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景的公司相比,是否有更低的盈余管理程度。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：成功IPO對(duì)我國風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)有很大的利益誘惑,在IPO前風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資表現(xiàn)出了道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資不能抑制盈余管理,甚至有輕微助長(zhǎng)盈余管理的嫌疑；而鑒于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)在前期進(jìn)行了謹(jǐn)慎、詳細(xì)的項(xiàng)目評(píng)估,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)在IPO成功后完全可以預(yù)期公司上市后的良好的市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn),此時(shí)道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)動(dòng)機(jī)小,而能支持監(jiān)督假說,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資開始發(fā)揮對(duì)盈余管理的抑制作用。但這種監(jiān)督和抑制作用亦有其時(shí)限性,在IPO后一年,由于部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)即將退出,因此其監(jiān)督積極性不高,表現(xiàn)為監(jiān)督作用不顯著。 上述發(fā)現(xiàn)表明,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)一定程度上看重誠實(shí)的高質(zhì)量的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告,本身有意識(shí)影響財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量,但風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的意愿和積極性并不強(qiáng),在與短期利益發(fā)生沖突時(shí),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資不能顯著抑制盈余管理,甚至有可能助長(zhǎng)盈余管理行為。因此,目前需要監(jiān)管層理順體制機(jī)制,從制度上激發(fā)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)提供增值服務(wù)的積極性,并通過獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制給予風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)正確的引導(dǎo)。從而使風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)更好地發(fā)揮其作為專業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的職業(yè)能力,促進(jìn)我國資本市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展。 本文研究風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與IPO盈余管理的關(guān)系,拓展研究了盈余管理的抑制問題；并驗(yàn)證了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告監(jiān)督作用,為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的研究提供了“財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告監(jiān)督”這樣一個(gè)有益的視角；同時(shí)也對(duì)促進(jìn)我國資本市場(chǎng)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的健康發(fā)展有重要意義。
[Abstract]:IPO earnings management has always been an important research topic, investors will make wrong stock valuation and trading decisions because of whitewashed financial reports. Because venture capital not only injects funds into the invested company, but also provides a series of value-added services to govern the enterprise, that is, venture capital has a theoretical supervision role. Through empirical research, this paper examines whether venture capital has the role of financial reporting supervision, that is, whether venture capital can inhibit the IPO earnings management of invested companies. This paper studies three periods near IPO: the year before IPO, the year after IPO, and the year after IPO. The research object of this paper is gem. Considering the interference of the financial crisis in this special macro period, the listed companies in 2009 are eliminated, and 319 listed companies from 2010 to 2012 are selected as the research samples. In this paper, the operational accrual profit of the sample company is calculated by using the cross section modified Jones model by annual regression, which is used as the index to measure the degree of earnings management. Then, this paper takes into account the factors that may affect the degree of earnings management, such as the size of the company, financial leverage, growth, cash flow adequacy and so on. At the same time, taking the background of venture capital as a virtual variable, a multiple regression model is established. Verify that companies with venture capital background have lower level of earnings management than those without venture capital background. It is found that successful IPO has great interest temptation to venture capital institutions in our country, and venture capital shows moral hazard before IPO. Venture capital can not restrain earnings management, and even slightly contribute to earnings management. In view of the cautious and detailed project evaluation of venture capital institutions in the early stage, venture capital institutions can fully expect the good market performance of the company after the IPO is successful, at this time, the motivation of moral hazard is small, and it can support the supervision hypothesis. Venture capital began to play a role in curbing earnings management. However, this kind of supervision and inhibition also has its time limit. One year after IPO, because some venture capital institutions are about to withdraw, their supervision enthusiasm is not high, which shows that the supervision role is not significant. The above findings show that venture capital institutions value honest and high quality financial reports to a certain extent and consciously affect the quality of financial reports, but the willingness and enthusiasm of venture capital to supervise financial reports is not strong. In the case of conflict with short-term interests, venture capital can not significantly inhibit earnings management, and may even contribute to earnings management behavior. Therefore, at present, it is necessary for the regulatory level to straighten out the institutional mechanism, stimulate the enthusiasm of venture capital institutions to provide value-added services from the system, and give the venture capital institutions the correct guidance through the reward and punishment mechanism. So that venture capital institutions can give full play to their professional ability as professional investment institutions and promote the healthy development of China's capital market. This paper studies the relationship between venture capital and IPO earnings management, and expands and studies the suppression of earnings management. It also verifies the role of financial reporting supervision of venture capital, which provides a useful perspective for the study of venture capital, and is also of great significance to promote the healthy development of capital market and venture capital in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F276.6

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