【摘要】：銀行系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定與效率對于一個國家的經濟增長和社會福利具有巨大的影響。2008年因美國次貸問題引發(fā)的全球金融危機,造成了全球范圍的金融動蕩,給世界各國的經濟帶來嚴重沖擊,銀行正是其中關鍵的一環(huán)。危機的巨大危害性凸顯了提高銀行體系的安全和保持銀行體系的穩(wěn)定的極端重要性,也引發(fā)了各國對銀行監(jiān)管體系、銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管有效性的反思。20世紀70年代末80年代初以來,激勵理論被吸收到西方監(jiān)管經濟學當中,形成了激勵監(jiān)管理論。激勵監(jiān)管理論把監(jiān)管問題置于信息不對稱條件下的委托—代理分析的框架內,研究如何通過機制和制度設計去實現最優(yōu)監(jiān)管為目的。而后激勵性規(guī)制理論被引入銀行監(jiān)管領域后,強調監(jiān)管機構應參照銀行的經營目標,將銀行的內部管理和市場約束納入監(jiān)管的范圍,引導這兩種力量來支持監(jiān)管目標的實現。激勵相容銀行監(jiān)管日益得到各國監(jiān)管部門的吸納。尤其在金融危機背景下,新一輪監(jiān)管改革的舉措也大多體現了激勵相容的要求。通過對激勵相容銀行監(jiān)管理論的研究和監(jiān)管實踐有效性的評估,一方面在一定程度上豐富銀行監(jiān)管理論,另一方面為推進我國銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管改革、提升銀行監(jiān)管有效性提供有益的參考。本文在規(guī)制經濟學、管理經濟學、信息經濟學、金融監(jiān)管和博弈論等多學科的基礎上,以有效銀行監(jiān)管為主線,結合我國銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管實際,首先對國內外銀行監(jiān)管和激勵相容的相關理論研究進行綜述,再分析激勵相容與銀行監(jiān)管的結合點和交叉點,然后運用成本收益分析法和實證分析法,一方面從資本要求、市場約束的層面來具體測度和評估我國銀行監(jiān)管的有效性,另一方面從成本收益的角度對我國近些年來激勵相容銀行監(jiān)管的有效性進行整體衡量,最后結合金融危機背景下國際銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管面臨的新問題及挑戰(zhàn),提出完善激勵相容監(jiān)管體制機制,提升銀行監(jiān)管有效性的路徑、方法和措施。本文對資本監(jiān)管實證分析表明,我國資本監(jiān)管提高了商業(yè)銀行資本充足率,降低了商業(yè)銀行風險。但是,隨著時間的推移,大多數的銀行的資本充足率已經超過8%,并且自從2010年后資本充足率都超過了10%,資本監(jiān)管所產生的管制效應以及風險減低的效應都在逐漸地減弱。本文市場約束實證分析表明,我國存款人在選擇存款銀行時并不從商業(yè)銀行的財務數據信號進行選擇,往往只選擇規(guī)模大的。甚至在不良貸款率越高、利潤率越低、資本充足率越低的情況下,規(guī)模大的商業(yè)銀行的存款增長還更多。這種存款市場不成熟現象很可能是出于公眾“大而不倒”的預期。這說明我國的存款市場還不成熟,在信息的傳播上并非是有效的,商業(yè)銀行存款人的市場約束相對薄弱。本文從成本收益分析法進行驗證后表明,我國銀行監(jiān)管收益大于銀行監(jiān)管成本。但是對比“減少金融犯罪案件”這一目標,金融犯罪案件呈現次數和數額的“雙增長”,可以看出這一塊的社會福利損失是很大的,這也與前面的實證分析的匹配,說明我國在資本充足和市場約束激勵相容監(jiān)管的實踐下,雖然在一定程度上實現了銀行業(yè)有效監(jiān)管(這其中監(jiān)督檢查、行業(yè)組織的力量和銀行內部控制同樣起到作用),但激勵相容監(jiān)管有效性需進一步提高。對此,要改進現行銀行監(jiān)管體制,切實厘清適度監(jiān)管的定位、加強差別化監(jiān)管、融合銀行內部管理、強化市場約束監(jiān)管,構建新形勢下適合我國銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管實踐的激勵相容監(jiān)管體系。
[Abstract]:The stability and efficiency of the banking system have a great impact on the economic growth and social welfare of a country. The global financial crisis, which was triggered by the American subprime problem in 2008, has caused a global financial turmoil and a severe impact on the economies of the world, The bank is one of the key rings. The great harm of the crisis has highlighted the extreme importance of improving the security of the banking system and maintaining the stability of the banking system, and also raised the reflection of the supervision and effectiveness of the banks in the banking supervision system and the banking supervision. Since the early 1980s, The theory of incentive is absorbed into the western supervision and economics, and the theory of incentive regulation is formed. The incentive regulation theory puts the supervision problem in the framework of the agency analysis of the entrusted agency under the condition of information asymmetry, and studies how to achieve the best supervision through the mechanism and the system design. Then, after the incentive regulation theory is introduced into the bank supervision field, it is emphasized that the regulator should refer to the operation target of the bank, and incorporate the internal management and market constraints of the bank into the scope of supervision, and guide these two forces to support the realization of the regulatory target. The supervision of incentive-compatible banks is increasingly being absorbed by various regulatory authorities. In the context of the financial crisis, especially in the context of the financial crisis, the new round of regulatory reform has also reflected the requirements of incentive compatibility. Through the research on the supervision theory of the incentive-compatible bank and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the supervision and practice, on the one hand, the bank supervision theory is enriched to a certain extent, and on the other hand, it is helpful to promote the reform of the banking supervision of our country and to improve the effectiveness of the supervision of the bank. This paper, on the basis of regulation economics, management economics, information economics, financial supervision and game theory, based on effective banking supervision as the main line, in combination with the practice of China's banking supervision, firstly reviews the relevant theoretical research of domestic and foreign bank supervision and incentive compatibility, Then, the binding point and the intersection point of the incentive compatibility and the bank supervision are analyzed, then the cost-benefit analysis method and the empirical analysis method are used, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the bank supervision in China is measured and evaluated on the one hand from the capital requirement and the market constraint level, On the other hand, from the point of view of the cost benefit, the effectiveness of the supervision of the incentive-compatible bank in recent years is measured, and the new problems and challenges facing the international banking supervision in the context of the financial crisis are put forward. The path, method and measure to improve the effectiveness of the bank's supervision. The empirical analysis of capital supervision shows that the capital management of China has raised the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks and reduced the risk of commercial banks. However, over time, most banks have a capital adequacy ratio of more than 8%, and the effects of regulatory effects and risk reduction have been gradually weakened since the capital adequacy ratio of more than 10% since 2010. The empirical analysis of the market constraints in this paper shows that the depositors of our country do not choose the financial data signal from the commercial bank when the deposit bank is selected. Even in the case of the higher the non-performing loan rate, the lower the profit margin, the lower the capital adequacy ratio, the larger the deposit growth of the large-scale commercial banks. The unripe phenomenon of such a deposit market is likely to be a public 鈥渂ig-and-no-fall鈥，

本文編號：2413291