【摘要】：本文界定了理財(cái)產(chǎn)品的定義,將其定義為：投資者作為委托方,商業(yè)銀行作為受托方,按照事前制訂以投資計(jì)劃與管理方式為內(nèi)容的契約而建立的委托-代理關(guān)系的銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)。在此基礎(chǔ)上梳理了我國理財(cái)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展歷程,本文認(rèn)為前后經(jīng)歷了 初步發(fā)展期、快速發(fā)展、金融危機(jī)后的調(diào)整期、逐漸成熟期。引入理財(cái)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)概念,認(rèn)為理財(cái)產(chǎn)品風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就是商業(yè)銀行在研發(fā)、銷售、投資、核算過程中的,由于各種不可有因素的影響,所形成的對(duì)于投資者約定收益率的偏差程度,是一種客觀存在的無法消滅的不確定性。在此基礎(chǔ)上,將理財(cái)產(chǎn)品風(fēng)險(xiǎn)歸納為市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、操作風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 運(yùn)用信息不對(duì)稱下委托代理理論作為本文的基礎(chǔ)理論,分析了理財(cái)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)中委托代理關(guān)系的表現(xiàn)與理解委托代理成本的重要性,進(jìn)而得出理論分析結(jié)論：理財(cái)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)需要充分的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露。從調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)與網(wǎng)絡(luò)資料入手,嘗試分析我國理財(cái)產(chǎn)品風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露現(xiàn)狀,認(rèn)為存在如下問題：1、未充分披露產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)過程中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；2、銷售階段客戶風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)級(jí)流于形式；3、未能建立完整的事前、事中、事后信息披露機(jī)制；4、銷售環(huán)節(jié)回避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；5、刻意夸大收益水平；6、理財(cái)產(chǎn)品說明書過于復(fù)雜；7、銷售人員管理存在漏洞。這些問題既是行業(yè)發(fā)展中的問題,也引起了社會(huì)高度關(guān)注。 面對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露存在的問題,理財(cái)產(chǎn)品放任似的發(fā)展不能緩解委托代理沖突,所以需要外部干預(yù)來達(dá)到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)信息的充分有效披露。引入理財(cái)產(chǎn)品監(jiān)管層——中國銀監(jiān)會(huì)2011年通過的《商業(yè)銀行理財(cái)產(chǎn)品銷售管理辦法》,逐條分析了《商業(yè)銀行理財(cái)產(chǎn)品銷售管理辦法》涉及理財(cái)產(chǎn)品風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露的條款以及對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露活動(dòng)的影響。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)《商業(yè)銀行理財(cái)產(chǎn)品銷售管理辦法》是理財(cái)產(chǎn)品行業(yè)發(fā)展到一定階段的問題與解決之道的制度回饋,全面系統(tǒng)的規(guī)范了包括風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露在內(nèi)的理財(cái)產(chǎn)品銷售環(huán)節(jié)的基本原則、制度建設(shè)、操作規(guī)范與法律責(zé)任,從理論上講,既具有宏觀指導(dǎo)意義,又不失微觀可操作性,是一部“良法”。值得我們關(guān)注理解并切實(shí)施行。在大量理論分析與歸納結(jié)論之上,引入了一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)案例,從投資者、商業(yè)銀行和法院三個(gè)角度進(jìn)行分析,重點(diǎn)結(jié)合風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露現(xiàn)狀和監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析,拓展了現(xiàn)實(shí)問題的深度以及理論研究的方向。最后對(duì)相關(guān)問題,做出了政策性建議,以期完善我國理財(cái)產(chǎn)品風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露市場(chǎng)建設(shè)。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the definition of financial products is defined as: investors as clients, commercial banks as trustees, The operation of a bank with a principal-agent relationship established in accordance with a prior contract based on investment planning and management. On this basis, the paper combs the development course of the financial products market in China. The author thinks that the financial products market has experienced the initial development period, the rapid development, the adjustment period after the financial crisis, and the gradually mature period before and after the financial crisis. By introducing the concept of financial risk, we think that the risk of financial products is the degree of deviation of the agreed rate of return for investors in the process of R & D, sales, investment and accounting of commercial banks, due to the influence of various factors. Is an objective and inexorable uncertainty. On this basis, the risks of financial products are classified as market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputation risk. Using the principal-agent theory under asymmetric information as the basic theory of this paper, this paper analyzes the performance of principal-agent relationship in the market of financial products and the importance of understanding the principal-agent cost. The conclusion of theoretical analysis is that the market of financial products needs adequate risk disclosure. Based on the investigation data and network data, this paper tries to analyze the present situation of financial product risk disclosure in our country, and thinks that there is the following problem: 1, the risk in product design is not fully disclosed, and the customer risk rating in sales stage is just a formality; 3, failure to establish a complete prior, in the matter, after the information disclosure mechanism, sales links avoid risk 5, deliberately exaggerate the level of income 6, financial product specifications are too complex, sales personnel management loopholes. These problems are not only the problems in the development of the industry, but also the high concern of the society. Faced with the problems of risk disclosure, the development of financial products as laissez-faire can not alleviate the principal-agent conflict, so external intervention is needed to achieve the full and effective disclosure of risk information. This paper introduces the supervision layer of financial management products (CBRC), which was adopted by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2011, and analyzes the articles on the risk disclosure of financial management products involved in the measures for the Management of Financial products of Commercial Banks one by one. And the impact on risk disclosure activities. This paper finds that the Management method of Financial products sales in Commercial Banks is the system feedback for the development of the financial products industry to a certain stage and the way to solve it. It comprehensively and systematically standardizes the basic principles, system construction, operational norms and legal responsibilities of financial management product sales links, including risk disclosure. Theoretically, it has both macroscopic guiding significance and microcosmic maneuverability. It's a good law. We should pay attention to understanding and practical implementation. Based on a large number of theoretical analysis and conclusion, this paper introduces a practical case, from the investors, commercial banks and the court to analyze the current situation of risk disclosure and supervision. Expand the depth of practical problems and the direction of theoretical research. Finally, some policy suggestions are made in order to perfect the market construction of risk disclosure of financial products in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.2

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