我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行公司治理對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為的影響研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-12 17:01
【摘要】：商業(yè)銀行以貨幣為產(chǎn)品高杠桿經(jīng)營(yíng),其存在和發(fā)展必須以承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為前提。08年爆發(fā)的金融危機(jī),由于影響的廣泛性、嚴(yán)重性和持久性,使人們逐步意識(shí)到僅依靠政府監(jiān)管約束銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為不太現(xiàn)實(shí),必須重視公司治理對(duì)控制銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的重要作用。因此,本文試圖探討商業(yè)銀行公司治理對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為有何影響以及如何影響,其中本文研究的商業(yè)銀行公司治理屬于廣義范疇,包括內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制和外部治理機(jī)制。首先,以現(xiàn)有的理論為基礎(chǔ),理論分析商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)、外部治理機(jī)制對(duì)其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為的影響,內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制主要考慮股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、組織制衡機(jī)制(包括董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事占比、監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模)和激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制(包括管理層報(bào)酬和持股),外部治理機(jī)制主要考慮政府監(jiān)管(包括資本充足率監(jiān)管、存款保險(xiǎn)制度和特許權(quán)價(jià)值)和市場(chǎng)約束。其次,在Jeitschko和Jeung理論模型的基礎(chǔ)上,加入政府監(jiān)管、市場(chǎng)約束變量,建立一個(gè)考慮商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)、外部治理機(jī)制的一般性理論分析框架,探討公司內(nèi)、外部治理因素如何影響商業(yè)銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為。再次,以除光大、農(nóng)行外14家上市商業(yè)銀行從2007下半年-2012年年底的相關(guān)半年度數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,實(shí)證研究我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行公司治理對(duì)其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為的影響。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明：1.股權(quán)集中度與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平呈U型關(guān)系,第一大股東具有國(guó)有性質(zhì)會(huì)降低銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平；2.董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平的影響系數(shù)雖然很小,但與后者顯著負(fù)相關(guān),獨(dú)立董事占比與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平正相關(guān)；3.管理層薪酬水平與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平負(fù)相關(guān),管理層持股與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平正相關(guān)；4.資本監(jiān)管與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為顯著負(fù)相關(guān),存款人的市場(chǎng)約束與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為負(fù)相關(guān)；5.資產(chǎn)規(guī)模、資本杠桿與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平顯著正相關(guān)。最后,依據(jù)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行公司內(nèi)、外部治理對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為的影響效果,提出相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:The existence and development of commercial banks with high leverage of money as products must be based on the assumption of risk. The financial crisis broke out in 2008, due to the universality, severity and durability of the impact, It makes people realize that it is not realistic to rely on government supervision to restrain banks' risk behavior, so we must pay attention to the important role of corporate governance in controlling banks' risk behavior. Therefore, this paper attempts to explore the impact of corporate governance on risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks and how to influence it. The corporate governance of commercial banks studied in this paper belongs to a broad category, including internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism. First of all, based on the existing theories, this paper theoretically analyzes the influence of internal and external governance mechanisms on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. The internal governance mechanism mainly considers the ownership structure, the organization and checks and balances mechanism (including the size of the board of directors). The proportion of independent directors, the size of board of supervisors, incentive and restraint mechanism (including management compensation and stock holding), external governance mechanism mainly consider government supervision (including capital adequacy regulation, deposit insurance system and franchise value) and market constraints. Secondly, based on the theoretical model of Jeitschko and Jeung, we add the variables of government supervision and market constraint, and establish a general theoretical analysis framework to consider the internal and external governance mechanism of commercial banks. How external governance factors affect the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. Thirdly, taking the relevant semi-annual data of 14 listed commercial banks from the second half of 2007 to the end of 2012 as the research sample, this paper empirically studies the impact of corporate governance on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks in China. The empirical results show that 1: 1. There is a U-shaped relationship between equity concentration and bank risk level, and the state-owned nature of the largest shareholder will reduce the bank risk level by 2. 5%. Although the influence coefficient of board size on bank risk level is very small, it is negatively correlated with the latter, and the proportion of independent director is positively related to bank risk level. The compensation level of management is negatively correlated with the level of bank risk, and the level of bank risk is positively correlated with managerial shareholding. There is a significant negative correlation between capital supervision and bank risk behavior, and a negative correlation between depositors' market constraint and bank risk behavior. Asset size, capital leverage and bank risk levels are significantly positively correlated. Finally, according to the effect of external governance on risk-bearing behavior in Chinese commercial banks, relevant policy recommendations are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33
[Abstract]:The existence and development of commercial banks with high leverage of money as products must be based on the assumption of risk. The financial crisis broke out in 2008, due to the universality, severity and durability of the impact, It makes people realize that it is not realistic to rely on government supervision to restrain banks' risk behavior, so we must pay attention to the important role of corporate governance in controlling banks' risk behavior. Therefore, this paper attempts to explore the impact of corporate governance on risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks and how to influence it. The corporate governance of commercial banks studied in this paper belongs to a broad category, including internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism. First of all, based on the existing theories, this paper theoretically analyzes the influence of internal and external governance mechanisms on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. The internal governance mechanism mainly considers the ownership structure, the organization and checks and balances mechanism (including the size of the board of directors). The proportion of independent directors, the size of board of supervisors, incentive and restraint mechanism (including management compensation and stock holding), external governance mechanism mainly consider government supervision (including capital adequacy regulation, deposit insurance system and franchise value) and market constraints. Secondly, based on the theoretical model of Jeitschko and Jeung, we add the variables of government supervision and market constraint, and establish a general theoretical analysis framework to consider the internal and external governance mechanism of commercial banks. How external governance factors affect the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. Thirdly, taking the relevant semi-annual data of 14 listed commercial banks from the second half of 2007 to the end of 2012 as the research sample, this paper empirically studies the impact of corporate governance on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks in China. The empirical results show that 1: 1. There is a U-shaped relationship between equity concentration and bank risk level, and the state-owned nature of the largest shareholder will reduce the bank risk level by 2. 5%. Although the influence coefficient of board size on bank risk level is very small, it is negatively correlated with the latter, and the proportion of independent director is positively related to bank risk level. The compensation level of management is negatively correlated with the level of bank risk, and the level of bank risk is positively correlated with managerial shareholding. There is a significant negative correlation between capital supervision and bank risk behavior, and a negative correlation between depositors' market constraint and bank risk behavior. Asset size, capital leverage and bank risk levels are significantly positively correlated. Finally, according to the effect of external governance on risk-bearing behavior in Chinese commercial banks, relevant policy recommendations are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33
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