本文選題：國有商業(yè)銀行 + 產權結構��； 參考：《南開大學》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：金融體系作為現代市場經濟的核心，其穩(wěn)定與否直接影響著國家的經濟安全和社會穩(wěn)定，這也是金融安全的真諦所在。鑒于金融體系在國家經濟安全中的重要性以及金融危機給世界各國經濟所帶來的嚴重威脅，中國政府決定全面推進金融體制改革。而國有商業(yè)銀行作為我國金融體系的最重要組成部分，無疑成為金融體制改革中的關鍵環(huán)節(jié)。四大國有商業(yè)銀行自成立以來，在促進國民經濟發(fā)展、保持宏觀經濟穩(wěn)定以及維護社會穩(wěn)定等方面都作出了巨大貢獻。但由于歷史及現實的原因，四大國有商業(yè)銀行在產權與治理結構等方面仍存在一些問題，如果它們不進行結構和機制創(chuàng)新，將影響金融體系的安全與穩(wěn)定，進而對國家金融安全和經濟安全產生威脅。因此，有必要深入探究國有商業(yè)銀行產權和治理結構中存在的問題，進行產權與治理結構創(chuàng)新，從根本上促進四大國有商業(yè)銀行穩(wěn)健經營和可持續(xù)發(fā)展，維護國家金融穩(wěn)定和經濟安全。 論文以國有商業(yè)銀行產權與治理結構改革遺留和產生的問題為切入點，以馬克思主義經濟學的基本原理為指導，在批判、借鑒西方產權與公司治理理論的基礎上，研究了國有商業(yè)銀行產權結構中的國有股與非國有股、國有商業(yè)銀行的內部治理結構以及產權與治理結構的綜合績效評估標準，分析了產權與治理結構現存問題的成因，提出了解決這些問題的思路和舉措。在研究過程中，論文綜合運用了馬克思主義歷史與邏輯相統(tǒng)一的方法、規(guī)范分析與實證研究相結合法、歸納分析法、文獻研究法等多種研究方法，遵循“提出問題--分析問題--解決問題”的研究思路，主要取得了以下研究成果： 論文以國有商業(yè)銀行股權多元化改革為研究對象，指出由生產力與生產關系矛盾運動規(guī)律所決定，，國有商業(yè)銀行股權多元化改革必須保證國家絕對控股，股權多元化改革的關鍵不是國家應不應放棄絕對控股地位，而是如何確定國家絕對控股前提下的國有股最佳控股方式和比重，通過這種方式和比重既能保證國家控制金融命脈，又能充分調動非國有股東的積極性，以最大限度地發(fā)揮國有股東與非國有股東的協同效應。針對這一問題，筆者在比較分析四種國有股產權持有主體設計方案的基礎上，提出了以下觀點：應組建專門的國有商業(yè)銀行國有資本運營公司來代表國家行使絕對控股權（賦予其管資本權、管人權、管事權，落實國有股東權利），并采用“財政部--國有商業(yè)銀行國有資本運營公司--國有商業(yè)銀行”的三層管理模式來實現政企分開、政資分開、所有權與經營權分開；提出國有股比重應不低于51%，以最大程度的發(fā)揮其控制力和影響力。 論文以國有商業(yè)銀行引進非國有股所產生的問題為研究對象，指出國有商業(yè)銀行引進非國有股有其客觀必要性，通過引進非國有股可以堅持和完善我國基本經濟制度、充實國有商業(yè)銀行的資本充足率、提升國有商業(yè)銀行的綜合創(chuàng)新能力和國際化水平、促進我國金融業(yè)監(jiān)管水平的提高，但引進非國有股所產生的金融安全問題和戰(zhàn)略投資者蛻變?yōu)樨攧胀顿Y者問題也不容忽視。引進非國有股所產生問題的根本原因在于私有資本的逐利本性，主要原因在于引資對象的偏失，因而解決問題的關鍵在于引進合格的非國有股東，并施以有效管控。針對這一問題，筆者在對中國銀行的戰(zhàn)略引資行為進行案例分析和反思的基礎上，明確了非國有股東的引進類型、選擇標準以及引進方式，提出了引進非國有股的配套措施。 論文以國有商業(yè)銀行內部治理存在的問題為研究對象，指出國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理現存問題是公司治理機制不完善導致的，因而解決問題的關鍵在于構建出科學高效的決策機制、公平合理的激勵機制、強有力的監(jiān)督機制。針對國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的現存問題，論文提出了以下解決思路和措施：第一，設計了以類別表決制與民主集中制相結合為主的國有商業(yè)銀行決策機制，該機制采取累積投票制來選舉國有商業(yè)銀行決策主體，以保證非控股股東獲得一定比例的決策層席位，使其有機會和途徑表達他們的利益訴求，對于特定情形下國有商業(yè)銀行日常經營性決策采用類別表決法和“董事會--決策監(jiān)督委員會--監(jiān)事會”三級決議異議處理方法，以提高國有商銀行決策的科學性和決策效率。第二，設計了以差異化薪酬為核心的國有商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬激勵機制，該機制以公平與效率相結合原則為指導，在對銀行高管進行分類的基礎上，構建了國有商業(yè)銀行激勵考核標準和薪酬激勵手段，以提高激勵機制的公平合理性。第三，設計了以監(jiān)事會為核心的國有商業(yè)銀行監(jiān)控機制，該機制在重新界定內部治理權利結構的基礎上，構建了以監(jiān)事會為核心的監(jiān)控機制，以保障所有者所有權與控制權相統(tǒng)一，進而防范和解決內部人控制問題。 論文以國有商業(yè)銀行產權與治理結構績效評估標準為研究對象，指出現有的商業(yè)銀行產權與治理結構績效評估標準不能客觀的反映國有商業(yè)銀行產權與治理結構的績效水平，因而有必要設計一套涵蓋宏觀績效、中觀績效和微觀績效三個層次的綜合績效評估體系。針對這一問題，筆者在吸收、借鑒國內外主要商業(yè)銀行產權與治理結構績效評估體系的基礎上，設計了國有商業(yè)銀行產權與治理結構綜合績效評估標準，該標準突出了宏觀績效考核和中觀績效考核，以全面的反映國有商業(yè)銀行產權與治理結構的真實績效水平。
[Abstract]:As the core of the modern market economy, the financial system has a direct impact on the economic security and social stability of the country. This is the true meaning of the financial security. In view of the importance of the financial system in the national economic security and the serious threat to the economies of the world, the Chinese government has decided to promote it in an all-round way. As the most important part of our financial system, the state-owned commercial banks have undoubtedly become the key link in the reform of the financial system. Since the establishment of the four state-owned commercial banks, they have made great contributions to promoting the development of the national economy, maintaining the stability of the macro-economy and maintaining the stability of the society. The four major state-owned commercial banks still have some problems in property rights and governance structure. If they do not carry out the structure and mechanism innovation, they will affect the security and stability of the financial system, and then threaten the national financial security and economic security. The problems existing in the governance structure and the innovation of property rights and governance structure will fundamentally promote the steady operation and sustainable development of the four state-owned commercial banks, and maintain the national financial stability and economic security.
On the basis of the theory of western property rights and corporate governance, the thesis takes the basic principles of Marx's economics as the guide, and studies the internal and non-state-owned shares of state-owned commercial banks, and the internal commercial banks in the property rights structure of state-owned commercial banks. The comprehensive performance evaluation standard of the Ministry governing structure and the property right and the governance structure, analyses the causes of the existing problems of the property right and the governance structure, and puts forward the ideas and measures to solve these problems. In the course of the study, the paper uses the method of unification of Marx's history and logic, the normative analysis and the empirical research. Many research methods, such as inductive analysis, literature research and so on, follow the research ideas of "putting forward questions - analyzing problems - solving problems", and the following research results are obtained.
The paper takes the reform of the ownership diversification of the state-owned commercial banks as the research object, and points out that the ownership diversification reform of the state-owned commercial banks must guarantee the absolute holding of the state. The key to the reform of the ownership diversification is not that the country should not abandon the absolute holding position, but how to determine the state's overwhelming majority. The best way and proportion of the state-owned shares under the precondition of holding can not only guarantee the state to control the financial lifeline, but also fully mobilize the enthusiasm of the non state-owned shareholders, so as to maximize the synergy between the state-owned and non-state shareholders. In this case, the author compares and analyzes four kinds of property rights of state-owned shares. On the basis of holding the main design scheme, the following views are put forward: a special state-owned commercial bank state capital operation company should be set up to represent the state to exercise the absolute controlling power (giving it the right to manage capital, managing human rights, managing the right to carry out the rights of the state-owned shareholders), and adopting the "Ministry of Finance - state owned commercial bank state capital operation company - state - state - state" The three layer management mode of commercial banks can separate the government from the enterprises, separate the government and capital, and separate the ownership from the management. The proportion of the state-owned shares should not be less than 51%, so as to exert its control and influence to the greatest extent.
The paper takes the problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares by state-owned commercial banks, and points out that the introduction of non-state owned shares by state-owned commercial banks has its objective necessity. Through the introduction of non-state-owned shares, the basic economic system can be adhered to and perfected in China, the rate of capital filling of state-owned commercial banks can be enriched and the comprehensive innovation of state-owned commercial banks can be promoted. The level of force and internationalization promotes the improvement of the level of financial supervision in China. However, the financial security problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares and the transformation of strategic investors into financial investors can not be ignored. The fundamental reason for the problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares lies in the nature of profit seeking of private capital, mainly due to the bias of the target. The key to solve the problem lies in the introduction of qualified non state shareholders and effective control. On this issue, on the basis of the case analysis and Reflection on the strategic investment behavior of the Bank of China, the author clarifies the types of non state shareholders, the selection criteria and the way of introduction, and puts forward the introduction of non state owned shares. Set measures.
The paper takes the problems existing in the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks as the research object, points out that the existing problems of the corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks are caused by the imperfect corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the key to solving the problem lies in the construction of a scientific and efficient decision-making mechanism, a fair and reasonable incentive mechanism and a strong supervision mechanism. The following solutions and measures are put forward in the paper. First, the decision mechanism of the state-owned commercial banks is designed by the combination of category voting system and democratic centralism. The mechanism adopts the cumulative voting system to elect the decision-makers of the state-owned commercial banks, so as to ensure a certain proportion of the non controlling shareholders. The policy layer seats make them have the opportunity and way to express their interest demands, and adopt the class voting method and the "board of directors - the supervisory committee - the board of supervisors" three resolution dissenting methods for the daily operational decision of the state-owned commercial banks to improve the scientific and decision-making efficiency of the state-owned commercial banks' decision. Second, Taking the differential compensation as the core, the incentive mechanism of executive compensation of the state-owned commercial banks is taken as the core. The mechanism is guided by the principle of combining fairness and efficiency. On the basis of the classification of the bank executives, the incentive assessment standard and salary incentive means are constructed to raise the fairness and rationality of the high incentive mechanism. Third, the design is designed. The supervisory mechanism of the state-owned commercial banks, which is the core of the board of supervisors, is based on the redefinition of the structure of the internal governance rights. The monitoring mechanism is built on the core of the board of supervisors to ensure the unity of ownership and control, and then to prevent and solve the problem of insider control.
This paper studies the performance evaluation standards of property rights and governance structures of state-owned commercial banks, and points out that the existing performance evaluation standards of commercial banks' property rights and governance structures can not objectively reflect the performance level of property rights and governance structures of state-owned commercial banks. Therefore, it is necessary to design a set of macro performance, medium performance and micro performance. On the basis of absorbing, drawing on the performance evaluation system of property rights and governance structure of major commercial banks both at home and abroad, the author designs a comprehensive performance evaluation standard for property rights and governance structure of state-owned commercial banks. The standard shows the macro performance assessment and the medium performance assessment, which is based on the overall performance evaluation system. It reflects the real performance level of state-owned commercial banks' property rights and governance structure.
【學位授予單位】：南開大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.33;F271

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本文編號：1982202