本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 + 高管變更�。� 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者隊(duì)伍在我國(guó)得到迅猛發(fā)展,并且逐漸成為資本市場(chǎng)上舉足輕重的中堅(jiān)力量。2000年上半年,中國(guó)證券監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)提出了“超常規(guī)、創(chuàng)造性地培育和發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者”的口號(hào),雖然當(dāng)年即爆發(fā)了一些負(fù)面事件,但監(jiān)管層超常規(guī)發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的決心并沒(méi)有因此改變。2004年初,國(guó)務(wù)院出臺(tái)的《國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于推進(jìn)資本市場(chǎng)改革開(kāi)放和穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的若干建議》中也指出,要培養(yǎng)一批誠(chéng)信、守法、專業(yè)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,使以基金管理公司和保險(xiǎn)公司為主的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者成為資本市場(chǎng)的主導(dǎo)力量。近幾年,證監(jiān)會(huì)把超常規(guī)、創(chuàng)造性地培養(yǎng)和發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作為推進(jìn)中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的重要政策手段,QFII制度的實(shí)施、保險(xiǎn)和社保基金的入市,使得機(jī)構(gòu)投資者比例日益增加。 在我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的不斷發(fā)展過(guò)程中,越來(lái)越多的學(xué)者開(kāi)始對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的情況進(jìn)行相關(guān)的研究。最開(kāi)始的研究更多的是對(duì)國(guó)外理論和實(shí)踐的引進(jìn)與學(xué)習(xí),現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)有了較為深入的理論分析和實(shí)證研究,這也表明我國(guó)學(xué)者針對(duì)此類研究已經(jīng)日漸成熟。 而在理論界諸多的研究中,對(duì)于我國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與上市公司治理的影響力卻一直存在著爭(zhēng)議：我國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是否真正參與了上市公司的公司治理?如果參與到了公司治理中,那么是存在積極的治理作用還是產(chǎn)生了消極的后果?而不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在發(fā)揮其治理作用時(shí)是否有不同之處呢?正是基于理論界對(duì)于上述問(wèn)題的爭(zhēng)議,筆者認(rèn)為有必要對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理產(chǎn)生的影響力進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步地探討,并從高管變更的角度進(jìn)行研究。同時(shí),不同的地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展速度不同,市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程也不相同,那么市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程的不同是否也會(huì)影響到機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的公司治理效果?這些都是本文認(rèn)為值得探討的問(wèn)題。 正是出于以上原因,本文擬對(duì)以下問(wèn)題進(jìn)行理論分析和實(shí)證的檢驗(yàn)：(1)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在替換業(yè)績(jī)較差高管的過(guò)程中到底是演繹著什么樣的角色呢,“有效監(jiān)督者”、“旁觀者”抑或是“合謀者”?(2)不同的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)公司高管變更的影響力是否存在差異?(3)市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程的不同是否會(huì)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司高管變更的影響力產(chǎn)生不同? 本文共分為六章,研究?jī)?nèi)容如下： 第一章為緒論,簡(jiǎn)要介紹了本文的研究目的與研究意義,研究?jī)?nèi)容與方法,以及本文主要的貢獻(xiàn)。 第二章為相關(guān)的概念界定以及國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究的文獻(xiàn)述評(píng),主要對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、異質(zhì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、公司治理以及高管變更的定義進(jìn)行了闡述,對(duì)本文涉及到的基礎(chǔ)理論進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要地分析,如委托代理理論和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)理論,同時(shí)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)按照以下幾個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了梳理：(1)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的意愿以及監(jiān)督效率；(2)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的主要領(lǐng)域；(3)高管變更的影響因素。 第三章是對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在公司高管變更過(guò)程中所產(chǎn)生作用力的理論進(jìn)行分析并提出相應(yīng)的假設(shè)。理論分析主要包括以下幾個(gè)方面：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者影響高管變更的動(dòng)因分析,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者影響公司高管變更的方式分析,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者影響高管變更的理論分析,異質(zhì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者影響高管變更的效應(yīng)分析,以及市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程的快慢對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司高管變更決策的理論分析。進(jìn)而根據(jù)下面的疑問(wèn)提出了相應(yīng)的假設(shè)：(1)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在替換業(yè)績(jī)不佳的上市公司高管過(guò)程中發(fā)揮的作用。(2)不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)揮的作用是否有所差異。(3)上市公司所在地的市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程的快慢程度是否會(huì)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與高管變更產(chǎn)生影響。 第四章為研究設(shè)計(jì),主要介紹了樣本選擇的方法以及數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)源,說(shuō)明了變量選取的原因,同時(shí)對(duì)本文模型的構(gòu)建進(jìn)行了解釋,并對(duì)采用的變量進(jìn)行了定義。 第五章為實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)與結(jié)果分析。首先是對(duì)本文所運(yùn)用的基礎(chǔ)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,并進(jìn)行變量之間的相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)。接著運(yùn)用stata軟件對(duì)模型進(jìn)行相關(guān)的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),在獲得檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果后進(jìn)行了相應(yīng)的解釋。 第六章為本文相關(guān)的研究結(jié)論以及相對(duì)應(yīng)的政策建議部分。在該部分根據(jù)文章的理論分析以及實(shí)證研究結(jié)果概括出相關(guān)的研究結(jié)論并提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議,同時(shí)總結(jié)了文章的不足之處,并對(duì)未來(lái)在該方面可進(jìn)行的研究方向進(jìn)行了說(shuō)明。 本文研究后發(fā)現(xiàn)： (1)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股比例越高,上市公司的高管因業(yè)績(jī)?cè)蚨l(fā)生非常規(guī)變更的概率就更大。說(shuō)明機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在替換業(yè)績(jī)不佳的高管時(shí)發(fā)揮了積極的治理作用。 (2)與壓力敏感型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者相比,壓力抵制型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者相對(duì)能夠提高上市公司高管因業(yè)績(jī)?cè)蚨l(fā)生非常規(guī)更換的概率。 (3)與市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程相對(duì)較慢的地區(qū)相比,市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程相對(duì)快的地區(qū)能夠促進(jìn)壓力抵制型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理,提高上市公司高管因業(yè)績(jī)?cè)蚨l(fā)生非常規(guī)更換的概率。 在該論文的寫作過(guò)程中,通過(guò)筆者對(duì)文獻(xiàn)的閱讀以及對(duì)框架的構(gòu)思,主要做出了以下貢獻(xiàn)： (1)拓寬了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作用于我國(guó)上市公司治理的相關(guān)研究領(lǐng)域。從文獻(xiàn)綜述中可以看出,當(dāng)前國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者對(duì)于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與到我國(guó)上市公司治理所產(chǎn)生的影響研究主要集中在高管薪酬、盈余管理、股利政策等領(lǐng)域,而很少有學(xué)者從高管變更的視角來(lái)探討機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司治理的影響力。而本文試圖從高管變更的視角來(lái)探討機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)我國(guó)公司治理所產(chǎn)生的影響,以此來(lái)拓寬機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作用于公司治理的研究領(lǐng)域。 (2)通過(guò)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的類型進(jìn)行劃分,探討了不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在參與上市公司高管變更的決策過(guò)程中所發(fā)揮的作用力。 (3)研究了市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程的快慢對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與上市公司的高管變更決策產(chǎn)生的影響。之前有一些文獻(xiàn)研究了市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程對(duì)高管的薪酬機(jī)制可能產(chǎn)生的影響,但是對(duì)高管變更決策產(chǎn)生的影響還沒(méi)有學(xué)者研究過(guò)。作者試圖將市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程的快慢作為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與高管變更決策的重要影響因素進(jìn)行研究。 本文存在的不足之處： (1)限于現(xiàn)有數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中總經(jīng)理變更數(shù)據(jù)缺失較多,本文僅僅是對(duì)董事長(zhǎng)的非常規(guī)變更進(jìn)行了研究,而并沒(méi)有對(duì)總經(jīng)理的非常規(guī)變更進(jìn)行研究。難以將兩個(gè)職位的變更進(jìn)行對(duì)比研究,這是本文的一個(gè)缺憾。 (2)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股普遍存在內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題,本文通過(guò)采用滯后一期的業(yè)績(jī)變量來(lái)減弱相關(guān)的內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題所產(chǎn)生的影響,但是這并不能完全消除這種內(nèi)生性所產(chǎn)生的影響。如何更好的控制研究中存在的內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題,是未來(lái)研究中還需要改進(jìn)的地方。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the team of institutional investors has developed rapidly in China, and has gradually become a key force in the capital market in the first half of.2000. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission has put forward the slogan of "supernormal, creative and developing institutional investors". Although some negative events have been broke out in the year, the supervision and Management Committee of the China Securities Regulatory Commission The determination of the ultra normal development of institutional investors has not changed the beginning of.2004. The State Council issued a number of suggestions on promoting the reform and opening up of the capital market and the steady development of the capital market. It also points out that a number of institutional investors with good faith, law-abiding and professional are needed to make investment based on fund management companies and insurance companies. In recent years, the SFC has developed and developed the institutional investors as an important policy means to promote the development of China's securities market. The implementation of the QFII system, insurance and the entry of the social security fund have made institutional investors increasing.
In the process of the continuous development of institutional investors in China, more and more scholars have begun to study the situation of institutional investors participating in corporate governance. Most of the first studies are the introduction and study of foreign theories and practices. Now there have been more in-depth theoretical analysis and empirical research, which also shows that China is a national study. This kind of research has become more mature.
In many theoretical circles, there is a dispute about the influence of institutional investors participating in the governance of Listed Companies in China: does our institutional investor really participate in the corporate governance of the listed companies? If they are involved in the corporate governance, there is a positive effect or a negative effect on the corporate governance. What is the difference between different types of institutional investors when they play its role? It is based on the controversy over the above problem that the author thinks it is necessary to further explore the influence of institutional investors in corporate governance and to study from the perspective of high management change. The speed of regional economic development is different, and the process of marketization is different. Then whether the different market process will affect the effect of corporate governance of institutional investors? These are all problems that are worth discussing in this paper.
For the reasons above, this paper intends to carry out theoretical analysis and empirical test on the following questions: (1) what role does institutional investors play in the process of replacing poor performance executives, "effective supervisors", "bystander" or "collusion"? (2) different institutional investors change their executives. Is there any difference in influence? (3) does the marketization process have different effects on institutional investors' participation in top management turnover?
This article is divided into six chapters, and the contents are as follows:
The first chapter is an introduction, which briefly introduces the purpose and significance of the study, contents and methods, and the main contributions of this paper.
In the second chapter, the definition of related concepts and the literature review of relevant research at home and abroad is reviewed. The definition of institutional investors, heterogeneous institutional investors, corporate governance and executive change is expounded. The basic theories involved in this paper are briefly analyzed, such as principal-agent theory and equity structure theory, and at the same time at home and abroad. The related literature has been combed in the following aspects: (1) the willingness of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and supervision efficiency; (2) the main areas of institutional investors' participation in corporate governance; (3) the influencing factors of executive change.
The third chapter is the analysis of the theory of institutional investors in the process of corporate executive change and the corresponding assumptions. The theoretical analysis mainly includes the following aspects: the analysis of the motivation of institutional investors affecting the change of senior executives, the analysis of the ways that institutional investors affect the change of executives, and the high influence of institutional investors. The theoretical analysis of management change, the effect analysis of hetero institutional investors affecting the change of senior executives, and the theoretical analysis of the mechanism investors' participation in the decision making of the company executives' change in the market process. Then, according to the following questions, the corresponding assumptions are put forward: (1) the institutional investors are in the process of replacing the top executives of the listed companies with poor performance. Play a role. (2) whether different types of institutional investors play a different role. (3) whether the speed of the market process of the location of the listed company will affect the institutional investors' participation in the change of executives.
The fourth chapter is for research and design, mainly introducing the method of sample selection and data sources, explaining the reasons for the selection of variables, explaining the construction of the model and defining the variables used.
The fifth chapter is the empirical test and the result analysis. First, it carries on the descriptive statistical analysis to the basic data used in this paper, and carries out the correlation test between the variables. Then the model is tested with Stata software, and the results are explained after the test results are obtained.
The sixth chapter is the relevant research conclusions and the corresponding policy recommendations. In this part, the relevant research conclusions are summarized and the corresponding policy suggestions are summarized according to the theoretical analysis and the results of the empirical study. At the same time, the shortcomings of the article are summarized, and the research direction that can be carried out in this area is also carried out. Explain.
After the study, we found that:
(1) the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the probability of unconventional changes for the executives of listed companies is greater. It shows that institutional investors have played a positive role in replacing executives with poor performance.
(2) compared with the pressure sensitive institutional investors, the pressure boycott institutional investors can increase the probability of unconventional replacement of the listed company executives because of their performance reasons.
(3) compared with the relatively slow market process, the regions with relatively fast marketization can promote the pressure boycott institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and improve the probability of unconventional replacement of the listed company executives because of their performance reasons.
In the process of writing this article, I have made the following contributions through the author's reading of the literature and the conception of the framework.
(1) it has widened the related research fields of institutional investors' effect on the governance of Listed Companies in China. From the literature review, it can be seen that the research on the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance in China is mainly focused on executive compensation, earnings management, dividend policy and so on, while few scholars have from senior executives. This paper tries to explore the influence of institutional investors on corporate governance in China from the perspective of executive change, so as to broaden the research field of institutional investors' role in corporate governance.
(2) by dividing the types of institutional investors, this paper discusses the exertion of different types of institutional investors in the decision-making process of participating in the change of listed company executives.
(3) the influence of the speed of the marketization process on the decision making by the institutional investors participating in the executive change of the listed company is studied. Some previous literatures have studied the possible influence of the marketization process on the executive compensation mechanism, but the influence on the executive change decision has not been studied by scholars. As an important factor affecting institutional investors' participation in top management turnover decisions, speed and speed are studied.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
(1) limited to the general manager's change of data in the existing database, this paper only studies the unconventional changes of the chairman, and does not study the unconventional changes of the general manager. It is difficult to compare the changes of the two positions. This is a shortcoming of this article.
(2) there is a general problem of endogenous ownership in institutional investors. In this paper, the impact of the related endogenous problems is weakened by using the performance variables of the lag phase, but this does not completely eliminate the impact of the endogenous nature. How to better control the endogenous problems in the study is also needed in the future research. A place to improve.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.91;F832.51;F271;F275

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