本文關(guān)鍵詞： 報酬激勵 經(jīng)理人薪酬 業(yè)績評價 運氣薪酬　出處：《復旦大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國收入分配制度改革的深入與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善,上市公司經(jīng)理人薪酬制度也不斷發(fā)展。根據(jù)經(jīng)典委托代理理論與激勵理論,薪酬是從股東利益最大化的角度出發(fā),為了激勵經(jīng)理人努力工作而設(shè)定的一種契約。為了產(chǎn)生有效的激勵,經(jīng)理人的薪酬應該與業(yè)績掛鉤。但是業(yè)績本身受到宏觀經(jīng)濟形勢、行業(yè)景氣情況等諸多“運氣”因素影響,也就是說經(jīng)理人享受了運氣薪酬,這又與薪酬設(shè)計的初衷不符。本文以運氣薪酬為研究對象,利用理論和實證相結(jié)合的方法,試圖較為完整的梳理運氣薪酬問題。首先在理論層面,分別從經(jīng)理人和股東效用最大化的角度進行論證。本文建立運氣薪酬模型,提出運氣本身并非確定因素,具有不可控的特征,也就是運氣風險的存在,使得經(jīng)理人并不期望獲得運氣薪酬。即使在經(jīng)理人可以在股票市場上通過對沖來分散風險的情況下,經(jīng)理人也沒有足夠的動機去尋求運氣薪酬。而股東也不會將這種沒有激勵效果的薪酬賦予經(jīng)理人。而運氣薪酬存在的真正原因在于其不對稱性,加之經(jīng)理人對薪酬存在一定的控制力,使得運氣薪酬具有向上的慣性與向下的剛性。在現(xiàn)實層面,本文首先用2000-2013年的數(shù)據(jù)通過橫向比較與縱向比較相結(jié)合的方式在宏觀上展現(xiàn)了運氣薪酬的存在性與不對稱性,然后選取2010-2012年的面板數(shù)據(jù)采用兩階段最小二乘法進行回歸分析,得出更有說服力的結(jié)論。即經(jīng)理人獲得了運氣薪酬,同時公司因運氣付薪的比重大于因能力和努力付薪的比重,不僅如此,經(jīng)理人因為好運而獲得的薪酬增加遠大于因為厄運造成的薪酬減少。最后本文在理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上,提出一些具有現(xiàn)實意義的建議。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the reform of the income distribution system and the perfection of the corporate governance structure, the executive compensation system of listed companies is also developing. According to the classical principal-agent theory and incentive theory. Compensation is a kind of contract set up in order to encourage managers to work hard from the angle of maximization of shareholders' interests, in order to produce effective incentives. Managers' compensation should be linked to performance. But performance itself is affected by many "luck" factors, such as the macroeconomic situation, industry prosperity and so on, that is, managers enjoy lucky pay. This is not in line with the original intention of the compensation design. This paper takes the compensation of luck as the research object, using the combination of theory and empirical method, trying to sort out the problem of the compensation of luck. First of all, in the theoretical level. From the perspective of maximizing the utility of managers and shareholders, this paper establishes the compensation model of luck, and points out that luck itself is not a certain factor and has the characteristics of uncontrollable, that is, the existence of luck risk. It makes managers not expect to get lucky pay, even when managers can hedge in the stock market to spread risk. Managers also do not have enough incentive to seek luck pay, and shareholders do not give managers such unmotivated compensation. The real reason for the existence of luck pay lies in its asymmetry. In addition, managers have a certain amount of control over the salary, which makes the salary of luck have the inertia of upward and the rigidity of downward. This paper first uses the data from 2000 to 2013 to show the existence and asymmetry of luck pay on the macro level through the combination of horizontal comparison and vertical comparison. Then the panel data of 2010-2012 were analyzed by two-stage least square method, and a more convincing conclusion was drawn, that is, managers got lucky compensation. At the same time, companies pay more for luck than for ability and hard work, not only that. The salary increase of managers due to good luck is far greater than that caused by bad luck. Finally, this paper puts forward some practical suggestions on the basis of theoretical research.
【學位授予單位】：復旦大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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