發(fā)布時間：2018-05-19 09:11

  本文選題：管理層 + 股權激勵��； 參考：《云南師范大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：所有權與經(jīng)營權分離的現(xiàn)代企業(yè)管理制度決定了管理層將在企業(yè)中扮演著重要的角色，他們雖然不擁有企業(yè)，但是在企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營過程中，經(jīng)營者掌握著許多所有者不知道的信息，站在企業(yè)經(jīng)營決策的最前沿，而股東卻不參與企業(yè)的日常決策，導致委托人跟代理者之間存在著信息不對稱的問題，委托人很有可能要承擔代理人的“道德風險”。因此，股東如何監(jiān)督管理層，讓其行為跟股東利益保持一致，是企業(yè)面臨的一大難題。為了最大程度增加公司的價值，降低管理層的代理風險和代理成本，提高公司的經(jīng)營績效，就需要讓管理層在日常經(jīng)營決策與股東的利益保持一致。股權激勵機制為解決這一難題提供了一個新的途徑，該機制會給予管理層一定的剩余索取權，以此將管理層的利益整合到了股東的利益之中，并將管理層的利益所得與公司的發(fā)展命運捆綁在一起，建立企業(yè)價值最大化與管理層利益的正相關關系，來降低代理成本，提高企業(yè)績效，改善企業(yè)的經(jīng)營管理機制。 為了完善我國上市公司的內(nèi)部治理結構，提高企業(yè)的績效，在20世紀90年代后半期，逐漸將股權激勵制度引入我國。隨著股權激勵機制的引入，我國越來越多的學者開始關注并研究股權激勵的問題。早期由于各種原因，股權激勵并沒有被大規(guī)模的實施，即使有一些公司實施了，但是實施的結果并不顯著，并未發(fā)揮該機制的激勵作用。隨著我國完成了股權分置改革，并在2006年《上市公司股權激勵實施管理辦法》的頒布與實施，為股權激勵的廣泛實施提供了廣闊的空間。在目前很多上市公司實施股權激勵機制的背景下，從制造業(yè)上市公司的角度繼續(xù)研究股權激勵實施的效果具有重要的現(xiàn)實意義。 本文主要闡述了論文的研究背景、方法意義等；論述了國內(nèi)外對股權激勵研究的現(xiàn)狀和股權激勵的理論支撐；對目前我國制造業(yè)上市公司實施股權激勵的基本狀況進行了整體考察；剖析了股權激勵實施過程中存在的主要問題；考慮數(shù)據(jù)的獲取性與股權激勵的時滯性，選取了2008年—2010年實施股權激勵的公司為樣本數(shù)據(jù)，，對影響實施管理層股權激勵水平的相關因素進行了實證分析，重點揭示實施管理層股權激勵與企業(yè)績效的關系。最后得出：實施管理層股權激勵能夠提升企業(yè)業(yè)績，但是效果不顯著的結論；就如何更好的實施股權激勵，提出了相關的對策建議。
[Abstract]:The modern enterprise management system, which separates the ownership from the management right, determines that the management will play an important role in the enterprise. Although they do not own the enterprise, but in the process of production and operation of the enterprise, The operator holds many information which the owner does not know and stands at the forefront of the enterprise management decision, but the shareholders do not participate in the daily decision of the enterprise, which leads to the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. The client is likely to bear the "moral hazard" of the agent. Therefore, how the shareholders supervise the management and keep their behavior consistent with the shareholders' interests is a big problem faced by enterprises. In order to increase the value of the company to the greatest extent, reduce the agency risk and agency cost of the management, and improve the performance of the company, it is necessary for the management to keep consistent with the interests of the shareholders in the daily operation decision. The equity incentive mechanism provides a new way to solve this problem. This mechanism will give the management a certain residual claim, thus integrating the interests of the management into the interests of the shareholders. The benefits of management and the fate of the development of the company are tied together to establish a positive correlation between the maximization of enterprise value and the interests of management to reduce agency costs improve corporate performance and improve the management mechanism. In order to perfect the internal governance structure of Chinese listed companies and improve the performance of enterprises, equity incentive system was gradually introduced into China in the second half of 1990s. With the introduction of equity incentive mechanism, more and more scholars in China begin to pay attention to and study the issue of equity incentive. Because of various reasons, equity incentive has not been implemented on a large scale, even if some companies have implemented, but the implementation results are not significant, did not play the incentive role of the mechanism. With the completion of the reform of the split share structure in China and the promulgation and implementation of the "measures for the implementation of equity incentives in listed companies" in 2006, it provides a broad space for the extensive implementation of equity incentives. Under the background of many listed companies implementing equity incentive mechanism, it is of great practical significance to continue to study the effect of equity incentive from the perspective of manufacturing listed companies. This paper mainly expounds the research background and method significance of the paper, discusses the current situation of the research on equity incentive at home and abroad and the theoretical support of equity incentive. This paper makes a general investigation on the basic status of equity incentive in Chinese manufacturing listed companies, analyzes the main problems existing in the implementation of equity incentive, and considers the data acquisition and the delay of equity incentive. This paper selects the companies that implemented equity incentive from 2008 to 2010 as sample data, and analyzes the relevant factors that affect the level of executive equity incentive, and puts emphasis on revealing the relationship between the implementation of management equity incentive and enterprise performance. Finally, the conclusion that the implementation of management equity incentive can improve enterprise performance, but the effect is not significant; on how to better implement equity incentive, put forward the relevant countermeasures.
【學位授予單位】：云南師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F424;F832.51;F272.92

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