本文關(guān)鍵詞： 發(fā)電側(cè)電力市場(chǎng) 差價(jià)合約模式 有限競(jìng)價(jià)模式 博弈均衡　出處：《東南大學(xué)》2004年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2002 年底,國(guó)家電力公司正式“廠網(wǎng)分開”,新成立了五大發(fā)電集團(tuán)和兩 家電網(wǎng)公司,為實(shí)行發(fā)電商競(jìng)價(jià)上網(wǎng)奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ),標(biāo)志著中國(guó)電力市場(chǎng)化 改革已邁出了關(guān)鍵的一步。在競(jìng)價(jià)上網(wǎng)的過程中,所有的發(fā)電公司都想使自身的 收益最大化,而電網(wǎng)公司卻想使購(gòu)電費(fèi)用最小化。在建立電力市場(chǎng)過程中,找到 一種有效合理的競(jìng)價(jià)模式就顯得很重要,既激勵(lì)發(fā)電企業(yè)強(qiáng)化管理、提高效率, 從而降低了上網(wǎng)電價(jià),又要考慮到電力改革的市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與平穩(wěn)過渡。 本文對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)試點(diǎn)的兩種競(jìng)價(jià)模式(差價(jià)合約模式與有限競(jìng)價(jià)模式)進(jìn)行了深 入研究與分析,揭示了兩種競(jìng)價(jià)模式的本質(zhì)區(qū)別在于發(fā)電商的上網(wǎng)電量小于合約 電量時(shí)收益的結(jié)算差別;運(yùn)用博弈論、微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、電力市場(chǎng)理論的相關(guān)部分分 析了在發(fā)電側(cè)電力市場(chǎng)中,各發(fā)電公司和電網(wǎng)公司面對(duì)兩種競(jìng)價(jià)模式的博弈行 為,基于發(fā)電商競(jìng)價(jià)是完全信息博弈模型,相繼分析了一次性博弈和重復(fù)博弈的 均衡;在分析重復(fù)博弈時(shí),研究了發(fā)電商合作的必要條件,為競(jìng)價(jià)規(guī)則的設(shè)計(jì)提 供了防止發(fā)電商合謀的思路;在完全信息靜態(tài)博弈的基礎(chǔ)上,建立了在兩種競(jìng)價(jià) 模式下,由多個(gè)發(fā)電商參加的產(chǎn)量博弈模型,并給出了數(shù)學(xué)解;最后在綜合比較 兩種競(jìng)價(jià)模式的基礎(chǔ)上,本文提出了某個(gè)區(qū)域電網(wǎng)的電源結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)選擇競(jìng)價(jià)模式的 影響。 本文主要是為當(dāng)前的中國(guó)電力市場(chǎng)改革的實(shí)施提供一些理論支持,希望通過 對(duì)競(jìng)價(jià)模式的理論研究,深化對(duì)中國(guó)電力工業(yè)市場(chǎng)化改革的認(rèn)識(shí)。
[Abstract]:In end of 2002, the State Power Company officially "separated the power plant and network", and set up five major power generation groups and two new power generation groups. The home appliance network company has laid a solid foundation for the implementation of power generation companies bidding for the Internet, marking the marketization of electricity in China. The reform has taken a crucial step. In the bidding process, all the power generation companies want to make their own While grid companies want to minimize the cost of buying electricity, they want to maximize revenue. In the process of building a power market, find An effective and reasonable bidding model is very important, which not only motivates power generation enterprises to strengthen management, but also improves efficiency. Therefore, the electricity price is reduced, and the market risk and smooth transition of electric power reform should be taken into account. In this paper, two bidding modes (contract for difference model and limited bidding model) are discussed in detail. Through research and analysis, it is revealed that the essential difference between the two bidding modes lies in the fact that the power on the net of the generator is less than the contract. The difference of income between electricity and electricity; applying Game Theory, Microeconomics, and relevant parts of electricity Market Theory In the generation side electricity market, each generation company and the power grid company face the game of two bidding modes. Based on the complete information game model, the one-off game and the repeated game are analyzed one after another. In the analysis of repeated game, the necessary condition of power generation cooperation is studied, which is proposed for the design of bidding rules. On the basis of static game of complete information, two kinds of bidding are established. In this paper, the output game model with the participation of multiple generators is given, and the mathematical solution is given. Finally, a comprehensive comparison is made On the basis of two bidding modes, this paper proposes a new method for selecting bidding modes in a regional power grid. Influence This paper is mainly to provide some theoretical support for the implementation of the current reform of China's electricity market. The theoretical research on the bidding mode, deepening the understanding of the market-oriented reform of China's electric power industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號(hào)】：F407.61

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前7條

1 顧洪超;基于演化博弈論的發(fā)電商競(jìng)價(jià)行為的研究[D];華北電力大學(xué)（北京）;2011年

2 鄧琳瑋;我國(guó)電力價(jià)格兩部制競(jìng)價(jià)上網(wǎng)機(jī)制研究[D];北京工商大學(xué);2010年

3 楊根;水電廠發(fā)電報(bào)價(jià)策略及其輔助決策系統(tǒng)研究[D];貴州大學(xué);2006年

4 劉建良;水電廠報(bào)價(jià)決策支持系統(tǒng)研究[D];貴州大學(xué);2007年

5 朱江艷;基于Repast仿真平臺(tái)的發(fā)電商演化博弈競(jìng)價(jià)策略研究[D];華北電力大學(xué)（北京）;2010年

6 李海澎;企業(yè)電力負(fù)荷特性及需求側(cè)管理技術(shù)措施的研究[D];華北電力大學(xué)（河北）;2009年

7 朱維瑩;隨機(jī)演化博弈模型在發(fā)電市場(chǎng)的應(yīng)用及分析[D];華北電力大學(xué);2012年

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