【摘要】：以外包商為參考點(diǎn),針對(duì)研發(fā)外包中承包商同時(shí)存在信息泄露和隱藏努力程度的兩類(lèi)道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題,運(yùn)用委托代理理論,建立了考慮知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)屬分配模式的研發(fā)外包激勵(lì)機(jī)制。研究表明,在允許知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)許可的情況下,將知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)所有權(quán)授權(quán)給承包商,不但會(huì)增加外包商的期望收益,還可以有效激勵(lì)承包商最優(yōu)努力水平,同時(shí)避免其信息泄露問(wèn)題。
[Abstract]:Outside the contractor as the reference point, aiming at the two kinds of moral hazard problem that the contractor simultaneously exists the information leakage and the concealment effort degree in the R & D outsourcing, the principal-agent theory is used. The incentive mechanism of R & D outsourcing based on intellectual property right distribution model is established. The research shows that under the condition of allowing intellectual property to license, authorizing the ownership of intellectual property to the contractor will not only increase the expected income of the outsourcer, but also effectively stimulate the contractor's optimal level of effort, while avoiding the problem of information disclosure.
【作者單位】： 福州大學(xué)八方物流學(xué)院;
【基金】：福建省社科重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(2010A013)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F273.1;F719

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本文編號(hào)：2399417