本文選題：服務(wù)外包　切入點(diǎn)：不完全契約　出處：《河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著全球產(chǎn)業(yè)的重新調(diào)整,第三產(chǎn)業(yè)即服務(wù)業(yè)的蓬勃發(fā)展在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的結(jié)構(gòu)和布局中發(fā)揮越來(lái)越重要的作用。發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家開(kāi)始將越來(lái)越多、越來(lái)越復(fù)雜的服務(wù)業(yè)功能轉(zhuǎn)向其他地方,于是出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)新的產(chǎn)業(yè)——服務(wù)外包。當(dāng)看到這種新興行業(yè)所帶來(lái)的發(fā)展機(jī)遇后,各個(gè)企業(yè)便開(kāi)始爭(zhēng)先恐后的進(jìn)入服務(wù)外包行業(yè)。然而我們?cè)谑斋@服務(wù)外包所帶來(lái)的收益的同時(shí),也必須面對(duì)隨之而來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)。服務(wù)外包的委托-代理雙方通過(guò)契約來(lái)規(guī)定雙方的權(quán)利和義務(wù),但雙方的有限理性,外界環(huán)境的不確定性,信息的不對(duì)稱性等因素都會(huì)使得契約具有不完全性。不完全的服務(wù)外包契約容易使發(fā)包方面臨著敲竹杠、機(jī)會(huì)主義等風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此,在不完全契約的背景下,研究服務(wù)外包風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及治理機(jī)制具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文遵循理論--建模--實(shí)證的思維及論述過(guò)程。首先,在委托代理理論、交易成本理論和不完全契約理論的理論支持下,分析了契約不完全的成因以及由此導(dǎo)致的契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。其次,針對(duì)契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn),本文參考了以往學(xué)者研究所涉及的諸多治理機(jī)制,分別以基于正式契約治理機(jī)制(完備契約機(jī)制、激勵(lì)懲罰機(jī)制、監(jiān)控機(jī)制)和基于關(guān)系契約治理機(jī)制(信息共享機(jī)制、溝通機(jī)制、信任機(jī)制、聲譽(yù)機(jī)制)為基礎(chǔ)提出相關(guān)的研究假設(shè),并構(gòu)建了雙態(tài)綜合治理機(jī)制模型。最后,本文根據(jù)國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)的成熟量表設(shè)計(jì)了初始調(diào)查問(wèn)卷,在此基礎(chǔ)上通過(guò)對(duì)小樣本題項(xiàng)的凈化處理,形成了比較合理的調(diào)查問(wèn)卷。針對(duì)問(wèn)卷調(diào)研獲得的數(shù)據(jù)信息進(jìn)行逐步回歸分析,以驗(yàn)證模型中的假設(shè),并對(duì)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果進(jìn)行分析和論證,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了可供企業(yè)防范和治理契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的建議。 本文的實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示,雙邊綜合治理機(jī)制對(duì)契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的治理效果要高于正式契約或關(guān)系契約治理機(jī)制其中的任何單一治理形式的治理效果。其中,完備契約、激勵(lì)懲罰、監(jiān)控和溝通與契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)存在著顯著地負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；信息共享和信任與契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,但是不顯著的；聲譽(yù)與契約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)未得到與理論假設(shè)一致的結(jié)果,即不存在顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:With the readjustment of the global industry, the vigorous development of the tertiary industry, that is, the service industry, is playing an increasingly important role in the structure and layout of the world economy.Developed countries began to shift more and more complex service functions to other places, and a new industry-service outsourcing emerged.After seeing the development opportunity brought by this new industry, each enterprise begins to rush into the service outsourcing industry.However, as we reap the benefits of outsourcing, we must also face the challenges that come with it.The principal-agent of service outsourcing stipulates the rights and obligations of both parties through contract, but the limited rationality of both parties, the uncertainty of external environment and the asymmetry of information make the contract incomplete.Incomplete service outsourcing contracts are likely to expose the contracting parties to risks such as ripping off, opportunism and so on.Therefore, under the background of incomplete contract, it is of practical significance to study the risk and governance mechanism of service outsourcing.This paper follows the thinking and argumentation process of theory-modeling-demonstration.Firstly, with the support of principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory and incomplete contract theory, this paper analyzes the causes of incomplete contract and the contractual risks caused by it.Secondly, in view of contract risk, this paper refers to many governance mechanisms involved in previous scholars' research, respectively, based on formal contract governance mechanism (complete contract mechanism, incentive and punishment mechanism).Based on the monitoring mechanism and the relational contract governance mechanism (information sharing mechanism, communication mechanism, trust mechanism, reputation mechanism), this paper puts forward the relevant research hypotheses, and constructs a two-state comprehensive governance mechanism model.Finally, this paper designs the initial questionnaire according to the domestic and foreign mature scale, and on this basis, through the purification of small sample items, a more reasonable questionnaire is formed.On the basis of stepwise regression analysis of the data information obtained by questionnaire investigation, the hypothesis in the model is verified, and the empirical test results are analyzed and demonstrated. On the basis of this, some suggestions are put forward for enterprises to prevent and manage contractual risks.The empirical results show that the governance effect of bilateral comprehensive governance mechanism on contract risk is higher than that of any single governance form of formal contract or relational contract governance mechanism.Among them, complete contract, incentive punishment, monitoring and communication have significant negative correlation with contract risk, information sharing and trust have negative correlation with contract risk, but not significant.The results of reputation and contract risk are not consistent with theoretical hypothesis, that is, there is no significant negative correlation between reputation and contract risk.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F719;F224

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