飯店委托管理中激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-01-29 03:48
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 飯店 委托代理 博弈論 激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制 出處:《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:改革開放三十幾年來(lái),中國(guó)飯店業(yè)得到了長(zhǎng)足的發(fā)展,根據(jù)國(guó)家旅游局不完全統(tǒng)計(jì),僅2011年就有千余家四星級(jí)以上標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的高檔飯店投入運(yùn)行,而且其中不乏國(guó)際知名品牌的飯店。隨著中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)和旅游業(yè)的不斷發(fā)展,國(guó)內(nèi)飯店業(yè)正在逐步向各分層次細(xì)分市場(chǎng)深度發(fā)展,中國(guó)這一蘊(yùn)藏巨大發(fā)展?jié)摿Φ氖袌?chǎng)正不斷地吸引著國(guó)內(nèi)外投資者的進(jìn)駐。但是,在高速發(fā)展的飯店業(yè)背后,是中國(guó)與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家間在飯店管理水平和管理模式上的明顯差異,尤其飯店委托管理中頻頻出現(xiàn)的不和諧現(xiàn)象,業(yè)主方和管理方在各自利益訴求的博弈中引發(fā)的委托代理問(wèn)題等等,均有待業(yè)界和理論界深入探討和研究。 本文首先對(duì)中國(guó)飯店業(yè)的發(fā)展歷史和現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了回顧,提出了現(xiàn)階段中國(guó)飯店業(yè)委托管理中存在的問(wèn)題;然后對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外飯店委托管理領(lǐng)域的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了綜述,總結(jié)了國(guó)內(nèi)該領(lǐng)域研究中與國(guó)外相比存在的差距;接著,本文對(duì)相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論進(jìn)行了回顧,為本文研究打好理論基礎(chǔ)。 為了更深入了解我國(guó)飯店委托管理模式現(xiàn)狀,本文利用了鄒益民、鮑娟的調(diào)查問(wèn)卷對(duì)實(shí)證飯店的業(yè)主方和管理方進(jìn)行問(wèn)卷調(diào)查,通過(guò)調(diào)查驗(yàn)證了實(shí)證飯店是否具有成功飯店委托管理的先決條件,然后通過(guò)對(duì)實(shí)證飯店實(shí)施激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制前后兩年經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)采用科學(xué)的激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制實(shí)施對(duì)委托管理飯店監(jiān)督,會(huì)取得巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益和社會(huì)效益。 本文對(duì)飯店委托管理模式中的業(yè)主方和管理方所關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了詳盡的分析,并通過(guò)博弈論相關(guān)模型進(jìn)行了博弈關(guān)系分析,深入了解業(yè)主方和管理方的利益沖突的核心點(diǎn)。 本文最后從業(yè)主方的角度針對(duì)管理方設(shè)計(jì)了多元化的激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制,試圖通過(guò)實(shí)施科學(xué)有效的多元化激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制,來(lái)探求飯店業(yè)主和管理方之間的利益平衡,以期能對(duì)中國(guó)飯店業(yè)產(chǎn)生積極的影響。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up to the outside world for more than 30 years, China's hotel industry has been greatly developed. According to the incomplete statistics of the National Tourism Administration, in 2011 alone, there were more than 1,000 high-grade hotels with four-star or more standards in operation. With the continuous development of China's economy and tourism, the domestic hotel industry is gradually developing to the various levels of market segmentation. China, a market with great potential for development, is attracting investors both at home and abroad. However, behind the rapid development of the hotel industry. It is the obvious difference between China and developed countries in hotel management level and management mode, especially in the hotel entrustment management. The principal-agent problem caused by the owner and the management in the game of their respective interests needs to be deeply discussed and studied by the industry and the theorists. Firstly, this paper reviews the history and present situation of Chinese hotel industry, and points out the problems existing in the entrustment management of Chinese hotel industry. Then it summarizes the related literature in the field of hotel commission management at home and abroad, and summarizes the gap between domestic and foreign research in this field. Then, this paper reviews the relevant basic theories, and lays a theoretical foundation for this study. In order to better understand the current situation of hotel management in China, this paper makes use of Zou Yimin and Bao Juan's questionnaire to investigate the owners and managers of the hotel. Through the investigation to verify whether the empirical hotel has the prerequisite of successful hotel entrustment management, and then through the empirical hotel incentive and constraint mechanism before and after two years of performance comparison. It is found that using scientific incentive and constraint mechanism to supervise the entrusted management hotel will achieve great economic and social benefits. This paper makes a detailed analysis of the focus issues of the owner and the management in the management model of hotel entrustment, and analyzes the game relationship through the game theory model. Learn more about the core points of conflict of interest between owner and manager. In the end, this paper designs a diversified incentive and constraint mechanism for the management from the owner's point of view, and tries to implement a scientific and effective incentive and constraint mechanism. To explore the balance of interests between hotel owners and managers in order to have a positive impact on the Chinese hotel industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號(hào)】:F719
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