基于財政分權(quán)視角的我國土地財政問題研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-11-23 21:03
【摘要】：進入21世紀后,我國提出所有權(quán)和使用權(quán)相分離的土地使用制度,在國家擁有土地所有權(quán)的情況下,地方政府將一定時期的土地使用權(quán)出讓給土地使用者。地方政府以土地相關(guān)收入促進城市發(fā)展,同時帶動地方稅收的增加。土地財政收入有效彌補了地方政府的財政缺口,同時也創(chuàng)造出許多新的挑戰(zhàn)。大量農(nóng)業(yè)用地轉(zhuǎn)為城市建設(shè)用地。不斷增長的人口和日益減少的耕地,在經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展的同時,糧食安全問題需要我們警惕。城市快速擴張的同時,經(jīng)濟增長的主要驅(qū)動力是什么,地方政府的動機是什么,是非常值得探討的。 本文首先研究了土地財政的內(nèi)涵,將土地財政收入劃分成三類。在估算的土地財政收入中,與土地相關(guān)的稅收收入規(guī)模所占比重最小,而且比較穩(wěn)定；國有土地使用權(quán)出讓收入受房地產(chǎn)宏觀調(diào)控政策影響波動較大；地方投融資平臺的土地抵押貸款收入在整個土地財政收入中占比最大,但也存在潛在的金融風(fēng)險。 其次,較為系統(tǒng)地分析了土地財政引發(fā)的問題。以生命周期假說和世代交疊模型等理論為基礎(chǔ),選取我國2000～2010年宏觀數(shù)據(jù),使用逐步篩選法對我國土地價格與住宅價格的關(guān)系進行實證研究。由于需求強烈,地方政府忽視低收入群體的基本住房需求,為了獲得更多的資金來源,地方政府開始追逐房地產(chǎn)利益,土地出讓收益也是水漲船高,保障性住房投入不足才是土地財政推動房價上升的主要原因；基于VAR模型驗證了地方政府的土地供應(yīng)量對地租有顯著影響,反之則不成立；混合戰(zhàn)略博弈分析表明,如果中央政府加大懲罰力度,可以降低地方政府不按規(guī)定使用土地的概率；而中央與地方政府的土地利用委托一代理關(guān)系表明中央政府在設(shè)計監(jiān)管模式時,除產(chǎn)出水平(GDP)外,還應(yīng)該觀測其他指標；使用1999～2009年31個省面板數(shù)據(jù)對我國城市成本收益模型進行計量分析,進一步驗證了我國存在城市面積擴張與人口增加不協(xié)調(diào)的發(fā)展情況。 再次,從財政、土地制度和軟預(yù)算約束的角度對地方政府的土地財政行為進行分析,構(gòu)建地方政府土地財政理論模型,使用我國1999～2009年面板數(shù)據(jù),運用數(shù)據(jù)包絡(luò)分析方法對城市全要素生產(chǎn)率的增長進行了實證研究。 最后,根據(jù)前述章節(jié)的研究以及發(fā)達國家和地區(qū)的一些經(jīng)驗,本文認為打破地方政府對土地財政的依賴應(yīng)該從多個方面入手。
[Abstract]:After entering the 21st century, our country put forward the land use system which separates the ownership and the right of use. Under the condition that the country owns the land ownership, the local government will transfer the land use right in a certain period to the land user. Local governments promote urban development with land-related revenues, while driving local tax increases. Land revenue can effectively make up for the financial gap of local government, but also create many new challenges. A large number of agricultural land into urban construction land. With the increasing population and decreasing cultivated land, food security needs our vigilance while the economy develops rapidly. At the same time of rapid urban expansion, what is the main driving force of economic growth and what is the motivation of local government is worth discussing. This article first studies the land finance connotation, divides the land finance income into three kinds. In the estimated land revenue, the proportion of land related tax revenue is the smallest, and relatively stable; the income from the transfer of state-owned land use rights is affected by the real estate macro-control policy. The land mortgage loan income of the local investment and financing platform accounts for the largest proportion of the total land revenue, but there are also potential financial risks. Secondly, the problems caused by land finance are analyzed systematically. Based on the theory of life cycle hypothesis and generation overlap model, the empirical study on the relationship between land price and housing price in China is carried out by using the stepwise screening method, which selects the macro data from 2000 to 2010 in China. Because of the strong demand, local governments ignore the basic housing needs of low-income groups. In order to obtain more sources of funds, local governments have begun to pursue real estate interests, and the proceeds of land sales are also rising. Inadequate investment in affordable housing is the main reason for land finance to promote the rise of house prices; Based on the VAR model, it is verified that the land supply of the local government has a significant impact on the rent, otherwise, it does not hold. The mixed strategic game analysis shows that if the central government increases the punishment, it can reduce the probability that the local government does not use the land according to the regulations. The principal-agent relationship between the central and local governments indicates that the central government should observe other indicators besides the output level (GDP) when designing the supervision mode. By using the data of 31 provincial panels from 1999 to 2009, this paper makes an econometric analysis on the urban cost-benefit model in China, which further verifies the incongruous development of urban area expansion and population increase in China. Thirdly, from the angle of finance, land system and soft budget constraint, this paper analyzes the land finance behavior of local government, constructs the land finance theory model of local government, and uses the panel data of our country from 1999 to 2009. This paper makes an empirical study on the growth of urban total factor productivity (TFP) by means of data envelopment analysis. Finally, according to the study of the above chapters and some experiences of developed countries and regions, this paper argues that breaking the dependence of local governments on land finance should start from many aspects.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F812.2
本文編號：2352696
[Abstract]:After entering the 21st century, our country put forward the land use system which separates the ownership and the right of use. Under the condition that the country owns the land ownership, the local government will transfer the land use right in a certain period to the land user. Local governments promote urban development with land-related revenues, while driving local tax increases. Land revenue can effectively make up for the financial gap of local government, but also create many new challenges. A large number of agricultural land into urban construction land. With the increasing population and decreasing cultivated land, food security needs our vigilance while the economy develops rapidly. At the same time of rapid urban expansion, what is the main driving force of economic growth and what is the motivation of local government is worth discussing. This article first studies the land finance connotation, divides the land finance income into three kinds. In the estimated land revenue, the proportion of land related tax revenue is the smallest, and relatively stable; the income from the transfer of state-owned land use rights is affected by the real estate macro-control policy. The land mortgage loan income of the local investment and financing platform accounts for the largest proportion of the total land revenue, but there are also potential financial risks. Secondly, the problems caused by land finance are analyzed systematically. Based on the theory of life cycle hypothesis and generation overlap model, the empirical study on the relationship between land price and housing price in China is carried out by using the stepwise screening method, which selects the macro data from 2000 to 2010 in China. Because of the strong demand, local governments ignore the basic housing needs of low-income groups. In order to obtain more sources of funds, local governments have begun to pursue real estate interests, and the proceeds of land sales are also rising. Inadequate investment in affordable housing is the main reason for land finance to promote the rise of house prices; Based on the VAR model, it is verified that the land supply of the local government has a significant impact on the rent, otherwise, it does not hold. The mixed strategic game analysis shows that if the central government increases the punishment, it can reduce the probability that the local government does not use the land according to the regulations. The principal-agent relationship between the central and local governments indicates that the central government should observe other indicators besides the output level (GDP) when designing the supervision mode. By using the data of 31 provincial panels from 1999 to 2009, this paper makes an econometric analysis on the urban cost-benefit model in China, which further verifies the incongruous development of urban area expansion and population increase in China. Thirdly, from the angle of finance, land system and soft budget constraint, this paper analyzes the land finance behavior of local government, constructs the land finance theory model of local government, and uses the panel data of our country from 1999 to 2009. This paper makes an empirical study on the growth of urban total factor productivity (TFP) by means of data envelopment analysis. Finally, according to the study of the above chapters and some experiences of developed countries and regions, this paper argues that breaking the dependence of local governments on land finance should start from many aspects.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F812.2
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