本文選題：商業(yè)銀行　切入點(diǎn)：信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：商業(yè)銀行是經(jīng)營(yíng)存貸款業(yè)務(wù)的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)企業(yè),其經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)具有很強(qiáng)的傳導(dǎo)性和破壞性,因此應(yīng)始終堅(jiān)持穩(wěn)健的經(jīng)營(yíng)理念。然而自上世紀(jì)八十年代以來(lái),國(guó)外銀行業(yè)多次爆發(fā)危機(jī),許多商業(yè)銀行在危機(jī)中破產(chǎn)倒閉。這些經(jīng)營(yíng)失敗的銀行普遍存在不穩(wěn)健的經(jīng)營(yíng)行為。本文經(jīng)分析認(rèn)為,中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行存在強(qiáng)烈的信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng)。信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng)的根源在于商業(yè)銀行高管,尤其是行長(zhǎng),在政治激勵(lì)和內(nèi)部人控制下傾向于制定激進(jìn)的業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展計(jì)劃,并通過(guò)不合理的考核體系轉(zhuǎn)化為各級(jí)分支機(jī)構(gòu)的信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng)。中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理體系尚未完全實(shí)現(xiàn)垂直管理,難以保證風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理決策的獨(dú)立性,因而無(wú)法抑制分支機(jī)構(gòu)的信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng)。同時(shí),銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理部門(mén)的內(nèi)部人控制導(dǎo)致信貸投放結(jié)構(gòu)失衡,向房地產(chǎn)、地方政府融資平臺(tái)等較高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)領(lǐng)域過(guò)多投放了貸款。 本文按照“發(fā)現(xiàn)問(wèn)題—分析問(wèn)題——解決問(wèn)題”的邏輯思路展開(kāi)。通過(guò)對(duì)文獻(xiàn)的總結(jié)和對(duì)委托代理理論的分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)商業(yè)銀行存在信貸過(guò)度擴(kuò)張和冒險(xiǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)傾向。本文通過(guò)分析指出中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行存在強(qiáng)烈的的信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng),其根源在于商業(yè)銀行總行高管層(尤其是行長(zhǎng))的內(nèi)部人控制。信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng)導(dǎo)致中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行向產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩行業(yè)、房地產(chǎn)、地方政府融資平臺(tái)等領(lǐng)域過(guò)多投放了貸款。為了防范化解中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行的信貸系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn),本文分別從業(yè)務(wù)操作層面和公司治理(含風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理架構(gòu))層面提出了對(duì)策建議。 本文包括四個(gè)部分,共九章。第一部分,包括第一章和第二章。第一章為導(dǎo)論,介紹論文研究背景、研究目的及意義、研究框架等內(nèi)容。第二章為文獻(xiàn)綜述。本章利用前人的研究成果從銀行股東道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、信貸投放親周期、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善等角度分析銀行信貸過(guò)度擴(kuò)張和冒險(xiǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)的原因。 第二部分,包括第三章和第四章。其中,第三章利用委托代理理論分析了銀行的“內(nèi)部人控制”問(wèn)題和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為,指出中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行委托代理關(guān)系的特殊性。第四章通過(guò)分析中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行的信貸投放總量、增速和結(jié)構(gòu)等情況,指出中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行存在強(qiáng)烈的信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng)。中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行偏好信貸規(guī)模擴(kuò)張的主要原因是銀行高管層傾向于制訂激進(jìn)的年度業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展計(jì)劃,并通過(guò)一整套考核指標(biāo)體系下達(dá)給分行。由于考核以年度為單位,考核獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)年底兌現(xiàn),而貸款幾乎是完成各項(xiàng)指標(biāo)(如利潤(rùn)、存款、中間業(yè)務(wù)等)的最關(guān)鍵手段。因此,這種考核體制直接導(dǎo)致了分支機(jī)構(gòu)的信貸擴(kuò)張沖動(dòng)。同時(shí),銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理部門(mén)和市場(chǎng)部門(mén)也存在“內(nèi)部人控制”問(wèn)題,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理部門(mén)的內(nèi)部人控制會(huì)導(dǎo)致信貸投放結(jié)構(gòu)失衡,市場(chǎng)部門(mén)的內(nèi)部人控制會(huì)導(dǎo)致信貸資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量不實(shí)等問(wèn)題。 第三部分,包括第五、第六、第七和第八章,為專題分析部分。本部分對(duì)中國(guó)銀行業(yè)當(dāng)前信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最突出的四個(gè)領(lǐng)域(產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩行業(yè)貸款、房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)貸款、地方政府融資平臺(tái)貸款和理財(cái)業(yè)務(wù))的發(fā)展動(dòng)因和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行了較為全面深入的分析,揭示了商業(yè)銀行開(kāi)展上述業(yè)務(wù)的原因,以及上述業(yè)務(wù)面臨的主要風(fēng)險(xiǎn),并從商業(yè)銀行的角度提出了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)化解對(duì)策。 第四部分,包括第九章。從防范重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域的信貸系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、解決委托代理問(wèn)題(內(nèi)部人控制問(wèn)題)角度提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:Commercial bank is a business enterprise of high risk deposit and loan business, the operating risk of conductivity and very destructive, therefore should always adhere to sound business philosophy. However, since the last century since 80s, foreign banking crisis erupted repeatedly, many commercial bank failures in the crisis. There are generally not robust business behavior these failing banks. The author holds that commercial banks Chinese have strong credit expansion impulse. Credit expansion impulse is the root cause of commercial bank executives, especially the president, in the political incentive and internal control tend to develop aggressive business development plan, and the unreasonable appraisal system into various branches the commercial bank credit expansion impulse. China risk management system is not yet fully implemented vertical management, it is difficult to ensure the independence of risk management decision, because It is unable to restrain the credit expansion impulse of branches. At the same time, the internal control of bank risk management departments leads to the imbalance of credit delivery structure, and has put more loans to real estate, local government financing platforms and other high risk areas.
According to the "discovery logic thinking: problems analyzing problems solving problems". Through the literature summary and analysis of the principal-agent theory, commercial banks have found excessive credit expansion and risk management tendency. The thesis points out that the commercial bank Chinese in strong credit expansion, its root lies in the Commercial Bank Senior Executives (especially president) of the internal control of commercial bank credit expansion. Chinese impulses lead to industry overcapacity, real estate, local government financing platform in areas such as too much put loans. To prevent and resolve the credit risk of commercial banks China system, this paper from the operational level and corporate governance (including risk management architecture) level and put forward countermeasures and suggestions.
This paper consists of four parts, a total of nine chapters. The first part includes the first chapter and the second chapter. The first chapter is the introduction, introduces the research background, research purpose and significance, research framework and contents. The second chapter is literature review. This chapter uses the previous research results from bank shareholders moral hazard, credit Pro cyclical. The angle of imperfect corporate governance of bank credit excessive expansion and risk management.
The second part includes the third chapter and the fourth chapter. The third chapter uses the principal-agent theory to analyze the banks "internal control" problem and moral hazard behavior, points out the particularity of commercial banks Chinese principal-agent relationship. The fourth chapter through the analysis of commercial bank China the credit amount, growth rate and structure, pointed out the commercial bank China exists strong credit expansion impulse. The main reason of commercial bank credit expansion China preference is the bank executives tend to make the annual business development plan of the radical and issued to the branch through a set of evaluation index system. Due to the assessment of the year for the units, reward the end of his loan is almost complete index (such as profits, deposits, and other intermediary business) the most important means. Therefore, this evaluation system led directly to the branches of the credit expansion. At the same time, Bank risk management department and market department also have the problem of insider control. The insider control of risk management department will lead to the imbalance of credit delivery structure, and the internal control of market department will lead to the problem of unreliable credit assets and so on.
The third part, including fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth chapter, for the thematic analysis part. This part of the four areas Chinese banking current credit risk (the most prominent industry overcapacity loans, loans, real estate loans to local government financing platform and financial services) the development and risks of a more in-depth analysis and reveals the reasons of the commercial banks to carry out these operations, as well as the main risks facing the business risk, and puts forward some countermeasures from the perspective of commercial banks.
The fourth part, including the ninth chapter, puts forward policy recommendations from the perspective of preventing credit systemic risks in the key areas and solving the problem of principal agent (insider control).

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 戴中亮;委托代理理論述評(píng)[J];商業(yè)研究;2004年19期

2 胡漢軍;邱力生;;信貸過(guò)度擴(kuò)張的動(dòng)因、危害與疏導(dǎo)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2008年06期

3 黨均章;王慶華;;地方政府融資平臺(tái)貸款風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析與思考[J];銀行家;2010年04期

4 劉煜輝;張櫸成;;中國(guó)地方政府融資平臺(tái)分析[J];銀行家;2010年06期

5 朱建武;;中小銀行規(guī)模擴(kuò)張的動(dòng)因與行為邏輯分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)理論與實(shí)踐;2007年04期

6 孔煜;;房?jī)r(jià)波動(dòng)、銀行信貸與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)理論與實(shí)踐;2009年05期

7 周彬;杜兩省;;“土地財(cái)政”與房地產(chǎn)價(jià)格上漲:理論分析和實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年08期

8 艾傳濤;商業(yè)銀行的“內(nèi)部控制”與“內(nèi)部人控制”比較分析[J];金融論壇;2002年03期

9 陶長(zhǎng)高;銀行業(yè)危機(jī):金融泡沫視角的分析[J];金融論壇;2005年06期

10 中國(guó)工商銀行董事會(huì)辦公室公司治理課題組;許善達(dá);錢(qián)毅;陸欽;張春煜;楊才然;丁朝霞;李媛;;全球金融危機(jī)中公司治理的經(jīng)驗(yàn)與教訓(xùn)研究[J];金融論壇;2010年03期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 劉懿;商業(yè)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2010年

，

本文編號(hào)：1684417