發(fā)布時間：2018-05-09 06:03

  本文選題：公平關(guān)切 + 體驗滯后��； 參考：《中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)與電子商務(wù)的蓬勃發(fā)展,越來越多的消費(fèi)者在體驗到了網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物方便快捷后,轉(zhuǎn)向了網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物。電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的推廣、銷售等營銷環(huán)境又有新的特點(diǎn)。如:在電子商務(wù)產(chǎn)品推廣環(huán)境下,企業(yè)不僅關(guān)注自身利潤的大小,而且關(guān)注利潤分配方式的不同;同時,新的產(chǎn)品銷售環(huán)境下,消費(fèi)者對于產(chǎn)品價值的估計不可避免的產(chǎn)生偏差。因此,對于企業(yè)決策者而言,將面臨著兩大難題:第一,當(dāng)企業(yè)和對手之間對于額外利潤的分配有了公平關(guān)切因素考慮時,企業(yè)如何做出最有利于自身的決策?第二,當(dāng)企業(yè)面對由于電商環(huán)境不可避免的網(wǎng)購體驗滯后的特點(diǎn)所造成消費(fèi)者對產(chǎn)品價值偏好不確定時,企業(yè)又該如何解決這個問題,以達(dá)到自身利益的最大化。這兩大問題即是本文研究的重點(diǎn)內(nèi)容。為了研究企業(yè)和企業(yè)之間考慮公平關(guān)切時的最優(yōu)營銷策略問題,我們構(gòu)建了一個Stackelberg博弈,其中以電商導(dǎo)購平臺為主導(dǎo),導(dǎo)入流量企業(yè)為跟隨者。在本文中我們打破了決策者是經(jīng)濟(jì)人完全理性的假設(shè),引入了決策者對公平關(guān)切的考慮,通過構(gòu)建決策者的目標(biāo)效用函數(shù),分析了企業(yè)的最優(yōu)決策行為。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):當(dāng)電商導(dǎo)購平臺的成本分擔(dān)決策屬于中等大小時,導(dǎo)入流量企業(yè)的最優(yōu)決策則不受公平關(guān)切的影響,同時,兩者的利潤之和與效用之和相等,達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)。此時,公平關(guān)切的考慮,會使電商導(dǎo)購平臺承擔(dān)更多的成本,也會使流量導(dǎo)入企業(yè)做出更多的銷售努力。在解決了企業(yè)和企業(yè)之間的最優(yōu)營銷策略決策問題后,本文對企業(yè)與消費(fèi)者之間的營銷策略問題進(jìn)行了研究。本文通過構(gòu)建Hotelling模型,對消費(fèi)者策略購買行為進(jìn)行刻畫,探究了企業(yè)在新情境下的最優(yōu)定價策略。分析得出:當(dāng)消費(fèi)者的退貨成本增加時,企業(yè)最優(yōu)定價也隨之增加;當(dāng)消費(fèi)者對產(chǎn)品的先驗效用差異化越小時,企業(yè)的最優(yōu)定價則越低。同時發(fā)現(xiàn),若某種產(chǎn)品無消費(fèi)者單獨(dú)購買,企業(yè)的最優(yōu)定價會隨消費(fèi)者偏好的增加而增加;而當(dāng)兩種產(chǎn)品均有消費(fèi)者單獨(dú)購買且消費(fèi)者退貨成本較大時,企業(yè)的最優(yōu)定價不但不會隨消費(fèi)者偏好的增加而提高,反而會隨消費(fèi)者偏好增加而減少。此外,本文給出了消費(fèi)者策略性退貨行為存在的臨界條件,當(dāng)消費(fèi)者的退貨成本高于這一臨界條件時,消費(fèi)者的策略退貨行為將消失。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet technology and electronic commerce, more and more consumers turn to online shopping after experiencing the convenience of online shopping. E-commerce environment, the promotion of enterprise products, sales and other marketing environment has new characteristics. For example, in the E-commerce product promotion environment, enterprises not only pay attention to the size of their own profits, but also pay attention to the different ways of profit distribution; at the same time, under the new product sales environment, Consumer estimates of the value of the product are inevitably biased. Therefore, for corporate decision makers, there will be two major difficulties: first, when there are fair concerns about the distribution of extra profits between enterprises and competitors, how can enterprises make decisions that are most beneficial to them? Second, how to solve this problem in order to maximize the interests of enterprises when faced with the uncertainty of consumers' preference for product value caused by the unavoidably delayed online shopping experience in e-commerce environment. These two problems are the key contents of this paper. In order to study the optimal marketing strategy between enterprises and enterprises when considering equity concerns, we construct a Stackelberg game, in which the leading e-commerce platform is the dominant one, and the leading traffic enterprise is the follower. In this paper, we break the assumption that the decision-maker is completely rational, and introduce the consideration of the decision-maker 's concern for fairness. By constructing the objective utility function of the decision-maker, we analyze the optimal decision-making behavior of the enterprise. It is found that when the cost sharing decision of the e-commerce platform is of medium size, the optimal decision of the lead-in flow enterprise is not affected by the concern of fairness, and the sum of the profit and utility of the two is equal, and the coordination is achieved. At this point, the consideration of fairness concerns will make the e-commerce shopping platform bear more costs, but also make more sales efforts. After solving the problem of optimal marketing strategy decision between enterprise and enterprise, this paper studies the problem of marketing strategy between enterprise and consumer. By constructing Hotelling model, this paper describes the purchasing behavior of consumer strategy and explores the optimal pricing strategy of enterprise in the new situation. The analysis shows that when the cost of return increases, the optimal pricing increases, and the smaller the prior utility difference is, the lower the optimal pricing is. At the same time, it is found that if a product is purchased by consumers alone, the optimal pricing will increase with the increase of consumer preference, and when both products are purchased separately by consumers and the cost of returning goods by consumers is higher, The optimal pricing of enterprises will not increase with the increase of consumer preference, but will decrease with the increase of consumer preference. In addition, the critical condition for the existence of strategic return behavior of consumers is given. When the cost of return is higher than this critical condition, the strategic return behavior of consumers will disappear.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F724.6

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