本文選題：電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)　切入點(diǎn)：資源依賴　出處：《武漢大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來,國(guó)內(nèi)電子商務(wù)發(fā)展迅猛,超過70%的網(wǎng)民加入網(wǎng)購大軍,電子商務(wù)日益成為新的重要經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)極。電子商務(wù)的快速發(fā)展使得網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺(tái)企業(yè)規(guī)模日益擴(kuò)大,淘寶、天貓等諸多知名電商平臺(tái)巨頭相繼涌現(xiàn)。對(duì)于蓬勃發(fā)展的電子商務(wù)平臺(tái),既存在廣闊的發(fā)展機(jī)遇,也面臨直接的現(xiàn)實(shí)挑戰(zhàn),其中就包括平臺(tái)商家的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。鑒于機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的潛在危害和影響廣泛,如何有效控制平臺(tái)交易過程中的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為是學(xué)術(shù)界和實(shí)業(yè)界的重要議題。學(xué)者針對(duì)傳統(tǒng)線下渠道機(jī)會(huì)主義行為做了大量研究,并從關(guān)系和交易兩個(gè)維度探討了機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的治理機(jī)制。不同于線下二元渠道關(guān)系,電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)具有顯著的雙邊市場(chǎng)特征,這種新興的市場(chǎng)特征決定了電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)對(duì)包括機(jī)會(huì)主義行為在內(nèi)的治理機(jī)制與單邊市場(chǎng)有所不同。此外,電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)作為線上交易平臺(tái),平臺(tái)商家、平臺(tái)顧客與平臺(tái)之間聯(lián)系更加緊密,彼此行為更易于觀察,更易于產(chǎn)生頻繁的互動(dòng)關(guān)系。電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)更為頻繁的多邊互動(dòng)關(guān)系會(huì)對(duì)機(jī)會(huì)主義行為產(chǎn)生了促進(jìn)或抑制的影響。然而,既有的機(jī)會(huì)主義研究大多數(shù)僅從單邊市場(chǎng)著手,局限于買賣雙方對(duì)于機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的影響;并沒有考慮或系統(tǒng)考慮雙邊市場(chǎng)里,在包含平臺(tái)商家、平臺(tái)顧客和平臺(tái)三方的電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)中多邊互動(dòng)關(guān)系的存在對(duì)機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的影響及其路徑。本研究基于資源依賴?yán)碚?探索電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)中資源依賴、關(guān)系質(zhì)量與機(jī)會(huì)主義行為之間的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。本文選取包括淘寶、天貓?jiān)趦?nèi)的122家電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)中的平臺(tái)商家為樣本,運(yùn)用結(jié)構(gòu)方程模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。研究結(jié)果表明,平臺(tái)商家對(duì)平臺(tái)的資源依賴會(huì)影響平臺(tái)商家的關(guān)系質(zhì)量。具體而言,平臺(tái)商家對(duì)平臺(tái)資金、人才等有形資源依賴越強(qiáng),平臺(tái)商家越傾向于開展競(jìng)爭(zhēng)并抑制合作;平臺(tái)商家對(duì)平臺(tái)知識(shí)、技術(shù)等無形資源依賴越強(qiáng),平臺(tái)商家越傾向于開展合作并抑制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。其次,本文還分析平臺(tái)商家關(guān)系質(zhì)量,即競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度和合作強(qiáng)度對(duì)其機(jī)會(huì)主義行為程度的影響。展開來說,隨著平臺(tái)商家競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度的加深會(huì)進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化其機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,而平臺(tái)商家之間的合作強(qiáng)度加深會(huì)抑制其機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的產(chǎn)生。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of e-commerce in China, more than 70% of Internet users have joined the army of online shopping. E-commerce has increasingly become a new important economic growth pole. With the rapid development of e-commerce, the scale of network platform enterprises is expanding day by day, Taobao, Tmall and many other well-known e-commerce platform giants have emerged in succession. For the booming e-commerce platform, there are not only broad development opportunities but also direct practical challenges. These include the opportunistic behaviour of platform vendors. Given the wide range of potential hazards and implications of opportunistic behaviour, How to effectively control the opportunistic behavior in the trading process of the platform is an important issue in academia and industry. Scholars have done a lot of research on the traditional off-line channel opportunism behavior. This paper also discusses the governance mechanism of opportunistic behavior from the two dimensions of relationship and transaction. Different from the offline dual channel relationship, the E-commerce platform has remarkable bilateral market characteristics. This new market characteristic determines that the governance mechanism of e-commerce platform, including opportunistic behavior, is different from that of unilateral market. Platform customers are more closely connected to the platform, and their behavior is easier to observe. It is easier to generate frequent interactions. The more frequent multilateral interactions in e-commerce platforms have a catalytic or inhibitory effect on opportunistic behaviour. However, most of the existing opportunistic studies begin with unilateral markets. Limited to the influence of both buyers and sellers on opportunistic behavior; not considered or systematically considered in bilateral markets, in which platform vendors are included, Based on the theory of resource dependence, this study explores resource dependence in e-commerce platform. This paper selects 122 e-commerce platform vendors including Taobao and Tmall as samples and uses structural equation model to test the relationship quality and opportunistic behavior. The results show that: 1. The resource dependence of platform merchants will affect the relationship quality of platform merchants. In particular, the stronger the platform merchants depend on platform funds, talents and other tangible resources, the more inclined platform merchants are to carry out competition and restrain cooperation. The more dependent platform merchants are on intangible resources such as platform knowledge and technology, the more inclined platform merchants are to cooperate and restrain competition. Secondly, this paper also analyzes the quality of platform business relationship. That is, the influence of competition intensity and cooperation intensity on the degree of opportunistic behavior. And the cooperation intensity between the platform merchants will restrain its opportunism behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F274

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