本文關(guān)鍵詞： 雙邊市場 用戶基礎(chǔ) 互聯(lián)互通 平臺兼并 捆綁銷售　出處：《山西大學(xué)》2017年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著信息技術(shù)和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)的發(fā)展,現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中廣泛存在著這樣一類平臺企業(yè),它們向兩邊用戶提供產(chǎn)品或服務(wù),并促使兩邊用戶在平臺上實(shí)現(xiàn)交易,這樣的平臺稱為“雙邊平臺”,形成的市場稱為“雙邊市場”。該市場型態(tài)在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中普遍存在,如運(yùn)行搜索引擎的Google、發(fā)展網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物的淘寶網(wǎng)、開展人際交往的Facebook、運(yùn)營電子支付的支付寶以及與人們生活息息相關(guān)的移動(dòng)通信、媒體平臺等新經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè),雙邊市場已在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)系統(tǒng)中占據(jù)重要地位。通過對雙邊市場理論進(jìn)行細(xì)致的研究,可以進(jìn)一步完善與豐富產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論,并為雙邊平臺企業(yè)制定恰當(dāng)?shù)纳虡I(yè)發(fā)展策略提供理論參考。因而,具有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)指導(dǎo)價(jià)值。目前,國內(nèi)外有關(guān)雙邊市場的文獻(xiàn)對雙邊平臺的定價(jià)方式、競爭策略以及具體平臺產(chǎn)業(yè)的定價(jià)問題已經(jīng)做了相當(dāng)?shù)难芯�。在雙邊市場中,由于平臺兩邊用戶間存在交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性,某一邊的用戶數(shù)量越多,就會(huì)吸引另一邊用戶的數(shù)量增加。因而,平臺若想獲得顯著的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng),拓展用戶基礎(chǔ)是雙邊平臺需要解決的重要問題。而隨著雙邊或多邊平臺產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展,同類平臺的用戶網(wǎng)絡(luò)常會(huì)出現(xiàn)交叉、重疊,平臺之間便形成了直接爭奪用戶的競爭。雖然采取一定的價(jià)格策略,如對兩邊用戶進(jìn)行適當(dāng)?shù)膬r(jià)格補(bǔ)貼,是平衡兩邊用戶基礎(chǔ)的有效策略,但價(jià)格競爭,不僅不利于整個(gè)行業(yè)的有序發(fā)展,而且由于平臺服務(wù)層次的不斷提高,成本逐漸增加,實(shí)施低價(jià)可能會(huì)加大平臺的運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此,本文討論雙邊平臺拓展用戶基礎(chǔ)不同于價(jià)格策略的方面。由于需求方規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)的存在,產(chǎn)業(yè)間的平臺企業(yè)不再局限于價(jià)格競爭,而是采取通過擴(kuò)大平臺服務(wù)范圍的策略如互聯(lián)互通、兼并以及捆綁銷售來拓展用戶,即不僅服務(wù)本平臺的用戶而且服務(wù)競爭平臺的用戶,使得平臺擴(kuò)大了對所服務(wù)用戶的覆蓋面,可增加平臺的影響力,提升平臺的知名度,進(jìn)而能夠吸引更多的用戶加入平臺進(jìn)行交易,提高自身競爭優(yōu)勢拓展市場。那么,這些擴(kuò)大平臺服務(wù)范圍的策略必然能提高平臺的收益嗎?這將會(huì)給用戶、廠商、平臺企業(yè)乃至社會(huì)帶來什么影響?目前對這方面的相關(guān)研究較少且不夠系統(tǒng),仍需進(jìn)一步深入地探索和分析。本研究運(yùn)用博弈論、管理學(xué)及產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等相關(guān)理論工具,針對雙邊平臺采取通過擴(kuò)大平臺服務(wù)范圍來拓展用戶基礎(chǔ)的三種主要策略,即互聯(lián)互通、兼并及捆綁銷售,并以擴(kuò)大平臺服務(wù)范圍的大小為研究主線,依次對其展開深入地剖析。首先,對雙邊市場中的相關(guān)重要概念進(jìn)行了界定,細(xì)致闡述了雙邊市場與傳統(tǒng)單邊市場的差別,然后對雙邊市場的基本理論內(nèi)容進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)的梳理,分析總結(jié)了目前國內(nèi)外關(guān)于雙邊市場理論的研究現(xiàn)狀,并指出現(xiàn)有研究中存在的不足。在此基礎(chǔ)上,提出了本文所需要解決的主要問題和研究框架。其次,針對本文所要研究的主要問題,即雙邊平臺拓展用戶基礎(chǔ)所采取的三種主要策略,并以擴(kuò)大平臺服務(wù)范圍的大小為研究主線,分別對其進(jìn)行具體分析。在雙寡頭平臺競爭且技術(shù)水平存在差異的情形下,考察技術(shù)創(chuàng)新對雙邊平臺互聯(lián)互通的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),高技術(shù)平臺對兩邊用戶的定價(jià)高于低技術(shù)平臺,且獲得較高的平臺利潤。兩平臺互聯(lián),當(dāng)平臺間的技術(shù)水平存在顯著差異時(shí),兩平臺利潤較無互聯(lián)時(shí)均增加,因而平臺間有互聯(lián)互通的動(dòng)機(jī)。當(dāng)?shù)图夹g(shù)平臺進(jìn)行技術(shù)創(chuàng)新時(shí),增加了其兩邊的用戶規(guī)模和平臺利潤,而高技術(shù)平臺的用戶規(guī)模和利潤減少,逐漸減弱了平臺間互聯(lián)互通的激勵(lì)。技術(shù)水平密切相近的競爭平臺間是不太可能進(jìn)行互聯(lián)的,但可容納新進(jìn)入平臺進(jìn)入市場。接著,構(gòu)建了一個(gè)博弈模型,分析雙邊平臺分別在縱向兼并和橫向兼并下的定價(jià)機(jī)制問題,并對不同情形下所得的均衡解進(jìn)行了比較分析。結(jié)果表明,橫向兼并下互補(bǔ)品提供商對消費(fèi)者的定價(jià)最高,縱向兼并下最低。而平臺對消費(fèi)者的接入定價(jià)與網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的強(qiáng)度有關(guān)�？v向兼并下平臺利潤最高,從而兩平臺具有縱向兼并的動(dòng)機(jī)。隨后,對雙邊平臺拓展用戶基礎(chǔ)所采取的另一策略——捆綁銷售進(jìn)行研究,在用戶部分多歸屬的條件下,討論雙邊平臺采取捆綁銷售策略對平臺定價(jià)及社會(huì)福利的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),平臺采取捆綁銷售策略對買方實(shí)施隱性的價(jià)格補(bǔ)貼,可以提高平臺兩邊的用戶規(guī)模和平臺利潤,當(dāng)隱性補(bǔ)貼較小時(shí),混合捆綁較純捆綁更增加了平臺利潤,而純捆綁較混合捆綁更有利于提高整個(gè)社會(huì)福利且具有排他作用。最后,將上述一般性理論研究應(yīng)用到具體的平臺運(yùn)營實(shí)踐——電子商務(wù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物平臺,在闡述了網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物平臺發(fā)展進(jìn)程及分析其雙邊市場特征的基礎(chǔ)上,利用所研究理論對該產(chǎn)業(yè)拓展用戶基礎(chǔ)的策略進(jìn)行了分析,考察這些策略對網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物平臺企業(yè)之間的競爭會(huì)帶來怎樣的影響,驗(yàn)證之前幾章所得出的理論結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of information technology and Internet technology, widely exists in the realistic economic life there is a kind of platform for enterprises, they provide products or services to both sides, and to promote the realization of both sides of the user transactions on the platform, such a platform called "bilateral platform", the market is called the "two-sided market. The market structure exists in real life, such as the operation of search engine Google, the development of online shopping taobao.com, the development of interpersonal Facebook, the operation of electronic payment and Alipay mobile communication with the people's lives, media platforms and other new economic industry, bilateral market has played an important role in the modern economic system. Through detailed study on the theory of two-sided markets, we can further improve and enrich the theory of industrial organization, and to provide a theoretical platform for enterprise development strategy for bilateral business right Reference. So it has important theoretical significance and practical guiding value. At present, domestic and foreign literature on two-sided market pricing on bilateral platform, pricing competition strategy and platform specific industry have made considerable research. In the bilateral market, due to the existence of cross network externalities between users, more users on both sides of the platform. The number one side, the number of users will be attracted to the other side of the increase. Therefore, if you want to get the platform network effect, expand the user base is an important problem in bilateral platform need to be solved. With the development of bilateral or multilateral platform industry, similar platform network users often overlap, cross platform between forms direct competition for users. Although some pricing strategies, such as appropriate price subsidies on both sides of the user, the user base is balanced on both sides of effective strategies, but The price competition is not conducive to the orderly development of the whole industry, and constantly improve the level of the service platform, the cost increase gradually, the implementation of low-cost may increase the risk of the operation of the platform. Therefore, this paper discusses the bilateral platform to expand the user base is different from the price strategy. Due to the demand side economies of scale exist, inter industry platform of enterprise no longer limited to the price competition, but by expanding the scope of services platform adopt strategies such as interconnection, mergers and bundling to expand the user, the user is not only service platform and service platform for competition users, so that the platform to expand the service coverage of the user, can increase the influence on the platform, to enhance the visibility of the platform then, to attract more users to join the trading platform, to enhance the competitive advantage of expanding the market. Then, the extended service platform fan The strategy will necessarily enhance platform revenue? This will give users, manufacturers, what is the impact of platform of enterprise and society? At present less relevant research on this aspect and insufficient, still need further exploration and analysis. This research uses the game theory and industrial economics, management science and other related theoretical tools, take the three main strategies by expanding the scope of service platform to expand the user base for bilateral platform, namely interconnection, mergers and bundling, and to expand the scope of the size of the service platform as the main line, followed by its in-depth analysis. First, the definition of some important concepts in the bilateral market, are discussed in detail bilateral market and traditional market differences, then the content of the basic theory of the two-sided market systematically analyzed and summarized at home and abroad on the theory of two-sided market The research status, and points out the shortcomings in the study. On this basis, put forward the main problems and research framework of this article needs to solve. Secondly, aiming at the main problem of this paper is to study the three main strategies that bilateral platform to expand the user base, and to expand the scope of the size of the service platform as the main line, respectively, carry on the concrete analysis. In the duopoly competition platform and different technology level under the condition of impact, the investigation of the technology innovation of bilateral platform interoperability research found that high technology platform on both sides of users is higher than the low pricing technology platform, and obtain higher profits. Platform two platform of Internet. When there are significant differences between the level of technology platform, increased two compared with non profit platform interconnection, and platform interoperability motivation. When technology innovation low technology platform, increased The two sides of the user scale and the profit of the platform, and high technology platform user scale and profits, gradually weakened the interoperability between platforms. The technical level is closely similar to the incentive competition between platforms is unlikely to be interconnected, but can accommodate new entrants into the market platform. Then, constructs a game model. Analysis of bilateral platform pricing mechanism in vertical mergers and horizontal mergers under the problem of income and the different circumstances of the equilibrium solution are compared and analyzed. The results show that horizontal mergers under the complementary goods providers to consumer pricing is the highest, the lowest vertical merger. The platform for consumers to access pricing and network externality intensity the vertical merger under the platform. The highest profit, which has two platform vertical merger motives. Then, another strategy of bilateral platform expanding user base in the bundling Study on condition of multi homing user part, to discuss bilateral platform to take effect, bundling strategies on platform pricing and social welfare research found that the platform adopts the bundling strategy implementation of the implicit price subsidy to the buyer, on both sides of the platform can improve the user scale and the profit of the platform, when the implicit subsidy is small, the binding is mixed pure bundling increased platform profits, while the pure binding is mixed bundling is more conducive to improving the welfare of the whole society and has exclusive role. Finally, the general application of theory to the concrete platform operation practice -- e-commerce online shopping platform, based on expounding the process of the development of online shopping platform and analyze the bilateral market characteristics on the use of theory to analyze the industry to expand the user base strategy, examine these strategies on the online shopping platform for enterprises How the competition will bring about the impact of the previous chapters to verify the theoretical conclusions.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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