本文選題：社會保險基金 + 利益相關(guān)者��； 參考：《遼寧大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：過去十年是中國社會保險事業(yè)迅速發(fā)展的十年，十年間中國社會保險制度得到了進(jìn)一步地完善，社會保險基金的管理水平和運營狀況也不斷地得以提高，這些都為中國社會保險基金的進(jìn)一步管理奠定了堅實的基礎(chǔ)。然而，在中國社會保險基金管理和服務(wù)水平不斷提高的情況下，社會保險基金管理與運營中還存在三個較為突出的問題：一是用人單位拖繳、欠繳、少繳、不繳社會保險費用等違法現(xiàn)象；二是在社會保險經(jīng)辦機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部的實際操作過程中因財務(wù)風(fēng)險、道德風(fēng)險及內(nèi)部控制能力不足等原因造成的基金擠占、挪用等違法行為；三是在社會保險基金給付環(huán)節(jié)因信息不對稱等原因，冒領(lǐng)社會保險基金行為時有發(fā)生。以上三種違法行為的存在，，均使社會保險基金在管理和服務(wù)過程中因上述違法行為而導(dǎo)致受損。 本文的理論基礎(chǔ)為博弈論、委托-代理理論和成本-收益理論等，在此基礎(chǔ)上主要運用完全信息下靜態(tài)博弈和動態(tài)博弈模型，對社會保險基金管理過程中存在的上述三種違法行為進(jìn)行研究，以試圖找出影響社會保險基金管理中的經(jīng)濟(jì)性和社會性變量因素，為下一步實現(xiàn)社會保險基金的有效、有序監(jiān)督和管理提供理論依據(jù)。 本文除緒論外，主要分為五章，具體內(nèi)容安排如下：第一章介紹了相關(guān)概念及理論基礎(chǔ)。本章節(jié)著重對研究中需要使用的幾個重要概念進(jìn)行了內(nèi)涵和外延的界定，同時對博弈論、委托-代理理論、成本-收益理論等相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論進(jìn)行了論述。第二章對中國社會保險基金征繳環(huán)節(jié)的監(jiān)管進(jìn)行了分析。本章節(jié)首先明確了征繳環(huán)節(jié)的相關(guān)利益主體，并利用博弈方法構(gòu)建靜態(tài)博弈模型，著重對該環(huán)節(jié)下不同利益主體的策略及其相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)變量進(jìn)行分析。第三章對中國社會保險基金運營環(huán)節(jié)的監(jiān)管進(jìn)行了分析。本章節(jié)首先明確了運營環(huán)節(jié)的相關(guān)利益主體，利用博弈方法構(gòu)建動靜態(tài)博弈模型，著重對該環(huán)節(jié)下不同利益主體的策略及其相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)變量進(jìn)行分析。第四章則對中國社會保險基金給付環(huán)節(jié)的監(jiān)管進(jìn)行了分析。本章節(jié)在明確給付環(huán)節(jié)的相關(guān)利益主體基礎(chǔ)上，利用博弈方法構(gòu)建靜態(tài)博弈模型，并對該環(huán)節(jié)下不同利益主體的策略及其相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)變量進(jìn)行分析。第五章結(jié)論與政策建議�；谏鲜霾煌h(huán)節(jié)下博弈研究的結(jié)果得出社會保險基金在監(jiān)管實踐中應(yīng)堅持適度性、成本-收益最大化等原則，并就加強(qiáng)和完善中國社會保險基金在不同環(huán)節(jié)下的監(jiān)管提出相關(guān)建議。
[Abstract]:The past decade has witnessed the rapid development of China's social insurance industry. In the past ten years, China's social insurance system has been further improved, and the level of management and operation of the social insurance fund has been continuously improved. All these have laid a solid foundation for the further management of China's social insurance fund. However, with the continuous improvement of the management and service level of the social insurance fund in China, there are three outstanding problems in the management and operation of the social insurance fund: first, the employer delays, fails to pay, and underpays. Non-payment of social insurance fees and other illegal phenomena; second, in the actual operation process of social insurance agencies, due to financial risks, moral risks and inadequate internal control capacity and other reasons such as fund embezzlement, misappropriation and other illegal acts; Third, in the social insurance fund payment link due to asymmetric information and other reasons, social insurance funds to risk the occurrence of behavior. The existence of the above three kinds of illegal acts all cause damage to the social insurance fund in the course of management and service. The theoretical basis of this paper is game theory, principal-agent theory and cost-income theory, etc. On this basis, we mainly use static game and dynamic game model under complete information to study the above three illegal behaviors in the process of social insurance fund management. In order to find out the economic and social variables that affect the management of social insurance fund, and to provide the theoretical basis for realizing the effective, orderly supervision and management of the social insurance fund in the next step, this paper is divided into five chapters except the introduction. The content is arranged as follows: the first chapter introduces the related concepts and theoretical basis. This chapter focuses on the definition and extension of several important concepts used in the research. At the same time, it discusses some basic theories such as game theory, principal-agent theory, cost-benefit theory and so on. The second chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund collection in China. This chapter firstly defines the relevant stakeholders in the collection process, and constructs a static game model by using the game method, focusing on the analysis of the strategies of different stakeholders and their related economic variables in this link. The third chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund operation in China. In this chapter, firstly, the relevant stakeholders of the operation link are defined, and the dynamic and static game model is constructed by using the game method, and the strategies of different stakeholders and their related economic variables are analyzed. The fourth chapter analyzes the supervision of social insurance fund payment in China. On the basis of defining the relevant stakeholders of the payment link, this chapter constructs a static game model by using the game method, and analyzes the strategies of the different stakeholders and their related economic variables under this link. Chapter V conclusions and policy recommendations. Based on the results of the game study under the above different links, it is concluded that the social insurance fund should adhere to the principles of moderation, cost-benefit maximization and so on. And to strengthen and improve China's social insurance fund in different links of supervision and put forward relevant suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.61;F224.32

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 馮果;李安安;;濫用與規(guī)制:我國社保基金的監(jiān)管缺失及其補(bǔ)救[J];當(dāng)代法學(xué);2007年04期

2 巴曙松;譚迎慶;丁波;;社�；鸨O(jiān)管的現(xiàn)狀、問題與建議[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2007年05期

3 胡繼曄;;社會保險基金監(jiān)管博弈分析[J];管理世界;2010年10期

4 楊燕綏;王巍;張曼;;社會保險基金風(fēng)險管理研究[J];廣西大學(xué)學(xué)報(哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版);2010年04期

5 ;堅決遏制擠占挪用社�；鸬膭蓊^[J];四川勞動保障;2005年05期

6 鄒麗麗;;加強(qiáng)社會保險基金監(jiān)管勢在必行[J];遼寧經(jīng)濟(jì);2007年04期

7 周云平;陳通;;當(dāng)前社會保險基金監(jiān)管中的問題和對策[J];青海社會科學(xué);2007年04期

8 張新民;試論我國社會保險基金監(jiān)管制度的完善與創(chuàng)新[J];人口與經(jīng)濟(jì);2004年03期

9 李春根;朱國慶;;我國社會保障基金監(jiān)管體系:問題與重構(gòu)[J];社會保障研究;2009年06期

10 施華斌;中國社會保險基金監(jiān)管體系探析[J];武漢冶金管理干部學(xué)院學(xué)報;2004年02期

本文編號：2006959