發(fā)布時間：2018-01-29 14:45

  本文關鍵詞： 信息披露 公司價值 投資者行為　出處：《廣西大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：自保險行業(yè)誕生,便面臨著“信息不對稱”的困境。保險人和投保人之間的信息博弈決定著保險行業(yè)的生死存亡。在保險行業(yè)中,“完全信息”的重要性從不曾弱化過。盡管如此,保險行業(yè)中因信息不對稱造成的矛盾依然隨處可見。在保險產品銷售過程中,逆向選擇、道德風險問題依然存在,虛假宣傳、違規(guī)操作依然嚴重損害著保險行業(yè)的形象。因此,保險監(jiān)管部門先后多次出臺了各項法規(guī)條文,試圖加強行業(yè)內的信息披露,營造一個誠信的保險運營環(huán)境,維護保險行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展,切實體現保險行業(yè)對整個經濟社會的保障作用。 在我國,對保險行業(yè)的監(jiān)管主要由中國保監(jiān)會負責。對于部分上市保險公司,證監(jiān)會也有一定的監(jiān)管權力。因此,為了考察信息披露對我國上市保險公司的影響,本文選取中國證監(jiān)會與中國保監(jiān)會制定的保險公司信息披露法規(guī),利用事件研究法,考察兩次比較重要的保險業(yè)信息披露規(guī)則事件前后保險公司市場價值變化情況,并使用高頻分筆交易數據考察不同類型投資者行為差異。從而判斷信息披露水平的提升,對上市保險公司市場績效的影響,并試圖分析這種影響的來源及規(guī)模。本文研究發(fā)現：更透明的保險業(yè)信息披露制度可以顯著提高上市保險公司的市場績效,增加公司價值,并且該效應可維持較長時間；更透明的保險信息披露體系傾向于吸引機構投資者進入,從而得到機構投資者的“獎勵”,增加其股票在證券市場上的收益,即公司價值的提升主要來源于相對理性的機構投資者的持有偏好。 本文研究結果一方面有著清晰的政策含義,如為建設完善的保險監(jiān)管體系提供了更加穩(wěn)健的現實依據和建設方向,并結合本文結果,分別從監(jiān)管機構、保險公司、投資者和市場制度建設等角度出發(fā),制定了相應的鼓勵措施,激勵保險公司完善自身信息披露制度,提高信息披露水平,從而提高整個保險行業(yè)的信息透明度,另一方面也指出了機構投資者和個人投資者之間的行為差異,在行為研究方面做了初步研究。
[Abstract]:Since the birth of the insurance industry, it has faced the dilemma of "information asymmetry". The information game between the insurer and the policy holder determines the life or death of the insurance industry. The importance of "complete information" has never been weakened. However, contradictions caused by asymmetric information in the insurance industry are still everywhere. In the process of selling insurance products, adverse selection. Moral hazard problems still exist, false propaganda, illegal operations are still seriously damaging the image of the insurance industry. Therefore, the insurance regulatory authorities have issued a number of regulations and provisions. This paper attempts to strengthen the disclosure of information in the industry, create a good faith insurance operation environment, maintain the healthy development of the insurance industry, and effectively reflect the insurance industry to the entire economic and social protection role. In China, China Insurance Regulatory Commission is mainly responsible for the supervision of the insurance industry. For some listed insurance companies, the CSRC also has certain regulatory powers. In order to investigate the impact of information disclosure on listed insurance companies in China, this paper selects the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission to formulate the insurance company information disclosure regulations, using the incident study method. This paper examines the changes in market value of insurance companies before and after two more important insurance disclosure rules. And the use of high-frequency split transaction data to investigate the behavior of different types of investors, so as to judge the level of information disclosure, the impact on the market performance of listed insurance companies. And try to analyze the source and scale of this impact. This study found that: more transparent insurance information disclosure system can significantly improve the market performance of listed insurance companies and increase the value of the company. And the effect can be maintained for a long time. A more transparent insurance disclosure system tends to attract institutional investors, thereby receiving "incentives" from institutional investors to increase returns on their stocks in the securities market. That is to say, the promotion of corporate value mainly comes from the relative rational institutional investors' holding preference. On the one hand, the research results of this paper have clear policy implications, such as for the construction of a sound insurance regulatory system to provide a more robust practical basis and construction direction, and combined with the results of this paper, respectively from the regulatory bodies. Insurance companies, investors and market system construction and other angles, formulated the corresponding incentives to encourage insurance companies to improve their own information disclosure system, improve the level of information disclosure. On the other hand, it also points out the behavioral differences between institutional investors and individual investors, and makes a preliminary study on behavior research.
【學位授予單位】：廣西大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.3;F830.43

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本文編號：1473661