發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-12 22:26

  本文選題：高鐵 + 民航�。� 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),我國(guó)高速鐵路發(fā)展迅速,為旅客出行提供了優(yōu)質(zhì)便捷的新型交通選擇,同時(shí)也改變了既有的運(yùn)輸格局,對(duì)民航運(yùn)營(yíng)產(chǎn)生了巨大的沖擊和影響。研究高鐵與民航競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系、分析競(jìng)爭(zhēng)雙方定價(jià)策略、價(jià)格與市場(chǎng)關(guān)系,有利于正確處理兩者的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系,避免運(yùn)輸方式之間的惡性競(jìng)爭(zhēng),提高運(yùn)輸效率,為高鐵與民航的發(fā)展和運(yùn)營(yíng)提供參考意見(jiàn)。本文首先回顧了國(guó)內(nèi)外高鐵與民航競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的相關(guān)研究,分析運(yùn)輸企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)理和旅客出行選擇行為;其次,結(jié)合旅客主體特性、需求特性和運(yùn)輸方式的服務(wù)特性,從旅行時(shí)間、費(fèi)用、服務(wù)頻率和舒適便捷性等方面分析旅客出行效用,建立基于旅客效用的Logit客運(yùn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型;第三,運(yùn)用運(yùn)輸經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論對(duì)運(yùn)輸企業(yè)不同階段的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈進(jìn)行分析,綜合考慮運(yùn)輸成本、客運(yùn)收入、消費(fèi)者剩余和政府盈余等因素,分別構(gòu)建以企業(yè)收益和社會(huì)效益為目標(biāo)函數(shù)的高鐵與民航競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈模型:最后,以京滬通道為例,對(duì)高鐵與民航的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,驗(yàn)證模型的有效性。研究結(jié)果表明:隨著運(yùn)輸距離的增加,民航的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)遞增,客運(yùn)分擔(dān)率上升,高鐵優(yōu)勢(shì)遞減,客運(yùn)分擔(dān)率下降;當(dāng)以企業(yè)收益最大化為目標(biāo)達(dá)到納什均衡時(shí),高鐵票價(jià)提升,客運(yùn)收益上升,民航票價(jià)下降,客運(yùn)收益上升;當(dāng)以社會(huì)效益最大化為目標(biāo)達(dá)到納什均衡時(shí),高鐵票價(jià)下降,客運(yùn)收益和社會(huì)效益提升,民航票價(jià)下降,客運(yùn)收益下降,社會(huì)效益提升;在高鐵低票價(jià)運(yùn)營(yíng)的情況下,民航可發(fā)展商務(wù)旅客,盡量降低休閑旅客的運(yùn)輸成本,減少休閑旅客的運(yùn)營(yíng)虧損。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the rapid development of high-speed railway in China has provided a new type of transportation choice with high quality and convenience for passengers to travel. At the same time, it has also changed the existing transport pattern, which has had a huge impact and impact on the operation of civil aviation. Studying the competitive relationship between high-speed rail and civil aviation, analyzing the pricing strategy, price and market relationship between the two sides will help to correctly handle the competitive relationship between the two, avoid the vicious competition between the modes of transport, and improve the transportation efficiency. To provide reference for the development and operation of high-speed rail and civil aviation. Firstly, this paper reviews the research on competition between high-speed rail and civil aviation at home and abroad, analyzes the competition mechanism of transportation enterprises and passenger travel choice behavior, secondly, combines the characteristics of passenger main body, demand and service characteristics of transportation mode, from the travel time. The cost, service frequency and comfort convenience are analyzed to establish the Logit passenger transport competition model based on passenger utility. Third, By using the theories of transport economics and microeconomics, the paper analyzes the competitive game of transport enterprises in different stages, and considers the factors such as transportation cost, passenger revenue, consumer surplus and government surplus, etc. The competition game model of high-speed rail and civil aviation is constructed with enterprise income and social benefits as the objective function. Finally, taking the Beijing-Shanghai corridor as an example, an empirical analysis of the competition game between high-speed rail and civil aviation is carried out to verify the effectiveness of the model. The results show that: with the increase of transportation distance, the competitive advantage of civil aviation increases, the share rate of passenger transport increases, the superiority of high-speed rail decreases, and the share rate of passenger transport decreases. When the goal of maximizing social benefits is to reach Nash equilibrium, the ticket price of high-speed rail will decrease, the income of passenger transport and social benefits will increase, the price of civil aviation will decrease, and the revenue of passenger transport will decrease. In the case of high-speed railway operating at low fares, civil aviation can develop business passengers, reduce the transport costs of leisure passengers, and reduce the losses of leisure passengers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F532;F562;F224.32

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