發(fā)布時間：2018-04-01 15:16

  本文選題：城市地下工程　切入點：核心安全風險　出處：《土木工程學報》2017年09期

【摘要】：多方協(xié)同治理是實現(xiàn)城市地下工程核心安全風險管控的重要途徑,然而風險管控主要參與方基于有限理性的決策阻礙了協(xié)同治理效應的形成。為探究主要參與方在收益聯(lián)動下的合理策略選擇,本文引入演化博弈研究方法依次構(gòu)建了"發(fā)包人—承包人—保險人"的三方博弈模型,在全局視角下分析了三方不同風險管控參與策略及兩方不同知識共享策略的支付矩陣,推演出不同策略組合的漸進趨勢。研究表明:在三方博弈關系中,發(fā)包人主動管控核心安全風險、承包人積極管控核心安全風險、保險人參與管控核心安全風險是各方的演化穩(wěn)定策略�；谏鲜鲅芯拷Y(jié)論,從強化風險共管的協(xié)同治理理念、固化"三元主體"的治理結(jié)構(gòu)及優(yōu)化風險治理激勵手段三個方面提出了風險協(xié)同治理機制設計的相關建議。
[Abstract]:Multi-party cooperative governance is an important way to realize the core safety risk management of urban underground engineering. However, the decision of the main participants in risk control based on limited rationality hinders the formation of synergistic governance effect. In this paper, the evolutionary game research method is introduced to construct the three-party game model of "the contractor, contractor and insurer" in turn. From the overall perspective, the paper analyzes the payment matrix of the three parties' different risk control participation strategies and the two parties' different knowledge sharing strategies. The research shows that in the tripartite game relationship, the contractor actively controls the core security risk, the contractor actively controls the core security risk, and the contractor actively controls the core security risk. The insurer's participation in the management of the core security risks is the evolutionary stability strategy of all parties. Based on the above conclusions, the cooperative governance concept of risk management is strengthened. The governance structure of solidified "ternary subject" and the incentive means of optimizing risk management are discussed in this paper, and the relevant suggestions on the design of risk coordination governance mechanism are put forward.
【作者單位】： 天津大學;天津軌道交通集團有限公司;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金重點資助項目(71231006);國家自然科學基金(71172148) 中國太平洋財產(chǎn)保險股份有限公司天津分公司委托項目
【分類號】：F299.24

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