本文選題：高速鐵路　切入點(diǎn)：速度匹配方案　出處：《物流科技》2017年03期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：隨著鐵路改革的深入進(jìn)行,高速鐵路的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益一直是一個(gè)重大的課題。在我國目前高速鐵路普遍采取的高中混行組織模式下,在不同的速度匹配方案對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益影響方面的研究仍不夠全面。文章從運(yùn)輸市場(chǎng)客流需求入手,針對(duì)客流高峰與非高峰兩種情況構(gòu)建動(dòng)態(tài)博弈論模型,對(duì)鐵路局在何時(shí)加開何種速度等級(jí)列車能帶來更高經(jīng)濟(jì)效益進(jìn)行了研究,分析了鐵路局和旅客之間的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈行為,并應(yīng)用逆向歸納法得到了該過程的子博弈精煉納什均衡,為日后制定出更加適應(yīng)市場(chǎng)、綜合收益更高的速度匹配方案,實(shí)現(xiàn)鐵路經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的進(jìn)一步增長提供一定理論參考。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of railway reform, the economic benefit of high-speed railway has been a major issue. The research on the impact of different speed matching schemes on economic benefits is not comprehensive enough. This paper starts with the demand of passenger flow in transportation market and constructs a dynamic game theory model for the peak and non-peak passenger flows. In this paper, the author studies when and which speed stage trains will bring higher economic benefit, analyzes the dynamic game behavior between railway bureau and passengers, and obtains the subgame refined Nash equilibrium of the process by using reverse induction method. It provides a theoretical reference for developing a speed matching scheme which is more suitable to the market and higher comprehensive income and realizing the further increase of railway economic benefits.
【作者單位】： 蘭州交通大學(xué)交通運(yùn)輸學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F532.3

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

1 任建英;;用逆向歸納法求解動(dòng)態(tài)博弈問題[J];中小企業(yè)管理與科技(下旬刊);2009年05期

2 ;[J];;年期

，

本文編號(hào)：1650859