本文關(guān)鍵詞：競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境及非對(duì)稱信息對(duì)雙寡頭博弈影響的研究　出處：《江蘇大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 雙寡頭博弈 數(shù)值模擬 混沌 競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境 非對(duì)稱信息

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)態(tài)勢(shì)也愈演愈烈。優(yōu)勝劣汰的市場(chǎng)法則不僅促使了許多雙寡頭壟斷行業(yè)的形成,也誘發(fā)了一些不良的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)手段,并引發(fā)了惡劣的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境的出現(xiàn)。此外,在這個(gè)信息產(chǎn)生價(jià)值的時(shí)代,信息對(duì)商家的重要性不言而喻。為了使商家以及整個(gè)市場(chǎng)都獲得更好的發(fā)展,對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境和信息的相關(guān)研究就顯得尤為必要。論文分別通過Jury準(zhǔn)則和數(shù)值模擬進(jìn)行定性和定量分析,針對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境和非對(duì)稱信息對(duì)于雙寡頭博弈的影響性,進(jìn)行了特定研究。在此基礎(chǔ)上,還考慮了其他不同參數(shù)對(duì)博弈系統(tǒng)的作用。論文主要內(nèi)容如下:首先,建立雙寡頭價(jià)格主從博弈模型,并構(gòu)建動(dòng)態(tài)價(jià)格博弈系統(tǒng)。將市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境分為兩大類:友好型的共贏競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境和存在壓低對(duì)方利益行為的惡意競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境。通過數(shù)值模擬,運(yùn)用穩(wěn)定區(qū)域圖、相圖、混沌分岔圖以及三維立體圖更好地體現(xiàn)出這兩類競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境對(duì)動(dòng)態(tài)系統(tǒng)的影響。結(jié)果顯示,發(fā)起惡意競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的商家在經(jīng)營狀況方面往往會(huì)得不償失,對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的影響性也遠(yuǎn)小于預(yù)期。其次,目前大部分文獻(xiàn)關(guān)于信息的研究都是采用只有一方知曉信息,而對(duì)手進(jìn)行應(yīng)對(duì)的基本設(shè)定。論文考慮到一般情況下信息的獲取或泄露都是雙邊的,構(gòu)建了含有雙方所獲信息參數(shù)的雙寡頭動(dòng)態(tài)價(jià)格博弈模型。通過對(duì)系統(tǒng)穩(wěn)定性進(jìn)行理論上以及數(shù)值模擬上的分析,探究了非對(duì)稱信息給企業(yè)雙方以及市場(chǎng)帶來的影響。同時(shí),對(duì)調(diào)價(jià)速度能否影響信息泄露的危害性也進(jìn)行了研究。結(jié)果表明,信息量的掌握程度將直接影響商家的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,并且調(diào)價(jià)速度能夠控制信息的作用性。綜上,論文主要是從獨(dú)特的立意和改進(jìn)的模型構(gòu)建出發(fā),通過理論上的定性分析和數(shù)值上的定量分析,得到了不同競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境和非對(duì)稱信息獲得量對(duì)雙寡頭博弈中的商家以及整個(gè)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)影響性的相關(guān)結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:With the development of market economy, the competition situation among enterprises is becoming more and more fierce. The market law of survival of the fittest not only promotes the formation of many duopoly monopolies, but also induces some bad competition methods. In addition, in this era of information value, the importance of information to the business is self-evident. In order to make the business and the whole market get better development. It is particularly necessary to study the competitive environment and information. This paper carries out qualitative and quantitative analysis by Jury criterion and numerical simulation. According to the influence of competitive environment and asymmetric information on duopoly game, this paper makes a specific study. On this basis, we also consider the effect of other parameters on the game system. The main contents of this paper are as follows: first. Establish duopoly price principal and subordinate game model. And the dynamic price game system is constructed. The market competition environment is divided into two categories: friendly win-win competition environment and malicious competition environment with the behavior of holding down the interests of the other side. Through numerical simulation, the stable regional map is used. The phase diagram, chaotic bifurcation diagram and three-dimensional stereogram better reflect the impact of these two kinds of competitive environment on the dynamic system. The results show that the business enterprises that initiate malicious competition often gain more than they lose in the business situation. The impact on competitors is also much less than expected. Secondly, most of the literature on information research is to use only one party to know the information. The paper takes into account that the acquisition or leakage of information is bilateral in general. The dynamic price game model of duopoly with the information obtained by both parties is constructed, and the stability of the system is analyzed theoretically and numerically. This paper explores the influence of asymmetric information on both sides of the enterprise and the market. At the same time, the paper studies whether the speed of price adjustment can affect the harm of information leakage. The results show that. The amount of information will directly affect the competitiveness of the business, and the speed of price adjustment can control the role of information. In summary, the paper is mainly based on the unique ideas and improved model construction. By qualitative analysis in theory and quantitative analysis in numerical value, we get the conclusion that different competitive environment and asymmetric information have influence on the merchants in duopoly game and the market economy as a whole.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F270

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前7條

1 李恒;吳維庫;劉士杰;;惡性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)沒有勝利者[J];企業(yè)管理;2014年01期

2 郭軍華;李幫義;倪明;;雙寡頭再制造進(jìn)入決策的演化博弈分析[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐;2013年02期

3 肖人彬;張耀峰;;網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件信息傳播的演化博弈分析[J];復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)與復(fù)雜性科學(xué);2012年01期

4 肖飛;唐小宏;王玲;吳濤;;使用Jury準(zhǔn)則對(duì)時(shí)域有限差分算法進(jìn)行穩(wěn)定性分析[J];中國科技論文;2012年01期

5 徐濤;趙慧偉;呂宗磊;;多人不完備信息博弈的一種解法及改進(jìn)[J];武漢大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(工學(xué)版);2011年06期

6 王玉榮;楊震寧;李軍;;競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境和技術(shù)戰(zhàn)略對(duì)制造業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效的影響[J];科研管理;2011年07期

7 石巋然;盛昭瀚;肖條軍;;基于博弈學(xué)習(xí)理論的企業(yè)組織模式演化動(dòng)態(tài)[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐;2007年06期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 楊明明;物流服務(wù)提供商之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作研究[D];中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué);2015年

2 吳芳;不同市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下多產(chǎn)品寡頭市場(chǎng)混沌特性分析[D];天津大學(xué);2014年

3 彭靖;寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)價(jià)格博弈模型復(fù)雜性及其應(yīng)用研究[D];天津大學(xué);2010年

4 張登兵;基于信息和理性的博弈均衡實(shí)現(xiàn)途徑及其效率分析[D];南京航空航天大學(xué);2010年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 李健新;有限理性雙寡頭供電市場(chǎng)動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的復(fù)雜性分析[D];吉林大學(xué);2014年

2 王睿明;基于博弈論的民航與高鐵市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略研究[D];南京航空航天大學(xué);2013年

3 楊柳;公共政策視野下非良性博弈均衡及其破解[D];華中師范大學(xué);2012年

4 吳睿;基于博弈論的我國商業(yè)銀行間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模式轉(zhuǎn)變研究[D];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2010年

，

本文編號(hào)：1361599