發(fā)布時間：2018-05-04 02:29

  本文選題：工程監(jiān)理 + 委托代理理論�。� 參考：《華北電力大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：工程監(jiān)理制度是在上個世紀80年代,針對我國建筑行業(yè)項目建設監(jiān)督不到位、外資企業(yè)對質(zhì)量的高要求等內(nèi)外實際情況下從國際上引入的新型制度。工程監(jiān)理是我國工程建筑產(chǎn)業(yè)同國際相接軌的重要措施。工程監(jiān)理制度在中國近40年的應用,取得了豐富的成效,同時也暴露出一些弊端和問題,如工程監(jiān)理方往往不能盡職盡責,與項目經(jīng)理合謀等。盡管全國人大常委會、國務院分別在《中華人民共和國招標投標法》、《中華人民共和國招標投標法實施條例》等國家法律法規(guī)或文件中針對項目利益相關(guān)方工程合謀問題明確做出了禁止性規(guī)定,但工程監(jiān)理與項目經(jīng)理合謀來侵害發(fā)包方利益、降低工程質(zhì)量的現(xiàn)象還是頻頻發(fā)生。如何有效激勵監(jiān)理方進行監(jiān)督,降低監(jiān)管領(lǐng)域的合謀行為,遏制項目經(jīng)理不當行為的發(fā)生是當前急需解決的嚴峻問題。目前,發(fā)包方對于自身利益的保護主要通過建立相應的激勵機制與監(jiān)督機制來規(guī)范項目經(jīng)理和第三方監(jiān)督者——工程監(jiān)理的行為。盡管近些年來對項目經(jīng)理出現(xiàn)了多種報酬形式,但對于監(jiān)理方而言,我國依然采用2007年《建設工程監(jiān)理與相關(guān)服務收費標準》中的相關(guān)公式進行計算,在工程概算額既定的情況下,對于監(jiān)理方來說,其取得的是依據(jù)固定監(jiān)理費率計算得出的固定報酬。實踐證明,現(xiàn)有的激勵機制與監(jiān)督機制沒有起到良好的作用,也就是說,現(xiàn)有的激勵機制與監(jiān)督機制存在缺陷。本文針對工程監(jiān)理中存在的問題,基于委托代理理論,在考慮市場聲譽的影響下,建立工程建筑領(lǐng)域中項目經(jīng)理、監(jiān)理方、發(fā)包方之間的三方博弈模型,通過模型分析了在固定監(jiān)理費率制度下,項目經(jīng)理、監(jiān)理方、發(fā)包方的委托代理關(guān)系及混合策略均衡解,通過對各方的最優(yōu)行為選擇的分析結(jié)果,提出相應的結(jié)論和防范合謀建議,并以理論研究為依據(jù)提出合理的、具體的工程監(jiān)理激勵、監(jiān)督意見和改進措施。
[Abstract]:The project supervision system is a new type of system introduced from the international market in the 1980s, in view of the fact that the construction supervision of the construction industry in our country is not in place and the high quality requirements of the foreign-funded enterprises. Engineering supervision is an important measure for China's engineering construction industry to connect with the world. The application of the project supervision system in China in the past 40 years has achieved rich results, but also exposed some disadvantages and problems, such as the engineering supervision side is often unable to fulfill its duties and collude with the project manager and so on. Although the standing Committee of the National people's Congress, The State Council has made specific provisions in the relevant national laws and regulations, such as the Law of the people's Republic of China on bidding and bidding, and the regulations on the implementation of the Law on the implementation of the Law on bidding and bidding of the people's Republic of China, on the issue of collusion of project stakeholders. However, the phenomenon of project supervision and project manager colluding to infringe upon the interests of the contracting party and reduce the quality of the project still occurs frequently. How to effectively encourage supervision, reduce collusion in the field of supervision, and curb the occurrence of improper behavior of project managers is a serious problem that needs to be solved. At present, the proprietors protect their own interests by establishing the corresponding incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism to standardize the behavior of project manager and third party supervisor-project supervision. Although there have been many forms of compensation for project managers in recent years, for the project managers, China still uses the relevant formula of "Construction Project Supervision and related Service charge Standard" in 2007 to calculate. When the estimated amount of the project is fixed, for the engineer, the fixed remuneration is calculated on the basis of the fixed supervision rate. Practice has proved that the existing incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism do not play a good role, that is to say, the existing incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism have defects. In this paper, based on the principal-agent theory and considering the influence of market reputation, a three-party game model between project manager, supervision party and contracting party in the field of engineering construction is established in view of the problems existing in engineering supervision. This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship and mixed strategy equilibrium solution of the project manager, the supervisor and the issuer under the fixed supervision rate system, and analyzes the results of the optimal behavior selection of the parties. The paper puts forward the corresponding conclusions and preventive collusion suggestions, and puts forward reasonable and concrete project supervision incentives, supervision opinions and improvement measures based on theoretical research.
【學位授予單位】：華北電力大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.92;F224.32

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