【摘要】：我國(guó)上市公司盈余管理是一個(gè)普遍的現(xiàn)象,給市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的正常運(yùn)作帶來(lái)一定的不利影響。從制度層面上看,影響和制約上市公司實(shí)施盈余管理行為的兩大因素主要是會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則與公司治理機(jī)制。企業(yè)在會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的范圍之下具有一定的會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇權(quán),企業(yè)擁有會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇權(quán)能夠更加真實(shí)、恰當(dāng)?shù)胤从称浣?jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)成果和財(cái)務(wù)適時(shí)狀況,但這種結(jié)果的前提是企業(yè)擁有一套完善的治理機(jī)制。如果企業(yè)沒(méi)有一套完善的治理機(jī)制,控股股東和管理層就可能利用其職權(quán)中所獲得的會(huì)計(jì)信息優(yōu)勢(shì),濫用會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇權(quán),實(shí)施盈余管理,已達(dá)到謀取私人利益的目的�；诖�,學(xué)者們認(rèn)為公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)盈余管理的影響程度要大于會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的影響程度。 因而,在抑制盈余管理的問(wèn)題上,政府管理機(jī)構(gòu)試圖借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外先進(jìn)理論和經(jīng)驗(yàn)提高我國(guó)上市公司治理水平,以此發(fā)揮公司治理在抑制盈余管理方面的作用,但收效甚微。由于盈余管理帶來(lái)的資本市場(chǎng)上的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞仍接連不斷,因此需要我們另辟蹊徑,把目光集中與公司治理對(duì)盈余管理影響的同時(shí),考慮公司所處的外部市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境對(duì)盈余管理的影響。 現(xiàn)代競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論認(rèn)為,產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)作為基本的外部公司治理機(jī)制之一,它能夠通過(guò)對(duì)公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的作用從而影響盈余管理。本文在現(xiàn)有研究基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合信息不對(duì)稱理論、委托代理理論、現(xiàn)代競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論以及我國(guó)企業(yè)的現(xiàn)實(shí)背景,將產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制、盈余管理至于一個(gè)邏輯嚴(yán)密的框架內(nèi)進(jìn)行研究。論文從理論上研究了公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制對(duì)盈余管理的影響,以及產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與公司內(nèi)部治理綜合作用對(duì)盈余管理的影響。同時(shí),利用中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)上市公司2006-2008年非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù),實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了股權(quán)治理、董事會(huì)治理對(duì)上市公司盈余管理的影響,以及產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與股權(quán)治理、董事會(huì)治理的綜合作用對(duì)盈余管理的影響。 1、研究目的及意義 本文旨在對(duì)前人研究成果進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)、完整歸納總結(jié)分析的基礎(chǔ)上,以Stata軟件為統(tǒng)計(jì)分析工具,利用實(shí)證研究的方法對(duì)公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制對(duì)盈余管理的影響以及產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制綜合作用對(duì)盈余管理的影響進(jìn)行了分析,揭示了產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)公司治理的補(bǔ)充作用,豐富了該領(lǐng)域的研究,并為我國(guó)公司治理提供了理論指導(dǎo)。具體來(lái)說(shuō),本研究能夠使得投資者更好地評(píng)估上市公司的盈余狀況并發(fā)現(xiàn)盈余管理行為,有助于其調(diào)整投資策略。 2、研究方法 為了實(shí)現(xiàn)本文的研究目標(biāo),本論文采用了規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,具體而言,使用了如下幾種研究方法：(1)文獻(xiàn)研究法。本研究的文獻(xiàn)來(lái)源于西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)圖書(shū)館數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)的數(shù)字資源,如國(guó)泰安數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)和中國(guó)學(xué)術(shù)期刊全文數(shù)據(jù)、維普學(xué)術(shù)期刊數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)等中文數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。(2)比較分析法。將國(guó)內(nèi)外專家學(xué)者對(duì)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、公司內(nèi)部治理以及盈余管理方面的研究成果進(jìn)行比較分析,總結(jié)出有益的結(jié)論,為本研究提供幫助。(3)實(shí)證分析法。實(shí)證研究是本文采用的主要研究方法。其基本做法是首先根據(jù)文獻(xiàn)的研讀情況提出本文的研究假設(shè),然后構(gòu)建實(shí)證模型,并搜集、整理相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),最后根據(jù)數(shù)據(jù)分析結(jié)果對(duì)所提出的假設(shè)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證,得出結(jié)論。 3、研究思路 本文主要分為四個(gè)部分：第一部分主要是介紹了本文研究背景和意義以及盈余管理概念的鑒定。同時(shí)對(duì)盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī),公司治理對(duì)盈余管理的影響,產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與公司內(nèi)部治理對(duì)盈余管理的影響的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了回顧和評(píng)述。此部分包括正文第一章和第二章。第二部分以第一部分中產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、公司治理以及盈余管理有關(guān)方面的文獻(xiàn)為基礎(chǔ),進(jìn)一步進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的理論說(shuō)明并提出研究假設(shè),公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制本文主要研究?jī)煞矫?即股權(quán)治理和董事會(huì)治理。提出的具體假設(shè)為假設(shè)一：股權(quán)制衡度與盈余管理呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；假設(shè)二：股權(quán)集中度與盈余管理的呈U型關(guān)系；假設(shè)三：產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能夠?qū)蓹?quán)治理影響盈余管理起到補(bǔ)充性作用；假設(shè)四：董事會(huì)規(guī)模與盈余管理程度呈U形關(guān)系；假設(shè)五：獨(dú)立董事比例與盈余管理呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；假設(shè)六：董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理兩職分離能夠降低盈余管理的程度；假設(shè)七：產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能夠?qū)Χ聲?huì)治理影響盈余管理起到補(bǔ)充性作用。此部分包括正文第三章。第三部分主要是采用實(shí)證研究的方法對(duì)公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制對(duì)盈余管理的影響,以及產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的綜合作用對(duì)盈余管理的影響進(jìn)行分析,主要采用的分析方法為：描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)分析和OLS回歸分析。此部分包括正文第四章和第五章。第四部分主要是結(jié)論和啟示�？偨Y(jié)研究結(jié)論,根據(jù)啟示提出相應(yīng)的建議。此部分包括正文第六章。 4、研究結(jié)論 本文研究的實(shí)證分析結(jié)果是：股權(quán)制衡度與盈余管理的關(guān)系是正相關(guān)關(guān)系,與理論假設(shè)不符。股權(quán)集中度與盈余管理呈U形關(guān)系,董事會(huì)規(guī)模與盈余管理呈U形關(guān)系,及與假設(shè)相符。獨(dú)立董事比例與盈余管理的關(guān)系,以及董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職分離與盈余管理的關(guān)系均不具有顯著性。本文對(duì)其原因,分別作了詳細(xì)的解釋。加入產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)后,股權(quán)治理綜合指數(shù)、董事會(huì)治理綜合指數(shù)與盈余管理的相乘項(xiàng)均與盈余管理呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系�？傮w的結(jié)論是,產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)股權(quán)治理和董事會(huì)治理起到了補(bǔ)充作用,由于公司內(nèi)部治理是股權(quán)治理機(jī)制和董事會(huì)治理機(jī)制的綜合體現(xiàn),因而得出產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)公司內(nèi)部治理對(duì)盈余管理的影響起到了補(bǔ)充作用。 5、創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)及不足之處 本文主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新點(diǎn)：(1)本文首次將產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制、盈余管理納入到一個(gè)邏輯嚴(yán)密的框架進(jìn)行研究。國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與公司治理對(duì)公司績(jī)效影響的文獻(xiàn)較多,但研究二者對(duì)盈余管理的影響的文獻(xiàn)不多。本文通過(guò)對(duì)信息不對(duì)稱理論、委托代理理論、現(xiàn)代競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論的回顧分析,找到產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、公司內(nèi)部治理、盈余管理之間的連接點(diǎn),并將它們置于一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的分析框架,從而可以更系統(tǒng)、更全面地分析降低上市公司的盈余管理程度。(2)在實(shí)證研究中,本文構(gòu)建了對(duì)比的模型,對(duì)比了未加入產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)變量和加入后的不同,更好的分析了產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和公司內(nèi)部治理對(duì)盈余管理的影響。 本文也有一些不足之處：(1)由于時(shí)間和精力有限,本文沒(méi)能夠把所有公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制囊括在內(nèi),只選擇了兩個(gè)主要的方面,因此還需后續(xù)的研究者加以補(bǔ)充。(2)數(shù)據(jù)收集方面,由于資料的有限性,文中產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)變量的衡量數(shù)據(jù)沒(méi)有采用全部企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù),而是用大企業(yè)來(lái)代替,希望后續(xù)的研究能夠用全部企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證研究結(jié)果。
[Abstract]:The surplus management of listed companies in China is a common phenomenon, which has a certain adverse effect on the normal operation of the market economy. From the system level, the two main factors that affect and restrict the performance of the listed company's earnings management are the accounting standards and the corporate governance mechanism. The enterprise has a certain choice of accounting policy under the scope of the accounting standards, and the enterprise has the option of accounting policy to be more realistic and appropriate to reflect the results of its operation activities and the timely status of the finance, but the premise of this result is that the enterprise has a complete set of governance mechanism. If the enterprise does not have a complete set of governance mechanism, the controlling shareholders and the management can take advantage of the accounting information obtained in its authority, abuse the option of accounting policy and implement the surplus management, and have achieved the purpose of seeking the private benefit. Based on this, scholars believe that the impact of corporate governance mechanism on earnings management is greater than that of accounting standards. Therefore, on the issue of inhibiting the management of surplus, the government administration has tried to improve the governance level of the listed companies by using the advanced theory and experience at home and abroad, so as to play the role of corporate governance in the suppression of surplus management, but the effect is very small. micro. The financial scandal in the capital market brought by the surplus management is still continuous, so we need to find a new way to focus on the influence of the company's governance on the earnings management, and to consider the shadow of the surplus management in the external market competition environment in which the company is located In response, the modern competition theory holds that the product market competition is one of the basic external corporate governance mechanisms, and it can influence the profit by the function of the internal governance mechanism of the company On the basis of the existing research, this paper, on the basis of the existing research, combines the information asymmetry theory, the entrusted agency theory, the modern competition theory and the reality background of our country's enterprises, and brings the product market competition, the internal governance mechanism of the company and the surplus management to a logical and tight framework. The paper studies the effect of the internal governance mechanism of the company on the surplus management, and the comprehensive effect of the product market competition and the internal governance of the company on the surplus management. At the same time, using the data of the non-equilibrium panel of listed companies in China's securities market for 2006-2008, the paper has examined the effect of the equity governance, the governance of the board of directors on the earnings management of the listed companies, and the comprehensive effects of the product market competition and the equity governance and the governance of the board of directors on the surplus management. The impact of.1. The purpose and significance of this paper are to make a systematic and complete summary and analysis of the previous research results, and to use the Stata software. In order to make a statistical analysis tool, the effect of the internal governance mechanism of the company on the surplus management, the influence of the product market competition and the comprehensive role of the internal governance mechanism of the company on the surplus management is analyzed, and the market competition of the product is revealed. The complementary effect of governance, enrich the research in this field, and provide our country's corporate governance In particular, this study can make the investors better evaluate the earnings of the listed companies and find the earnings management behavior, which can help It adjusts the investment policy In order to achieve the aim of this paper, the thesis adopts the method of combining the normative research and the empirical research, in particular, the following research methods are used: Methods: (1) The literature study. The literature of this study is derived from the digital resources of the library database of the University of Finance and Economics, such as the Taian database of the State and the full-text data of the Chinese academic journal. The number of Chinese characters such as the periodical database It is useful to compare and analyze the research results of domestic and foreign experts and scholars on the market competition, internal governance and surplus management of the products. Conclusion. It is provided for this study Help. (3) Empirical study. The basic practice of this paper is to put forward the research hypothesis of this paper based on the study of the literature, then build the empirical model, and collect and sort the relevant data, and finally, according to the result of the data analysis, Assumptions to be verified 3. The study thought is mainly divided into four parts: the first part mainly introduces the study of the back The view and significance and the appraisal of the concept of surplus management. At the same time, the motive of the surplus management, the influence of corporate governance on the surplus management, the market competition of the products and the internal governance of the company to the surplus management The relevant literature of the effect is reviewed and reviewed. This part includes the first chapter and the second chapter of the text. The second part is based on the literature of the product market competition, corporate governance and earnings management in the first part. Two aspects, namely, equity governance and the governance of the board of directors. The specific assumptions put forward are the assumption that the balance of equity is negatively related to the management of earnings; The surplus management plays a complementary role; it is assumed that the scale of the board of directors is in a U-shape with the degree of earnings management; it is assumed that the proportion of the independent directors is negatively related to the management of the surplus; and that six, the chairman and the general manager are separated from each other. The ability to reduce the level of earnings management; assume seven: the product market competition can be used to the board of directors The management of the surplus management plays a role in the management of surplus The third part mainly uses the method of empirical research to analyze the effect of the internal governance mechanism of the company on the surplus management, as well as the influence of the product market competition and the comprehensive function of the internal governance mechanism of the company on the surplus management. The analytical methods to be used are: descriptive Statistics, correlation analysis and OLS regression analysis This section includes the text in Chapter 4 and Chapter 4. The fourth part is the conclusion and the inspiration. The conclusion is based on the enlightenment. A suggestion should be made. The part includes the main text, Chapter VI.4. The results of the research are as follows: the balance of the equity and the surplus The relationship between equity concentration and earnings management is in the form of U-shape, and the board of directors The scale and earnings management are U-shaped and are in line with the assumptions. The relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the management of earnings, as well as the chairman and the general manager The relationship between the two levels of separation and earnings management is not obvious In this paper, the reasons are explained in detail. After the market competition of the product, the comprehensive index of the equity governance, the comprehensive index of the board of directors and the management of the surplus The result of the general conclusion is that the market competition of the product plays a complementary role in the governance of the stock and the governance of the board of directors, as the internal governance of the company is The mechanism of equity governance and the comprehensive reflection of the governance mechanism of the board of directors, so that the market competition of the product is obtained Internal Governance to Earnings Management The main innovation points of this paper are: (1) the first time in this paper, the product market competition and the internal governance of the company The mechanism and the surplus management are integrated into a logical framework to study. The domestic and foreign scholars study the influence of market competition and corporate governance on the performance of the company. The literature is much more, but there are not many literatures to study the effect of the two on the earnings management. This paper, through the review and analysis of the information asymmetry theory, the proxy agent theory and the modern competition theory, finds the connection point between the product market competition, the company's internal governance and the surplus management. and place them in a unified analysis framework, (2) In the empirical study, this paper constructs a comparative model, and compares the different and better points that have not been added to the market competition variable and the addition of the product. The paper analyses the influence of the product market competition and the internal management of the company on the earnings management. Two main aspects are selected, so the following researchers are required to supplement. (2) In the aspect of data collection, due to the limitation of the data, the measurement data of the product market competition variable is not the data of the whole enterprise, but instead of using the large enterprise,
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F276.6;F224

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