全流通背景下我國上市公司控制權(quán)私有收益研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-06-18 15:42
【摘要】：20世紀(jì)90年代以來,控制權(quán)私有收益問題成為公司金融和公司治理的重點(diǎn)研究問題之一,其研究已經(jīng)取得豐碩成果。無論是在世界范圍還是在我國國內(nèi),控股股東為獲取控制權(quán)私人收益而侵占公司資源和中小股東利益的現(xiàn)象已經(jīng)成為資本市場的一大頑疾�？毓晒蓶|為了追逐控制權(quán)私利,很可能不會(huì)再以公司價(jià)值最大化為目標(biāo)作為決策和行動(dòng)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),這嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了中小股東的利益和公司價(jià)值,造成資本市場的融資功能喪失、資源配置效率低下的嚴(yán)重后果。因此,如何防范控股股東的利益侵占行為不僅是我國公司治理研究的焦點(diǎn)問題,也是世界上大多數(shù)國家公司治理研究的重點(diǎn)問題之一。 本文在充分借鑒國內(nèi)外控制權(quán)私有收益最新研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,以我國上市公司控制權(quán)私有收益為研究對(duì)象,結(jié)合我國逐步邁入全流通的時(shí)代背景,采用不同的度量方法對(duì)全流通背景下(限售股解禁前后)的控制權(quán)私人收益水平進(jìn)行測度和比較,并將股票價(jià)值納入控股股東的利益范疇進(jìn)行分析,考慮了限售股背景下控股股東所持股份市場增值預(yù)期與控股股東攫取私利的之間的關(guān)系。進(jìn)而研究了全流通過程中在控股股追逐控制權(quán)私利影響下的資本配置行為。通過以上的系統(tǒng)研究,本文期望對(duì)進(jìn)一步改善全流通背景下我國上市公司治理機(jī)制、減少控股股東的控制權(quán)私利、保護(hù)中小投資者利益提供理論支持和政策建議。本文主要內(nèi)容如下： 首先,在系統(tǒng)梳理相關(guān)資料的基礎(chǔ)上,本文結(jié)合我國上市公司特有的制度背景,運(yùn)用實(shí)證分析方法從所有權(quán)性質(zhì)的角度對(duì)中國上市公司控制權(quán)私人收益水平進(jìn)行了度量,并對(duì)其影響因素進(jìn)行了探討。研究結(jié)論表明：國有法人的控制權(quán)私人收益最高,私人控股的控制權(quán)私人收益次之；在國有股中,股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度、國有股比例對(duì)控制權(quán)私有收益有一定的抑制作用,國家控股公司更傾向于采取在職消費(fèi)等隱蔽方式攫取控制權(quán)私人收益；在私有股份中,股權(quán)集中度和制衡度與控制權(quán)私人收益成反比,但作用有限,這種現(xiàn)象在個(gè)人控股公司中更為普遍。 其次,在全流通過程中的限售股解禁背景下,檢驗(yàn)了限售股解禁給控股股東所帶來的市場預(yù)期收益與控制權(quán)私利之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系,并同時(shí)對(duì)控制權(quán)私利的影響因素進(jìn)行了相關(guān)分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),公司盈利水平、公司規(guī)模、股權(quán)制衡度與控制權(quán)私有收益負(fù)相關(guān),非流通股溢價(jià)倍數(shù)、公司負(fù)債率、股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓比例、股權(quán)離散度與控制權(quán)私有收益正相關(guān)；流通股規(guī)�？赡懿⒉皇怯绊懣刂茩�(quán)私人收益的主要因素。 再次,基于資本投資形成控制權(quán)收益的理論詮釋,結(jié)合我國上市公司目前特定的市場化程度、股權(quán)制度安排和漸進(jìn)式的股權(quán)分置改革情況,從固定資產(chǎn)投資和股權(quán)投資兩個(gè)方面對(duì)限售股解禁前后的控股股東利益攫取行為進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：限售股解禁后的控制權(quán)私利水平高于解禁前的私利水平；控股股東通過資本投資獲取控制權(quán)私利,而且固定資產(chǎn)投資規(guī)模與控制權(quán)私利水平正相關(guān),隨著限售股的解禁,其正相關(guān)關(guān)系有所削弱；股權(quán)投資規(guī)模與控制權(quán)私利水平正相關(guān),在限售股解禁后,由于控股股東利益的多元化,控制權(quán)私利水平對(duì)股權(quán)投資規(guī)模更為敏感。 最后,在全流通過程中的限售股減持背景下,以控制權(quán)收益理論為基礎(chǔ),構(gòu)建控股股東跨期投資的兩期利益侵占模型。研究現(xiàn)金流權(quán)比例、限售股減持比例、遠(yuǎn)期減持收益率對(duì)控制權(quán)私利的影響。結(jié)果表明：現(xiàn)金流權(quán)比例與控股股東的即期最優(yōu)侵占水平和遠(yuǎn)期最優(yōu)侵占水平負(fù)相關(guān)；限售股減持比例與控股股東的即期最優(yōu)侵占水平和遠(yuǎn)期最優(yōu)侵占水平正相關(guān)；遠(yuǎn)期減持收益率與控股股東的即期最優(yōu)侵占水平負(fù)相關(guān),但與遠(yuǎn)期最優(yōu)侵占水平無關(guān)�？毓晒蓶|在兩期侵占中的即期最優(yōu)水平低于單期侵占中的即期最優(yōu)水平；由于控股股東的限售股減持行為,使得兩期侵占中的遠(yuǎn)期最優(yōu)水平高于單期侵占中的遠(yuǎn)期最優(yōu)水平。
[Abstract]:Since the 1990s, the private income of control has become one of the key research problems of the company's financial and corporate governance, and its research has achieved fruitful results. Whether in the world or in our country, the phenomenon that the controlling shareholders encroach on the resources of the company and the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders in order to gain control of the private income of control has become a stubborn disease of the capital market. In order to pursue the self-interest of the controlling shareholders, the controlling shareholders are likely not to use the value of the company as the standard of decision-making and action, which seriously undermines the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders and the value of the company, resulting in the loss of the financing function of the capital market and the serious consequences of the low resource allocation efficiency. Therefore, how to prevent the interests of the controlling shareholders is not only the focus of our corporate governance research, but also one of the key problems in the research of the corporate governance of most countries in the world. This paper, based on the latest research results of the private income of control right at home and abroad, is based on the private income of the control right of the listed companies in our country, and combined with our country's step-by-step into the time of full circulation. In view of the view, measure and compare the level of control of the control right of the control right (before and after the release of the restricted share) of the whole circulation background by means of different measurement methods, and share the stock value in the interest category of the controlling shareholder The relationship between the value-added expectation of the controlling shareholders and the self-interest of the controlling shareholders under the background of the limited-selling unit is considered. This paper further studies the capital allocation line under the influence of the control unit's self-interest in the whole circulation process. In order to study the above system, this paper expects to further improve the governance mechanism of listed companies in China, to reduce the control of the controlling shareholders and to provide the theoretical support and policy building for the interests of the small and medium-sized investors. The main contents of this paper are as follows: Abstract: First of all, on the basis of the system combing the relevant data, this paper, combining with the specific system background of the listed company in our country, applies the positive analysis method to the private income level of the control right of the Chinese listed company from the perspective of the property of ownership. The metrics are measured and their impact factors are The results of the study show that the private gain of the control right of the state-owned legal person is the highest, and the private gain of the private control is the second. In the state-owned share, the share concentration, the balance of the equity and the proportion of the state-owned shares have a certain effect on the private income of the control right. In production, the state holding company is more inclined to take the private gain of control power in a hidden way, such as on-the-job consumption; in the private shares, the degree of equity concentration and the balance of checks and balances are inversely proportional to the private income of the control, but the effect is limited, and the phenomenon is higher in the personal holding company Second, under the background of the restriction of the limited selling unit in the whole circulation process, the relationship between the market expected income and the self-interest of the controlling shareholders is checked, and the influence factors on the self-interest of the control unit are also carried out. The study found that the company's profitability, the size of the company, the balance of the equity and the control of the private income of the control, the multiple of the non-tradable shares, the ratio of the company's debt, the proportion of the equity transfer, the divergence of the equity and the private right of control. The proceeds are positively related; the size of the tradable shares may not affect the private gains of control On the basis of the theory of capital investment forming control profit, this paper, combined with the current market-oriented degree, stock-stock system arrangement and gradual stock of listed companies in our country, In the case of non-tradable shares, the interests of the controlling shareholders before and after the release of the restricted shares from the investment of fixed assets and equity investment In order to carry out the empirical study, it is found that the self-interest level of the control right after the release of the restricted stock is higher than the self-interest level before the release; the controlling shareholder obtains the gain of the control right through the capital investment, and the investment scale of the fixed assets is positively related to the self-interest level of the control right, The relationship between control and control has been weakened; the level of equity investment is positively related to the level of self-interest of control, and after the release of the restricted shares, the interests of the controlling shareholders are diversified, and the level of self-interest is in the interest of the equity investment. It is more sensitive to the scale of capital. In the end, under the background of the reduction of the limited share in the whole circulation process, the cross-period investment of the controlling shareholders is built on the basis of the theory of control income. The ratio of cash flow rights, the proportion of limited share reduction and the yield of long-term reduction of yield are studied. The result shows that the proportion of cash flow rights is negatively related to the spot optimal occupation level and the long-term optimal occupation level of the controlling shareholders, and the reduction ratio of the restricted stock shares and the spot optimal occupation level and the long-term of the controlling shareholder The optimal appropriation level is positively correlated; the long-term reduction yield is negatively related to the spot optimal occupation level of the controlling shareholder, but it is far from that of the controlling shareholder The optimal level of the controlling shareholder in the two-stage occupation is lower than the spot optimal level in the single-period invasion, and the long-term optimal level in the two-stage occupation is higher than that of the single-stage invasion due to the reduction of the limited-selling shares of the controlling shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F271
本文編號(hào)：2501603
[Abstract]:Since the 1990s, the private income of control has become one of the key research problems of the company's financial and corporate governance, and its research has achieved fruitful results. Whether in the world or in our country, the phenomenon that the controlling shareholders encroach on the resources of the company and the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders in order to gain control of the private income of control has become a stubborn disease of the capital market. In order to pursue the self-interest of the controlling shareholders, the controlling shareholders are likely not to use the value of the company as the standard of decision-making and action, which seriously undermines the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders and the value of the company, resulting in the loss of the financing function of the capital market and the serious consequences of the low resource allocation efficiency. Therefore, how to prevent the interests of the controlling shareholders is not only the focus of our corporate governance research, but also one of the key problems in the research of the corporate governance of most countries in the world. This paper, based on the latest research results of the private income of control right at home and abroad, is based on the private income of the control right of the listed companies in our country, and combined with our country's step-by-step into the time of full circulation. In view of the view, measure and compare the level of control of the control right of the control right (before and after the release of the restricted share) of the whole circulation background by means of different measurement methods, and share the stock value in the interest category of the controlling shareholder The relationship between the value-added expectation of the controlling shareholders and the self-interest of the controlling shareholders under the background of the limited-selling unit is considered. This paper further studies the capital allocation line under the influence of the control unit's self-interest in the whole circulation process. In order to study the above system, this paper expects to further improve the governance mechanism of listed companies in China, to reduce the control of the controlling shareholders and to provide the theoretical support and policy building for the interests of the small and medium-sized investors. The main contents of this paper are as follows: Abstract: First of all, on the basis of the system combing the relevant data, this paper, combining with the specific system background of the listed company in our country, applies the positive analysis method to the private income level of the control right of the Chinese listed company from the perspective of the property of ownership. The metrics are measured and their impact factors are The results of the study show that the private gain of the control right of the state-owned legal person is the highest, and the private gain of the private control is the second. In the state-owned share, the share concentration, the balance of the equity and the proportion of the state-owned shares have a certain effect on the private income of the control right. In production, the state holding company is more inclined to take the private gain of control power in a hidden way, such as on-the-job consumption; in the private shares, the degree of equity concentration and the balance of checks and balances are inversely proportional to the private income of the control, but the effect is limited, and the phenomenon is higher in the personal holding company Second, under the background of the restriction of the limited selling unit in the whole circulation process, the relationship between the market expected income and the self-interest of the controlling shareholders is checked, and the influence factors on the self-interest of the control unit are also carried out. The study found that the company's profitability, the size of the company, the balance of the equity and the control of the private income of the control, the multiple of the non-tradable shares, the ratio of the company's debt, the proportion of the equity transfer, the divergence of the equity and the private right of control. The proceeds are positively related; the size of the tradable shares may not affect the private gains of control On the basis of the theory of capital investment forming control profit, this paper, combined with the current market-oriented degree, stock-stock system arrangement and gradual stock of listed companies in our country, In the case of non-tradable shares, the interests of the controlling shareholders before and after the release of the restricted shares from the investment of fixed assets and equity investment In order to carry out the empirical study, it is found that the self-interest level of the control right after the release of the restricted stock is higher than the self-interest level before the release; the controlling shareholder obtains the gain of the control right through the capital investment, and the investment scale of the fixed assets is positively related to the self-interest level of the control right, The relationship between control and control has been weakened; the level of equity investment is positively related to the level of self-interest of control, and after the release of the restricted shares, the interests of the controlling shareholders are diversified, and the level of self-interest is in the interest of the equity investment. It is more sensitive to the scale of capital. In the end, under the background of the reduction of the limited share in the whole circulation process, the cross-period investment of the controlling shareholders is built on the basis of the theory of control income. The ratio of cash flow rights, the proportion of limited share reduction and the yield of long-term reduction of yield are studied. The result shows that the proportion of cash flow rights is negatively related to the spot optimal occupation level and the long-term optimal occupation level of the controlling shareholders, and the reduction ratio of the restricted stock shares and the spot optimal occupation level and the long-term of the controlling shareholder The optimal appropriation level is positively correlated; the long-term reduction yield is negatively related to the spot optimal occupation level of the controlling shareholder, but it is far from that of the controlling shareholder The optimal level of the controlling shareholder in the two-stage occupation is lower than the spot optimal level in the single-period invasion, and the long-term optimal level in the two-stage occupation is higher than that of the single-stage invasion due to the reduction of the limited-selling shares of the controlling shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F271
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