【摘要】：傳統(tǒng)的“理性經(jīng)濟人”假設(shè)認為，人總是能理性地做出決策，而且理性能使決策者在系統(tǒng)地分析所獲得信息的基礎(chǔ)上，做出最優(yōu)的決策。很多心理學(xué)家對傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟學(xué)中決策者都是理性的基本假設(shè)提出了質(zhì)疑，，行為經(jīng)濟學(xué)家也將認知心理學(xué)的理論及研究模式引入到經(jīng)濟學(xué)的領(lǐng)域，他們研究結(jié)果都表明，決策者的決策行為不僅受到經(jīng)濟利益的驅(qū)動，而且容易受到主觀心理因素的影響，像本能、情緒、偏見和感覺等。這些命題都圍繞著個體認知偏差這一核心觀點展開，而到目前為止，過度自信是公司金融學(xué)中最關(guān)注的認知偏差問題。 我國上市公司的成長環(huán)境有別于西方發(fā)達國家，大多數(shù)上市公司都是由國有企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型而來。鑒于我國特殊的制度背景，本文對管理者過度自信的衡量不同于已有文獻，用的是前三名高管的薪酬和與高管人員持股總數(shù)變化這兩個指標(biāo)。由于我國國有與非國有上市公司的代理問題有所差異，代理成本的不同對管理者過度自信與企業(yè)投資行為的關(guān)系會產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響，這是一個全新的視角。本文以2008年—2010年滬深兩市掛牌交易的所有上市公司為樣本數(shù)據(jù)，運用EVIEWS6.0和EXCEL軟件進行了實證研究，得到了以下三個結(jié)論：中國上市公司的管理者過度自信與投資現(xiàn)金流的敏感性有顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，而且這種關(guān)系在國有上市公司中表現(xiàn)比較顯著；國有上市公司的代理成本要顯著高于非國有上市公司的代理成本；只有在代理成本高于樣本平均數(shù)的上市公司中，管理者過度自信引起投資過度的現(xiàn)象才明顯。
[Abstract]:The traditional assumption of "rational economic man" is that people can always make rational decisions, and rationality enables decision makers to make optimal decisions on the basis of systematic analysis of the information obtained. Many psychologists have questioned the basic hypothesis that decision-makers are rational in traditional economics, and behavioral economists have also introduced the theory and research model of cognitive psychology into the field of economics. The decision making behavior of decision makers is not only driven by economic interests, but also easily influenced by subjective psychological factors, such as instinct, emotion, prejudice and feeling. These propositions revolve around the core viewpoint of individual cognitive bias, and by far, overconfidence is the most concerned cognitive bias in corporate finance. The growth environment of Chinese listed companies is different from that of western developed countries. Most listed companies are transformed by state-owned enterprises. In view of the special institutional background of our country, the measurement of manager overconfidence in this paper is different from the existing literature, using the compensation of the top three executives and the total change of stock ownership of the top three executives. Due to the difference of agency problems between state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies, how does the difference of agency cost affect the relationship between managers' overconfidence and enterprise investment behavior? this is a new perspective. Based on the sample data of all listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010, this paper makes an empirical study by using EVIEWS6.0 and EXCEL software. The conclusions are as follows: there is a significant positive correlation between overconfidence of managers and sensitivity of cash flow of investment in Chinese listed companies, and this relationship is more significant in state-owned listed companies; The agency cost of the state-owned listed company is significantly higher than that of the non-state-owned listed company, and only in the listed company whose agency cost is higher than the sample average, the overconfidence of the manager leads to overinvestment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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