【摘要】：上市公司的構(gòu)建和治理問題一直都是理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界的熱點(diǎn)問題。很多上市公司管理層為了自身或企業(yè)的利益通過各種手段對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表進(jìn)行修飾，嚴(yán)重影響了會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量。董事會(huì)作為對(duì)公司披露的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表負(fù)有審核監(jiān)督義務(wù)的治理機(jī)構(gòu)，有責(zé)任保證投資者和利益相關(guān)者投資決策所依賴的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表信息的質(zhì)量。本文通過分析我國上市公司董事會(huì)特征對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的影響，提出了完善董事會(huì)制度以提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的對(duì)策，不僅有利于上市公司董事會(huì)健康發(fā)展，而且有助于維護(hù)投資者和利益相關(guān)者的利益。 本文先采用了規(guī)范研究的分析方法對(duì)上市公司董事會(huì)和會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的內(nèi)涵進(jìn)行了研究分析，在分析我國上市公司董事會(huì)存在的問題和會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的現(xiàn)狀的基礎(chǔ)上，本文就董事會(huì)特征對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的影響進(jìn)行了理論研究。然后，在規(guī)范研究的基礎(chǔ)上采用了實(shí)證分析的方法進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。第一步提出假設(shè)并由盈余管理模型求出因變量，，接著定義自變量和提出三個(gè)控制變量（公司規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率和凈資產(chǎn)收益率）,最后利用統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件SPSS19.0從董事會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)特征、結(jié)構(gòu)特征、行為特征和激勵(lì)特征方面對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量影響進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)論表明：董事長和總經(jīng)理兩職分離有助于提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量；獨(dú)立董事比例的提高對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量沒有影響；專門委員會(huì)的設(shè)立能加強(qiáng)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量；董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量正向相關(guān)；董事會(huì)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)和薪酬激勵(lì)在樣本公司中沒有起到提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的作用。根據(jù)結(jié)論，本文對(duì)我國上市公司如何加強(qiáng)董事會(huì)制度建設(shè)和完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)提供了相關(guān)對(duì)策和建議，對(duì)于提高我國上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量具有一定的借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:The construction and governance of listed companies has always been a hot issue in theory and practice. Many listed company managers modify the financial statements through various means for their own benefit or for the benefit of enterprises, which seriously affect the quality of accounting information. The board of directors has the responsibility to ensure the quality of the financial statement information which investors and stakeholders depend on as the governing body which has the obligation to audit and supervise the financial statements disclosed by the company. By analyzing the influence of the characteristics of the board of directors of listed companies on the quality of accounting information, this paper puts forward some countermeasures to improve the quality of accounting information by perfecting the system of board of directors, which is not only conducive to the healthy development of the board of directors of listed companies. And it helps to protect the interests of investors and stakeholders. In this paper, the connotation of the board of directors and the quality of accounting information of listed companies is studied and analyzed by using the analytical method of normative research. On the basis of analyzing the problems existing in the board of directors of listed companies in our country and the present situation of the quality of accounting information, This paper makes a theoretical study on the influence of board characteristics on the quality of accounting information. Then, on the basis of normative research, empirical analysis method is used to carry out empirical test. The first step is to make assumptions and derive dependent variables from earnings management model, then define independent variables and propose three control variables (company size, asset-liability ratio and return on net assets). Finally, the influence of accounting information quality on the quality of accounting information is tested by using the statistical software SPSS19.0 from the aspects of leadership, structure, behavior and incentive characteristics of the board of directors. The conclusion shows that the separation of chairman and general manager can improve the quality of accounting information, the proportion of independent directors has no influence on the quality of accounting information, the establishment of special committee can strengthen the quality of accounting information. The number of board meetings is positively related to the quality of accounting information, and the equity incentive and compensation incentive of the board of directors do not play a role in improving the quality of accounting information in the sample company. According to the conclusion, this paper provides the relevant countermeasures and suggestions on how to strengthen the board of directors system construction and improve the corporate governance structure of listed companies in China, and has certain reference significance for improving the quality of accounting information of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長沙理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F832.51;F224

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