【摘要】：現(xiàn)在，人類社會已經(jīng)進入知識經(jīng)濟時代。此時，公司之間的競爭歸根結(jié)底是知識的競爭，更是人才的競爭。也正是如此，國內(nèi)外的公司都極力引進優(yōu)秀人才，擴大自身智囊團，積極探索并實施針對公司高管以及高級技術(shù)人員的多種激勵措施。股權(quán)激勵制度作為其中一種激勵措施也得到了很大程度的發(fā)展。但由于我國資本市場不成熟，股權(quán)激勵機制不完善等原因，股權(quán)激勵機制在實施過程中出現(xiàn)了一些問題，其最主要的表現(xiàn)就是眾多上市公司尤其是創(chuàng)業(yè)板的上市公司高管紛紛辭職套現(xiàn)，給我國的許多公司以及市場經(jīng)濟帶來了很大的沖擊。但究其實質(zhì)，股權(quán)激勵機制真正的問題是其沒有充分考慮高管在長遠的未來能真正帶來的公司成長性。正因如此，眾多高管趁機高估公司未來成長性，抬高股價，一方面為自己創(chuàng)造出公司認可的業(yè)績，另一方面，可以通過辭職等手段實現(xiàn)套現(xiàn)目的。 本文首先分析了上市公司高管辭職套現(xiàn)這一經(jīng)濟行為，進而深入分析了這一行為出現(xiàn)的緣由：現(xiàn)行股權(quán)激勵機制存在的內(nèi)在問題——高估公司未來成長性。其次分析高估公司未來成長性的性質(zhì)極其危害，并提出了防止高估公司未來成長性的途徑和對策。為了防止公司成長性受到損害，公司必須嚴格限制出資者通過高估成長性獲得股票發(fā)行價的虛高，進而通過套現(xiàn)損害股票市場發(fā)展，而具體手段就是以承諾收益法進行出資估價、人力資本出資者退出即注銷其股權(quán)和公開募股價與特殊股權(quán)持有者保證的最低成長性掛鉤。 本文從一個新穎的角度對現(xiàn)行股權(quán)激勵機制存在的問題進行了深入的分析和研究，并提出了相應的對策，筆者認為這一研究具有非常現(xiàn)實的意義：一方面，可以解決現(xiàn)行股權(quán)激勵機制存在的問題，將管理者的利益真正與公司的長遠利益相結(jié)合，防止人才的流失，有利于公司的健康發(fā)展；另一方面，可以促進整個市場經(jīng)濟的平穩(wěn)發(fā)展，避免股票市場產(chǎn)生大的波動。
[Abstract]:Now, the human society has entered the era of knowledge economy. At this time, the competition between companies is ultimately the competition of knowledge, but also the competition of talent. It is also true that companies at home and abroad are trying their best to introduce talents, expand their own think tanks, and actively explore and implement a variety of incentives for company executives and senior technical personnel. Equity incentive system as one of the incentives has also been greatly developed. However, due to the immature capital market and imperfect equity incentive mechanism, there are some problems in the implementation of the equity incentive mechanism. Its main performance is that many listed companies, especially the gem listed company executives have resigned to cash, to our country's many companies and the market economy has brought a great impact. But in essence, the real problem of equity incentive mechanism is that it does not fully consider the company growth that executives can bring in the long-term future. For this reason, many executives take the opportunity to overestimate the future growth of the company, driving up the stock price, on the one hand, to create a recognized performance for the company, on the other hand, through resignation and other means to achieve the purpose of cash. This paper first analyzes the economic behavior of executive resignation and cash in listed companies, and then deeply analyzes the causes of this behavior: the inherent problem of the current equity incentive mechanism-overestimating the future growth of the company. Secondly, the paper analyzes the nature and harm of the future growth of overestimated companies, and puts forward the ways and countermeasures to prevent the future growth of overestimated companies. In order to prevent the growth of the company from being damaged, the company must strictly limit the investors to obtain the false high price of the stock issue by overestimating the growth, and then damage the development of the stock market by cash. But the concrete means is to use the promise income method to carry on the investment appraisal, the human capital investor withdraws namely cancels its stock right and the public offering price and the special equity holder guarantees the lowest growth. This paper makes a deep analysis and research on the problems existing in the current equity incentive mechanism from a novel angle, and puts forward the corresponding countermeasures. The author thinks that this research has very practical significance: on the one hand, It can solve the problems existing in the current equity incentive mechanism, combine the interests of managers with the long-term interests of the company, prevent the brain drain, and benefit the healthy development of the company. On the other hand, can promote the smooth development of the whole market economy, avoid the stock market produce big fluctuation.
【學位授予單位】：天津商業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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