【摘要】：美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)與歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)的相續(xù)爆發(fā),使得政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題成為世界各國(guó)關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。而處在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期的中國(guó),隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展和經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的不斷深入,地方政府的收支缺口越來(lái)越大,債務(wù)規(guī)模迅速膨脹從而導(dǎo)致我國(guó)的地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)逐漸顯現(xiàn),地方政府債務(wù)逾期時(shí)有發(fā)生,地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展過(guò)分依賴(lài)地方政府債務(wù)。在此背景下,如不對(duì)我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)進(jìn)行科學(xué)有效的防范與化解,將引發(fā)地方政府債務(wù)危機(jī)進(jìn)而引發(fā)金融危機(jī)甚至社會(huì)危機(jī)。如何科學(xué)地監(jiān)測(cè)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的形成及傳導(dǎo),根據(jù)各個(gè)層級(jí)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的形成以及傳導(dǎo)狀況,如何及時(shí)有效地、動(dòng)態(tài)地、關(guān)聯(lián)地防止地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大范圍、大規(guī)模地進(jìn)行傳導(dǎo),成為本文研究的主題。在上述背景下,本文將我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作為研究對(duì)象。 文章首先界定了我國(guó)地方政府、地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制等核心概念,在回顧已有和相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,借助我國(guó)審計(jì)署、中國(guó)人民銀行以及銀監(jiān)會(huì)的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)比分析了我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)的產(chǎn)生發(fā)展?fàn)顩r、我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的現(xiàn)狀及識(shí)別。 然后,對(duì)我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制各個(gè)構(gòu)成要素進(jìn)行了定性識(shí)別與分析,在此基礎(chǔ)上闡釋了我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制的內(nèi)在機(jī)理。 再次,借助我國(guó)審計(jì)署、中國(guó)人民銀行以及銀監(jiān)會(huì)的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)并運(yùn)用博弈的分析方法從內(nèi)部、外部?jī)蓚�(gè)方面演繹驗(yàn)證了我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)的過(guò)程。結(jié)論顯示：內(nèi)部傳導(dǎo)主要有三種情況,即我國(guó)分稅制的財(cái)政體制使得政府的財(cái)政權(quán)和事權(quán)極不匹配,導(dǎo)致了我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)自下級(jí)政府向上級(jí)政府傳導(dǎo)；在我國(guó)現(xiàn)有的行政制度下上級(jí)政府的較高的行政權(quán)力為地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)自上級(jí)政府向下級(jí)政府傳導(dǎo)提供了絕對(duì)的優(yōu)勢(shì)；同級(jí)政府之間的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)往往是通過(guò)稅負(fù)以及財(cái)政競(jìng)爭(zhēng)進(jìn)行傳導(dǎo)的；外部傳導(dǎo)主要有兩種情況即地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)通過(guò)地方政府融資平臺(tái)、企業(yè)(主要是當(dāng)?shù)氐膰?guó)有企業(yè))以及當(dāng)?shù)氐慕鹑跈C(jī)構(gòu)之間債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的累積從而在政府與市場(chǎng)之間進(jìn)行的正向以及逆向傳導(dǎo)。 最后從我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)的視角出發(fā),結(jié)合現(xiàn)實(shí)情況提出我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范和化解的對(duì)策和建議：有效控制地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)源；加強(qiáng)對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)載體的管理；圍堵地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)路徑；建立風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警系統(tǒng)加強(qiáng)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)過(guò)程的監(jiān)控。
[Abstract]:With the continuous outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the issue of government debt risk has become the focus of attention all over the world. With the development of economy and the deepening of economic system reform, the gap of local government's income and expenditure is getting bigger and bigger, and the scale of debt expands rapidly, which leads to the local government's debt risk appearing gradually. Local government debt is often overdue, local economic development too dependent on local government debt. Under this background, if we do not prevent and resolve the local government debt scientifically and effectively, it will lead to the local government debt crisis and even the financial crisis and even the social crisis. How to scientifically monitor the formation and transmission of local government debt risk, according to the formation and transmission of local government debt risk at all levels, how to prevent the local government debt risk in a large range in a timely, effective, dynamic and related manner. Conducting in large scale has become the subject of this paper. Under the above background, this article regards the local government debt risk as the research object. Firstly, the paper defines the core concepts of local government, local government debt risk, transmission mechanism and so on. On the basis of reviewing the existing and relevant literature, the article makes use of the Audit Office of our country. The data of the people's Bank of China and the Banking Regulatory Commission compare and analyze the development of the local government debt, the status quo and identification of the risk of the local government debt in China. Then, the author identifies and analyzes the elements of local government debt risk transmission mechanism qualitatively, and then explains the internal mechanism of local government debt risk transmission mechanism. Thirdly, with the help of the relevant data from the Audit Office of China, the people's Bank of China and the Banking Regulatory Commission, and using the game analysis method, this paper deduces and verifies the process of risk transmission of local government debt in China from two aspects: internal and external. The conclusion shows that there are three main cases of internal transmission: the financial system of tax distribution makes the government's financial power and power mismatch, which leads to the transmission of local government debt risk from the lower government to the higher government; Under the present administrative system of our country, the higher administrative power of the higher level government provides the absolute superiority for the local government to transmit the debt risk from the superior government to the lower government. The transmission of debt risk between government at the same level is often conducted through tax burden and financial competition. There are two main external transmission cases: local government debt risk through local government financing platform. The accumulation of debt risk between enterprises (mainly local state-owned enterprises) and local financial institutions, thus conducting both positive and negative transmission between the government and the market. Finally, from the perspective of local government debt risk transmission, combined with the actual situation, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to prevent and resolve the local government debt risk: effectively control the risk source of local government debt risk transmission; Strengthen the management of the local government debt risk transmission carrier; surround the local government debt risk transmission path; establish a risk early warning system to strengthen the risk transmission process monitoring.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F812.5

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前4條

1 郭琳,陳春光;論我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的四大成因[J];山東大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(人文社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2002年01期

2 傅道忠;略論我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及防范[J];吉林省經(jīng)濟(jì)管理干部學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2004年05期

3 魏加寧;中國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與金融危機(jī)[J];商務(wù)周刊;2004年05期

4 馮靜;石才良;;地方政府債務(wù)違約的博弈理論分析[J];中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2006年03期

，

本文編號(hào)：2231378