本文選題：深圳特區(qū)A股上市公司 + 股權(quán)激勵(lì)�。� 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)起源于20世紀(jì)70年代末的美國(guó)，在20世紀(jì)80、90年代得到了迅速發(fā)展。其產(chǎn)生的背景，主要是著眼于解決股東與經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間的利益矛盾，建立對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的長(zhǎng)效激勵(lì)機(jī)制。20世紀(jì)90年代開(kāi)始，我國(guó)開(kāi)始逐步引進(jìn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度。本文對(duì)深圳特區(qū)A股上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)行分析，從2005~2013年間實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的300多家上市公司中提取數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)比分析深圳特區(qū)的A股上市公司，發(fā)現(xiàn)完成股權(quán)分置改革并全流通的A股上市公司的股票的確存在顯著的異常收益。股權(quán)激勵(lì)是一種產(chǎn)權(quán)明晰、激勵(lì)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人為企業(yè)服務(wù)的重要途徑。經(jīng)營(yíng)者持股、國(guó)家股股東(國(guó)有資本注資持股)和流通股股東(中小股東持股)具有不同的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果，上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法是股權(quán)激勵(lì)的藍(lán)本。 本文以深圳特區(qū)A股上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制為導(dǎo)向，根據(jù)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的目的，結(jié)合深圳特區(qū)公司的特點(diǎn)，探討深圳特區(qū)A股上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)的問(wèn)題。本文論析了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的理論基礎(chǔ)及其理論依據(jù)，在對(duì)深圳特區(qū)A股上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析的過(guò)程中，發(fā)現(xiàn)了這些公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在的問(wèn)題，并針對(duì)這些問(wèn)題的成因進(jìn)行了分析。最后通過(guò)對(duì)深圳特區(qū)A股上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行理論和實(shí)證的全面研究，得出深圳特區(qū)A股上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)刺激公司績(jī)效的提高等相關(guān)結(jié)論，，并提出相關(guān)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策建議，主要包括：完善與股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)的地方性法規(guī)及配套措施，從多層次資本市場(chǎng)實(shí)現(xiàn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)提升A股上市公司估值，建立科學(xué)有效的股權(quán)激勵(lì)評(píng)估體系，健全約束平衡機(jī)制，采取靈活的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式等。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive originated in the United States in the late 1970s and developed rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s. Its background is mainly focused on solving the conflicts between shareholders and managers, establishing a long-term incentive mechanism for managers. Since the 1990s, China began to gradually introduce the equity incentive system. This paper analyzes the equity incentive of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, and compares and analyzes the A-share listed companies of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone from more than 300 listed companies that implemented stock incentive in 2005 and 2013. It is found that there is a remarkable abnormal return in A-share listed companies which have completed the split share structure reform and are in full circulation. Equity incentive is a clear property right, an important way to encourage professional managers to serve enterprises. The managerial methods of equity incentive of listed companies are the blueprint of equity incentive, such as the ownership of managers, the shareholders of state shares (state-owned capital equity) and the shareholders of circulating shares (minority shareholders holding shares). Based on the stock incentive mechanism of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, this paper discusses the problem of stock incentive of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone according to the aim of implementing equity incentive and combining the characteristics of companies in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. This paper analyzes the theoretical basis and theoretical basis of equity incentive. In the process of analyzing the status quo of equity incentive of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, it finds out the problems existing in the equity incentive of these companies. The causes of these problems are analyzed. Finally, through a comprehensive theoretical and empirical study on the equity incentive of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, the relevant conclusions are drawn, such as the implementation of equity incentive to stimulate the improvement of corporate performance. And put forward the relevant equity incentive policy recommendations, including: improve the local regulations and supporting measures related to equity incentive, from the multi-level capital market equity incentive to promote the valuation of A-share listed companies, Establish a scientific and effective equity incentive evaluation system, improve the constraint balance mechanism, and adopt flexible equity incentive methods.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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