發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-12 01:40

  本文選題：上市公司 + 關(guān)聯(lián)交易　； 參考：《河南大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：眾所周知，我國(guó)第一批上市公司的出現(xiàn)，被賦予建立和完善市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的使命，大多數(shù)是由國(guó)有企業(yè)改制上市而成。在這個(gè)制度變遷的過(guò)程中，中國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)呈現(xiàn)一種失衡狀態(tài)，主要表現(xiàn)為股權(quán)高度集中，國(guó)有股一股獨(dú)大。在這樣的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下，控股股東對(duì)上市公司有著重大影響，中小股東缺乏對(duì)控股股東的監(jiān)督和制約�？毓晒蓶|能夠通過(guò)非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易操縱利潤(rùn)，掏空上市公司。這不僅直接損害了中小股東的利益，損害了上市公司的利益，同時(shí)也扭曲了財(cái)務(wù)信息，誤導(dǎo)了投資者的判斷，從而破壞了資本市場(chǎng)秩序，削弱了市場(chǎng)在資源配置中的基礎(chǔ)性作用。 在這樣的背景下，如何有效控制我國(guó)上市公司非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易的頻繁發(fā)生，就顯得頗為必要，這個(gè)問(wèn)題也是本文研究的重點(diǎn)。本文在描述我國(guó)上市公司非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易現(xiàn)狀及特征的基礎(chǔ)上，著重分析了上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易的關(guān)系，提出了三個(gè)假設(shè)，，分別為：非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易金額與控股股東數(shù)量呈負(fù)相關(guān)；非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易發(fā)生頻率與第一大股東持股比例正相關(guān)；當(dāng)公司存在一個(gè)以上的控股股東時(shí)候，控股股東持股比例越接近，非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易發(fā)生金額越低。通過(guò)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)，確認(rèn)了假設(shè)的合理性。除此之外，本文還運(yùn)用了規(guī)范研究的方法分析了內(nèi)部控制制度與非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易之間關(guān)系。 本文在綜合運(yùn)用了規(guī)范和實(shí)證兩種方法進(jìn)行分析的基礎(chǔ)之上，針對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易的現(xiàn)象提出了建議，包括股權(quán)分置改革，完善內(nèi)部控制，合理確定關(guān)聯(lián)交易轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)以及加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管等措施。其中，通過(guò)股權(quán)分置改革和完善內(nèi)部控制是本文的重點(diǎn)，也是一個(gè)創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)，以前關(guān)于我國(guó)上市公司非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易現(xiàn)象的研究，大多數(shù)研究成果主要圍繞在如何加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管這一領(lǐng)域，本文則通過(guò)論證提出繼續(xù)深化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)改革這一建議。如果不從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)改革著手，完善上市公司內(nèi)部控制制度，僅僅依靠完善相關(guān)法律法規(guī)，加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管，很難從根本上解決我國(guó)上市公司非公平關(guān)聯(lián)交易的現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:As we all know, the emergence of the first batch of listed companies in our country has been entrusted with the mission of establishing and perfecting the market economy, most of which are formed by the reform and listing of state-owned enterprises. In the process of institutional change, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies presents a state of imbalance, which mainly shows that the ownership is highly concentrated and the state-owned shares are dominant. Under this kind of ownership structure, the controlling shareholder has great influence on the listed company, and the minority shareholder lacks the supervision and restriction to the controlling shareholder. Controlling shareholders can manipulate profits through unfair related party transactions, hollowing out listed companies. This not only directly damages the interests of minority shareholders and listed companies, but also distorts financial information and misleads the judgment of investors, thus undermining the order of the capital market. Weakened the market in the allocation of resources in the basic role. In this context, how to effectively control the frequent occurrence of unfair related party transactions of listed companies in China is quite necessary, and this issue is also the focus of this paper. On the basis of describing the current situation and characteristics of unfair related party transactions of listed companies in China, this paper focuses on the analysis of the relationship between the equity structure of listed companies and non-fair related party transactions, and puts forward three hypotheses. They are as follows: the amount of unfair related party transactions is negatively correlated with the number of controlling shareholders; the frequency of unfair related party transactions is positively related to the proportion of the largest shareholders; when the company has more than one controlling shareholder, The proportion of controlling shareholders is close, the amount of unfair related party transactions is lower. Through the empirical test, confirmed the rationality of the hypothesis. In addition, this paper also analyzes the relationship between internal control system and unfair related party transactions by the method of normative research. On the basis of synthetically applying normative and empirical methods to analyze the phenomenon of unfair related party transactions of listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some suggestions, including the reform of split share structure and the improvement of internal control. Reasonably determine the transfer pricing of related party transactions and strengthen supervision and other measures. Among them, through the reform of split share structure and the improvement of internal control is the focus of this paper, but also an innovation point, the previous research on the phenomenon of unfair related party transactions of listed companies in China, Most of the research results mainly focus on how to strengthen the supervision of this field, and this paper puts forward the suggestion of deepening the reform of ownership structure through demonstration. If we do not start from the reform of equity structure, perfect the internal control system of listed companies, only rely on the improvement of relevant laws and regulations, strengthen supervision, it is difficult to fundamentally solve the phenomenon of unfair related party transactions of listed companies in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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