發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-09 21:00

  本文選題：債權(quán)治理效應(yīng) + 公司績效　； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文

【摘要】： 在我國理論界,關(guān)于公司治理方面,研究的較多是關(guān)于股權(quán)的治理,就債權(quán)治理方面的研究有些成果,但是相對(duì)于股權(quán)治理的研究則比較單薄。為此,借鑒西方發(fā)達(dá)國家關(guān)于債權(quán)治理的理論研究成果和實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn),探討我國上市公司的債權(quán)治理功效是本文的研究目的。全文以新企業(yè)理論與融資理論為基礎(chǔ),以債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)作為研究視角,利用理論歸納與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的研究方法,對(duì)我國上市公司債權(quán)治理四大效應(yīng)即對(duì)經(jīng)理層控制權(quán)的瓜分效應(yīng)、破產(chǎn)威脅效應(yīng)、杠桿效應(yīng)及債權(quán)人直接介入公司治理效應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究,以便發(fā)現(xiàn)我國上市公司債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)是否發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的作用,為進(jìn)一步完善上市公司的債權(quán)治理提供指引。 本文理論部分首先對(duì)西方發(fā)達(dá)國家債權(quán)治理理論進(jìn)行回顧,歸納總結(jié)出西方發(fā)達(dá)國家關(guān)于債權(quán)治理理論發(fā)展的三個(gè)階段:第一階段債權(quán)融資的選擇論、第二階段企業(yè)融資的代理論與第三階段債權(quán)治理的功效論。其次,對(duì)國內(nèi)債權(quán)治理理論進(jìn)行了簡要?dú)w納,主要側(cè)重于債權(quán)治理作用與效率、債權(quán)治理弱效應(yīng)根源研究。最后進(jìn)行了債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)的理論分析。 本文重點(diǎn)部分是對(duì)我國上市公司債權(quán)治理的效應(yīng)進(jìn)行分析。首先分析了我國的上市公司債權(quán)治理現(xiàn)狀,在此基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)我國上市公司債權(quán)治理的效應(yīng)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。自變量選擇為資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、長期資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率,并進(jìn)一步將流動(dòng)負(fù)債細(xì)分,建立各組成部分對(duì)公司業(yè)績指標(biāo)—凈資產(chǎn)收益率的線型關(guān)系。選擇了規(guī)模、銷售收入增長率、管理層是否持股以及行業(yè)虛擬變量為控制變量�；貧w結(jié)果顯示,資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率和長期資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率都與凈資產(chǎn)收益率呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系;商業(yè)信用與固定負(fù)債等無成本負(fù)債與凈資產(chǎn)收益率呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,其他成分還是負(fù)相關(guān)。這些檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果都表明,目前我國上市公司債權(quán)治理是缺乏效應(yīng)的。在實(shí)證研究的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)我國債權(quán)治理無效原因進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步的分析�？偨Y(jié)為企業(yè)融資結(jié)構(gòu)不合理,上市公司融資行為異化和債權(quán)保護(hù)的缺失。文章的第五部分,針對(duì)研究的結(jié)果提出建議和對(duì)策:完善我國企業(yè)的債權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、加強(qiáng)銀行治理能力建設(shè)和健全法律制度。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處:一是在以往的債權(quán)治理研究中大多是以規(guī)范研究為主,實(shí)證研究為輔,本文首次對(duì)上市公司債權(quán)治理效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)的實(shí)證研究。二是首次以在深滬市發(fā)行A股的全部上市公司(剔除了被ST、PT的公司)為研究對(duì)象,樣本齊全,結(jié)論較有說服力。
[Abstract]:In the theoretical circle of our country, on the aspect of corporate governance, the research is mostly on the governance of equity, the research on governance of creditor's rights has some achievements, but the research on governance of equity is relatively weak. For this reason, it is the purpose of this paper to study the effect of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in our country by referring to the theoretical research and practical experience of western developed countries on the governance of creditor's rights. Based on the new enterprise theory and financing theory, the thesis takes the governance effect of creditor's rights as the research angle, and makes use of the research methods of theoretical induction and empirical test to divide the four effects of creditor's right governance of listed companies in our country, that is, the division effect on the control right of managers. The effects of bankruptcy threat, leverage and direct involvement of creditors in corporate governance are studied in order to find out whether the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies in China plays its due role, and to provide guidance for further improving the governance of creditor's rights of listed companies. In the theoretical part of this paper, the author reviews the theory of creditor's rights governance in western developed countries, and summarizes the three stages of the development of creditor's rights governance theory in western developed countries: the selection theory of creditor's rights financing in the first stage. The second stage of enterprise financing generation theory and the third stage of creditor's rights governance efficacy theory. Secondly, the theory of creditor's rights governance in China is summarized briefly, mainly focusing on the function and efficiency of creditor's rights governance, and the research on the root of weak effect of creditor's rights governance. Finally, the paper analyzes the governance effect of creditor's rights. The main part of this paper is to analyze the effect of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in China. Firstly, this paper analyzes the current situation of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in China, and then makes an empirical test on the effect of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in China. The independent variables are asset-liability ratio, current asset-liability ratio and long-term asset-liability ratio. The scale, the growth rate of sales income, the ownership of management and the virtual variables of industry are selected as control variables. The regression results show that asset-liability ratio, current asset-liability ratio and long-term asset-liability ratio are all negatively related to net asset return, and non-cost liabilities such as commercial credit and fixed liabilities are positively correlated with net asset return. Other components are still negatively correlated. These results show that the governance of creditor's rights of listed companies in China is lack of effect. On the basis of empirical research, this paper makes a further analysis on the causes of invalid governance of creditor's rights in China. The conclusion is that the financing structure of enterprises is unreasonable, the dissimilation of financing behavior of listed companies and the lack of creditor's rights protection. The fifth part of the article, according to the results of the study, put forward suggestions and countermeasures: improve the structure of the creditor's rights of enterprises in China, strengthen the construction of bank governance capacity and improve the legal system. The innovations of this paper are as follows: first, most of the previous research on creditor's rights governance is based on normative research, supplemented by empirical research, and this paper makes a systematic empirical study on the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies for the first time. The second is the first time that all the listed companies issued in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange (excluding those listed by STPT-listed companies) as the research object, the sample is complete, and the conclusion is more persuasive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F276.6;F224

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