本文選題：銀行債權(quán) + 大股東��； 參考：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)仍以集中為主，特殊的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)決定了大股東與中小股東及債權(quán)人的利益沖突是公司治理的主要問(wèn)題。近年來(lái)由于大股東利益侵占而破產(chǎn)的上市公司數(shù)量不斷上升，大股東利益侵占問(wèn)題已經(jīng)得到廣泛重視。 現(xiàn)有研究大多從公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)等方面來(lái)探討對(duì)大股東利益侵占行為的防范，專門研究銀行債權(quán)治理對(duì)大股東利益侵占的文獻(xiàn)很少。大股東的利益侵占行為不僅會(huì)掠奪中小股東的利益，還會(huì)威脅銀行的利益，因此銀行有足夠的動(dòng)力約束大股東的利益侵占行為。為了對(duì)我國(guó)銀行債權(quán)治理對(duì)大股東利益侵占約束作用有一個(gè)全面的認(rèn)識(shí)，本文在研究時(shí)結(jié)合了我國(guó)特殊的制度背景。 研究銀行債權(quán)治理對(duì)大股東利益侵占的約束作用既可以豐富已有的銀行債權(quán)治理和大股東利益侵占的理論，又可以為解決大股東利益侵占問(wèn)題及完善銀行的治理功能提供參考，有助于完善銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)的金融生態(tài)環(huán)境和上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)，因此此項(xiàng)研究具有重大的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文總結(jié)歸納了國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)大股東利益侵占及債權(quán)治理的相關(guān)理論研究，并在前人研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，研究了銀行債權(quán)治理對(duì)大股東利益侵占的約束作用。圍繞著銀行債權(quán)治理和大股東利益侵占進(jìn)行了理論分析，為后文的研究提供理論支持。以2008-2010年我國(guó)滬深兩市A股上市公司為研究樣本，，通過(guò)多元線性回歸方法分別檢驗(yàn)了銀行貸款比例、銀行貸款期限結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)大股東利益侵占的約束作用以及不同股權(quán)性質(zhì)及市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程下該約束作用的區(qū)別。得出的結(jié)論是：（1）銀行債權(quán)不能有效約束大股東的利益侵占行為，銀行貸款的增加反而會(huì)加劇大股東的利益侵占行為；（2）當(dāng)銀行貸款率低于60%時(shí)，銀行債權(quán)對(duì)大股東利益侵占行為沒(méi)有約束作用，但當(dāng)銀行貸款率高于60%時(shí)，銀行債權(quán)治理能夠起到一定的約束大股東利益侵占行為的作用；（3）長(zhǎng)短期銀行貸款均對(duì)大股東利益侵占沒(méi)有約束作用，但是短期銀行貸款對(duì)大股東利益侵占的約束作用要強(qiáng)于長(zhǎng)期銀行貸款的約束作用；（4）在市場(chǎng)化程度較低的地區(qū)和國(guó)有企業(yè)中的銀行貸款率與大股東利益侵占程度的顯著正相關(guān)程度要高于市場(chǎng)化程度較高和非國(guó)有企業(yè)中的銀行貸款率與大股東利益侵占程度的顯著正相關(guān)程度。 最后針對(duì)實(shí)證結(jié)論并結(jié)合我國(guó)上市公司的實(shí)際情況，提出了相關(guān)的政策建議，這些建議將有助于提高銀行債權(quán)治理對(duì)大股東利益侵占的約束作用。
[Abstract]:The ownership structure of listed companies in our country is still concentrated, and the special ownership structure determines the conflict of interests between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders and creditors is the main problem of corporate governance. In recent years, the number of listed companies bankrupt due to the expropriation of the interests of major shareholders has been increasing, and the problem of encroachment of the interests of large shareholders has been paid more and more attention. Most of the existing studies from the corporate governance structure, equity structure and other aspects to explore the interests of large shareholders to prevent encroachment behavior, the special study of bank creditor's rights governance on the interests of large shareholders of the few documents. The interest encroachment of large shareholders will not only plunder the interests of minority shareholders, but also threaten the interests of banks, so banks have enough incentive to restrain the interests of large shareholders. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the effect of bank creditor's rights governance on the interests of major shareholders, this paper combines the special institutional background of our country in the study. The study of the binding effect of bank creditor's right governance on the major shareholder's interest encroachment can not only enrich the existing theories of bank creditor's right governance and large shareholder's interest encroachment, but also provide a reference for solving the problem of large shareholder's interest encroachment and perfecting the bank's governance function. It is helpful to perfect the financial ecological environment of bank management and the governance structure of listed companies, so this research has great theoretical and practical significance. This paper summarizes and summarizes the relevant theoretical studies on the expropriation of the interests of major shareholders and the governance of creditor's rights at home and abroad, and on the basis of the previous research results, studies the binding effect of bank creditor's rights governance on the encroachment on the interests of large shareholders. The theoretical analysis is carried out around the governance of bank creditor's rights and the encroachment of major shareholders' interests, which provides theoretical support for the later research. Taking the A-share listed companies of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as the research samples, the paper tests the ratio of bank loans by using multiple linear regression method. The term structure of bank loans restricts the interests of major shareholders and the difference between them under the different equity nature and marketization process. The conclusion is that: 1) the bank creditor's rights can't effectively restrain the interest encroachment behavior of the major shareholders, but the increase in bank loans will aggravate the interest encroachment behavior of the major shareholders.) when the bank loan ratio is lower than 60%, The bank's creditor's rights have no binding effect on the behavior of major shareholders' interest encroachment, but when the bank loan ratio is higher than 60%, The governance of bank creditor's rights can restrain the behavior of major shareholders' interest encroachment to a certain extent. (3) both long-term and short-term bank loans have no binding effect on the encroachment of large shareholders' interests. However, the constraint of short-term bank loans on the interests of major shareholders is stronger than that of long-term bank loans. The degree of significant positive correlation is higher than that of high degree of marketization and the degree of significant positive correlation between the ratio of bank loan in non-state-owned enterprises and the degree of major shareholder's interest encroachment. Finally, according to the empirical conclusions and the actual situation of listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some relevant policy recommendations, which will help to improve the binding effect of bank creditor's rights governance on the interests of large shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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